LEADERS IN WAR

WEST POINT REMEMBERS THE 1991 GULF WAR

EDITED BY FREDERICK W. KAGAN AND MAJOR CHRIS KUBIK

LEADERS IN WAR

Leaders in War provides first-person perspectives across the spectrum of American combat operations during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. From division commanders to platoon leaders, the authors offer an insider's view of tough leadership challenges, tragic failures and triumphant victories. *Leaders in War* captures the essence of the post-Cold War US Army: how an all-volunteer army, equipped with new weapons systems and adjusting to new battle doctrine, mounted one of history's most successful military campaigns. Described here are the details of the tremendous logistical challenges, innovations in intelligence, ground combat operations from platoon to division, and a wide range of combat support operations. *Leaders in War* focuses not just on the successes, but on the failures as well, in operations ranging from violent tank battles against the vaunted Iraqi Republican Guard to train-and-fill operations thousands of miles away. *Leaders in War* illustrates how US Army leaders adapted to the psychological strains of combat, the fog of war, unforeseeable challenges, and the fury of tank warfare during the Persian Gulf War.

Frederick W. Kagan is Associate Professor of Military History at the US Military Academy at West Point, NY. He has written extensively in the fields of military history and current American military policy, including *While America Sleeps* (co-authored with Donald Kagan); *The Military History of Tsarist Russia* and *The Military History of the Soviet Union* (co-edited with Robin Higham); and *The Military Reforms of Nicholas I.*

Major Chris Kubik has spent more than two decades as a leader in the US Army. Enlisting in 1982, he served in the Republic of Panama and in the United States. After commissioning, he served as a platoon leader in the Persian Gulf War and as a company commander in Croatia and Bosnia. He is currently an Assistant Professor of English at the US Military Academy, West Point, NY.

CASS MILITARY STUDIES SERIES

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN ANCIENT ROME
Trust in the gods, but verify
Rose Mary Sheldon

CLAUSEWITZ AND AFRICAN WAR
Politics and strategy
Isabelle Duyvesteyn

STRATEGY AND POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 1954–60
Defending the Northern Tier
Michael Cohen

THE CUBAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA, 1965–1991
From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale
Tedd George

MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN THE BRITISH CIVIL WARS, 1642–1651
'The genius of this age'
Stanley Carpenter

ISRAEL'S REPRISAL POLICY, 1953–1956
The dynamics of military retaliation
Zeev Drory

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR
Enver Redzic

LEADERS IN WAR
West Point remembers the 1991 Gulf War
Frederick W. Kagan and Major Chris Kubik (eds)

BOY SOLDIER
The defence of Budapest 1944–45
Erwin Galantay

CONSCRIPTION IN NAPOLEONIC EUROPE, 1789–1815
A revolution in military affairs
Donald Stoker and Harold Blanton (eds)

THE ARMY OF KHEDIVE ISMAIL
Neo-Mamluks
John Dunn

YUGOSLAV MILITARY INDUSTRY 1918–1991
Amadeo Watkins

RAILWAYS AND THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
Harold Shukman and Felix Patrikeeff

CORPORAL HITLER'S REGIMENT 1914–1918
John Williams

BRITISH WAR PLANS, 1919–39
Steven Ross

LEADERS IN WAR

West Point remembers
the 1991 Gulf War

Edited by
Frederick W. Kagan and
Major Chris Kubik

FRANK CASS
LONDON • NEW YORK

First published 2005
by Frank Cass
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Frank Cass
270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005.

"To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge's collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk."

Frank Cass is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group

© 2005 selection and editorial matter, Frederick W. Kagan and Chris Kubik;
individual chapters, the contributors

The opinions expressed in this book are entirely those of the authors and should not in any way be construed to reflect the views of any department or agency of the United States government

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Kagan, Frederick W., 1970–
Leaders in war : West Point remembers the 1991 Gulf War /
Frederick Kagan and Christian Kubik. – 1st ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Persian Gulf War, 1991–Campaigns. 2. Persian Gulf War, 1991–Personal narratives, American. 3. United States–Armed Forces–History–20th century. I. Kubik, Christian. II. Title.

DS79.72.K34 2005 956.7044'24'092273–dc22

ISBN 0-203-32748-9 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0–415–35016–6 (Print Edition)

CONTENTS

Foreword by Dennis Showalter ix

Introduction by Frederick W. Kagan 1

PART 1
Senior combat commanders **9**

1 The Battle for Norfolk 11
BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN S. BROWN

2 Attacking the Republican Guard 25
MAJOR GENERAL ERIC T. OLSON

3 Airborne Unit operations 44
LIEUTENANT GENERAL (RETIRED) JAMES JOHNSON

PART 2
Combat support and combat service support at the theater level **53**

4 Theater logistical support 55
DR (LIEUTENANT COLONEL, RETIRED) KENT LAUDEMAN

5 Military Police support 76
COLONEL (RETIRED) RICHARD A. POMAGER

6 Strategic Military Intelligence support 83
MAJOR CHRISTINE CARBONE SANDOVAL

PART 3
Junior combat commanders **103**

7 The Battle of 73 Easting 105
COLONEL H.R. MCMASTER

8 Fratricide at Ar Rumaylah 118
MAJOR JONATHAN J. NEGIN

PART 4
Combat support and combat service support at the tactical level **137**

9 Tactical logistics support 139
MAJOR SANDRA L. VANN-OLEJASZ

10 Platoon Leader challenges 149
MAJOR CHRIS KUBIK

11 Tactical Engineer support 166
LIEUTENANT COLONEL MICHAEL HUBER

12 Training "Individual Ready Reserve" soldiers 176
MAJOR CHRIS TATARKA

Conclusion: the lessons of DESERT STORM 181
GENERAL (RETIRED) BARRY R. MCCAFFREY

Chapter introductions by Major Chris Kubik

References 194
Index 195

FOREWORD

Dennis Showalter

The Second Gulf War of 1990–91 is likely to be recorded by historians as an incomplete process that employed a steam hammer to crack a nut and produced results far less than might have been expected given the elaborate preparations involved. The three-week campaign of 2003 and its aftermath pitilessly exposed the weaknesses of Saddam Hussein's Iraq: a regime based on grandiosity and mendacity to a point where, at the end, its dictator was basing policy on systematic and successful deception by his subordinates on the subject of weapons of mass destruction.

Seen in contemporary contexts, however, the challenges posed by DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM were formidable, particularly for the US Army. Humiliated in slow motion by the Vietnam War, it had comprehensively reconstructed itself during the 1970s and 1980s. It had made the transition from a conscript to a volunteer force. It had adjusted its male ethos to admit increasing numbers of women. It had overhauled its doctrine and its training, introduced entire new families of weapons and equipment, and addressed systematically perceived moral problems from alcohol abuse to careerism.

The Army had also suffered a fundamental shock with the end of the Cold War. For forty years its essential orientation had been toward meeting a Soviet threat to Western Europe. Its primary focus had been on the Fulda Gap. Now not only was Othello's occupation gone, but the army was being brutally downsized. A 'peace dividend' embraced by Democrats and Republicans alike called in the first instance for cutting the numbers in muddy boots. Future wars, should such anomalies occur, would be conducted by high-tech operatives at one end and special operations warriors at the other.

DESERT STORM was thus the last fight for many units, their colors furled when the shooting stopped, their traditions conveyed to the keeping of administrators. For many of the Army's men and women as well, especially the junior officers, DESERT STORM occurred in an environment of quandaries. What options and opportunities remained in a downsized, marginalized institution? Go or stay? And would one have a choice as the selection boards did their work?

DESERT STORM was the 'hail and farewell' of the Cold War army. For the only time in its history it engaged under the conditions projected for its creation: large-scale, high-end conventional war against a symmetric enemy: one proposing to fight the same way. But the graduation ceremony took place under unfavorable conditions. For all the brave post-Vietnam talk of fighting separate regional wars, the one thing the US Army of 1990 did not expect was to have to pick itself up at short notice from its long-established bases in the US and western Europe and conduct a large-scale, high-end conventional campaign in a significantly underdeveloped infrastructure. Added to that was Iraq's demonstrated experience in and willingness to conduct chemical warfare, the size of its forces (the third or fourth largest army in the world by many estimates), and the problems of command and coordination created by the complex allied coalition. It was an operational situation, in short, fit to daunt great captains – and the US Army of 1990 had not yet been proven to have even a stable of good ordinary generals. The narratives in this book combine to tell the story of an accomplished mission that only appeared easy in hindsight.



Map 1 Operation DESERT SHIELD

INTRODUCTION

Frederick W. Kagan

The United States was at war with Saddam Hussein's Iraq for nearly thirteen years. Saddam's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 triggered the rapid deployment of American troops to protect Saudi Arabia and then to liberate the captured emirate. In an air campaign that lasted 43 days and a 100-hour ground war, U.S. and coalition forces freed Kuwait and destroyed the bulk of the Iraqi army in January and February 1991. For the next twelve years America and its allies continued to use air strikes and ground demonstrations to attempt to press Saddam to comply with the provisions of the U.N. resolutions that had ended combat in March 1991, but to no avail. In March and April 2003, therefore, U.S. and coalition forces once again assaulted Saddam's regime from the air, ground, and sea, and utterly destroyed both the Iraqi army and Saddam's government in three weeks.

The utter destruction of what had been the world's fourth largest army in a total of nine weeks of high intensity combat was an extraordinary achievement. It ranks with the most successful military campaigns of all time, including the Israeli victories of 1967 and 1973 and the German successes over Poland and France, and in many ways surpasses even those. Historians and defense analysts will study these campaigns for decades to come, attempting to draw all possible lessons from our success and Iraq's failure.

Like many conflicts that arise suddenly and end quickly, the outcome of the Gulf War was largely determined in the years and decades that preceded it. The U.S. armed forces had undergone a remarkable transformation in the 1970s and 1980s that laid the groundwork for our stunning victories in 1991 and 2003. Amazingly, that transformation had envisioned a completely different war from the one the armed forces actually fought. The systems that we built and the soldiers whom we trained were all designed to fight the Soviet Union in the Central Front in Europe. That they were able to serve so well in destroying Saddam's army is testimony to the balance of the transformation and the flexibility that it provided to our forces.

The transformation of the 1970s and 1980s had three major components: technology, professionalism, and training, of which the last two were closely interrelated. The importance of America's technology has been repeatedly

exaggerated in the accepted explanations for our victories. There can be little doubt, however, that the technological transformations of the 1970s and 1980s (and of the 1990s for the most recent war) played critical roles in enabling our forces to win so rapidly and decisively.

Beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s, all of the armed services developed new equipment and weapons systems that would fundamentally change the way our soldiers fought. The Air Force developed the F-15 and F-16 fighters, which entered the arsenal in 1976 and 1979 respectively. The Navy introduced the F-14 and F/A-18 aircraft in 1973 and 1983 respectively. These aircraft were all so far superior to any others that they were able to achieve complete air supremacy within the first hours of combat. They were also able to mount and use the precision-guided munitions developed in the 1980s that transformed strategic bombing, battlefield air interdiction, and close-air support missions.

The Army responded to the experience of Vietnam and the lessons it learned from the Arab–Israeli wars with the development of five new weapons systems: the M1 Abrams tank, the M3 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, the AH64 Apache attack helicopter, the UH60 Blackhawk transport helicopter, and the Patriot anti-aircraft (and now anti-ballistic missile) missile system. Although initially controversial, the M1 tank has proved its ability to achieve total dominance on the battlefield, the Apache helicopter has demonstrated its prowess as a tank-killer, the Patriot missile has become the first anti-ballistic missile system used effectively in combat, and the Bradley and Blackhawk have provided the Army with impressive mobility and fire support capabilities.

The systems of the 1970s were supplemented by further developments in the 1980s. The perfection of stealth technology led to the fielding of F-117 stealth fighters and their use in the first Gulf War, and to the B-2 bomber used with great effect throughout the 1990s and the most recent conflict. Improvements in precision-guided munitions dramatically increased the accuracy of Air Force and Navy systems, making possible the rapid destruction of enemy weapons systems and command and control nodes with minimal collateral damage. The Army also fielded the Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS), which it used to great effect in both Gulf conflicts.

All of these systems combined to give American forces a tremendous technological edge over Saddam's troops, who were using obsolete and poorly maintained Soviet equipment. The most advanced aircraft and tanks in Saddam's arsenal were hopelessly outclassed by America's weapons and our ability to integrate satellite intelligence and the Global Positioning System into our plans and their execution. Technological superiority is not enough to guarantee victory, however, let alone such a one-sided and (for us) extremely low-casualty victory. Technology is only as good as the troops that use it, and by 1990 America's troops were the best in the world thanks to the other two elements of the

transformation of the 1970s and 1980s: professionalization and the training revolution.

Operation DESERT STORM was the first major high-intensity conflict that the U.S. has ever fought using only the members of a professional armed force. All of the soldiers and officers who served were volunteers in the Active Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force, in the reserves, or in the National Guard and Air National Guard. There were no conscripts as there had been in every major conflict of the twentieth century, and no hastily inducted untrained volunteers, as there had been in numerous wars in the previous century. All of the servicemen and women who fought in the Gulf Wars were highly trained and professional volunteers.

The development of the all-volunteer armed forces was a reaction to the Vietnam War, of course, and to the resistance to the draft that that conflict had generated. The decision to adopt such a course of action had profound consequences on the future development of America's military. We could not hope to match the enormous numerical superiority of the Soviet armed forces with numbers of our own. Instead, the professional armed forces would have to hold the Red Army at bay with superior technology and skill.

The technological consequences of that fact have already been described above, but it is important to note that the extremely sophisticated technology we now put in the hands of our soldiers, seamen, and airmen requires that they themselves be sophisticated and highly trained. Conscripts could master the simple technology of the Sherman tank relatively quickly, but the same is not true of the M1. The advent of the all-volunteer professional force made possible the explosive growth of our technological capabilities that was so important for our subsequent successes.

As important as the professionalization of the armed forces, however, was the revolution in training that accompanied it. The core of that revolution was the establishment of combat training centers in all of the services in the 1960s and 1970s. The Air Force established its Air Warfare Center at Nellis Air Force Base in 1965. The Navy followed shortly thereafter with the creation of its Fighter Weapons School (Top Gun) at Miramar Naval Air Station. The Marines opened their Air Ground Combat Training Center at Twentynine Palms, California, in 1978, and the Army began its National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, in 1982. Since then, numerous other training centers have been developed in the U.S. and around the world.

The key element of these training centers is that they featured force-on-force simulated exercises. Each now has its own permanent 'Red Team' or 'Opposing Force.' Deployable units that have already completed individual and unit training (the Blue Force or BLUFOR at the National Training Center) then rotate into the base and conduct a series of exercises against the 'OPFOR.' Observer-controllers evaluate the BLUFOR's performance using sophisticated simulation technology

that tracks the movement of each piece of equipment and determines the effects of simulated weapons on those systems.

These exercises are invaluable in a number of ways. First, the sheer experience of taking, in the case of the NTC, a brigade-sized formation into the California desert and maneuvering it around helps to familiarize all of the soldiers from the lowliest private to the brigade commander with the essentials of moving large formations. Second, the need to operate against a thinking opponent who is free to develop and execute its own plans is the best possible training for real combat. Third, the execution of a series of different scenarios allows units to learn from their mistakes and grow in skill even while they are 'in the box' doing actual missions. Finally, the process of training up for an NTC (or other combat training center) rotation helps commanders focus on preparing for combat and highlight and correct any deficiencies in their units. It was entirely fortuitous that all of the services established their training centers initially in the California desert, and were therefore familiar with the sorts of terrain and climatic conditions they would encounter in the Persian Gulf.

All of these elements of transformation – technology, professionalization, and the training revolution – played critical roles in America's success in Operation DESERT STORM, and also in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The technological story is well known and has been recounted in numerous excellent publications. The story of the people of the armed forces and their importance in bringing about the victory is much less well studied. The present work aims to correct that deficiency in our understanding of the first Gulf War by providing an insight into the experiences of the officers who fought and won that conflict.

In February 2001 the United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point sponsored a Symposium in honor of the 10th Anniversary of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. USMA has been training officers for the professional Army for more than 200 years, and it seemed an appropriate venue for the celebration of the ultimate triumph of the professional force. More than a dozen current and former members of the USMA faculty and staff participated in three panels attended by hundreds of cadets and visitors.

The presenters were asked to focus on how their previous experiences in the Army prepared them for the rigors of combat in the Gulf. They were specifically asked to identify a few of the most important challenges they faced during operations and consider how they were able to overcome those challenges. The results, presented here in an edited and slightly expanded form,[1] provide extraordinary insight into the stresses and complexities of modern warfare and how the men and women of our professional armed forces are trained and prepared to cope with them.

One of the most salient lessons that will appear from the chapters that follow is the importance of realistic training in helping officers and soldiers to overcome indecision and fear. Fear, not only for oneself, but especially for one's subordinates, can be paralyzing in combat. The sensory experiences of modern

combat can be simply overwhelming. The battlefield, seen through a tiny viewing prism or through night-vision or infra-red equipment, is complex and rapidly changing. Commanders frequently have to monitor three or more radio nets as well as commanding their own vehicles and small units. They must be aware of what the units immediately around them are doing both so as to coordinate their activities and in order to avoid fratricide. They must also know to the maximum possible extent where the enemy is and what he is doing. When the fear caused by incoming rounds is added to the equation, the result can be psychologically devastating.

The intense and extensive training our officers receive both during normal training cycles in their units and at the combat training centers is essential to overcoming this confusion and fear. In some cases, soldiers reported that they found combat to be less difficult than training had been; others noted that they had fought in combat exactly as if it had been a training exercise. When soldiers and officers are well-trained, they can fall back on the sights, sounds, and experiences of that training to offset the incipient panic caused by the confusion and terror of the battlefield. The battle drills used to respond to specific situations come automatically and everyone becomes more comfortable with what is going on. The high level of training was critical to our rapid and decisive success.

The confusion and even fear of war is by no means confined to combat leaders, however. Supplying and equipping our forces before, during, and after the fight required the movement of megatons of material. An M1 tank burns a full tank of fuel every eight hours whether it is moving or not. The hundreds of M1s that roared across the Iraqi desert required millions of gallons of fuel to keep moving. The task of supplying them with that fuel, with the ammunition they needed, with food and water for their soldiers, fell on the shoulders of experienced, trained, and professional service support troops. They had also been trained in the art of supplying the movement of large mechanized forces through repeated exercises and drills. They also found that their well-developed techniques and habits stood them in good stead when faced with an apparently overwhelming task. Their professionalism and experience helped them to overcome the stresses of their duties, and also the fears resulting from Iraqi SCUD missile and other attacks.

The chapters that follow are broken, therefore, into four major categories. In the first, we examine the experiences of senior ground forces commanders including one division and two battalion commanders. The second part contains the stories of senior combat support and combat service support officers, including the commander of the VII Corps Military Police Brigade, a host nation support coordinator, and a member of the theater intelligence staff. The third part tells the stories of two junior combat commanders, a cavalry troop commander, and a scout platoon leader. The last part contains chapters from junior combat support and combat service support leaders including quartermaster and engineer officers. The conclusion is written by General (Retired) Barry R. McCaffrey, who

was the commander of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized – now the 3rd Infantry Division).

The volume thus offers perspectives from many of the specialties required to put an army in the field and keep it going, in addition to those needed to fight and defeat the enemy. It also provides an insight into what the war was like for people on different parts of the battlefield or, in some cases, how different the war was even for units that were relatively close together. It is a survey, not a comprehensive study. But many of the lessons of that war fought more than twelve years ago remain relevant.

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was different from and yet remarkably similar to Operation DESERT STORM. This war, like the first, was decided by a large-scale mechanized maneuver, although by a much smaller ground force against a much weaker enemy. The air campaign was conducted simultaneously with the ground offensive, as opposed to the 39-day air war that preceded the first ground war in the Gulf. New weapons systems were used, and our intelligence capabilities were much greater than they had been before.

Yet the war did not end until American tanks drove through the streets of Baghdad, having destroyed Republican Guard armored units maneuvering to defeat them, just as they had 1991. The fears and tensions of the battlefield were just as great. Those fears were even greater among the combat service support elements in this war because of the guerrilla attacks launched by the Saddam Fedayeen. Although the supply services had to move fewer supplies, they had to move them much more rapidly and with much less time to prepare. The human tasks of war remain daunting and frightening.

But the professionalism of our soldiers and the high degree of their training paid off once again. Our troops who had gone through our training centers did not panic when they met the enemy, but destroyed him calmly. As in the first war, the professionalism of our soldiers was so great that they did not fire on civilians or on surrendering enemy soldiers even when the Iraqis repeatedly abused the conventions of surrender. Once again when the fighting stopped American soldiers immediately began to render first aid to their defeated and injured foes. This war, like the first, highlighted the great degree to which humanity and professionalism are intermingled.

Above all, it highlighted the commonality of all successful ground combat: soldiers overcoming their fears and confusion best through training and experience. That is an eternal lesson of military history, and one that should not be lost as we continue to move along the path of transforming the armed forces.

This introduction would not be complete if it did not express the boundless gratitude of its author and the American people for the men and women who risk their lives to defend freedom and their country. This volume, together with the triumph it celebrates, belongs to them all.

Note

1 Not all of those who presented at the conference prepared chapters for this volume, while two of the current authors, Colonel H. R. McMaster and General (Retired) Barry McCaffrey, were not present at the conference, although both have served on the USMA faculty.

Part 1

SENIOR COMBAT COMMANDERS

1

THE BATTLE FOR NORFOLK

Brigadier General John S. Brown

The 2nd Armored Division (Forward) brigade, based in Garlstadt, Germany, deployed to Southwest Asia to become the 1st Infantry Division's 3rd Brigade. This unit provided much-needed additional tank capability to the growing United States VII Corps. That corps consisted of the 1st Infantry Division, along with the 1st and 3rd Armored Divisions, the British 1st Armoured Division, the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the 1st Cavalry Division, and was one of the most powerful corps in military history.[1] *Its commander was General Fred Franks, who had left one of his feet in Vietnam more than two decades before.*

The 1st Infantry Division's mission within the VII Corps was unique. While the armored divisions to the west would rumble around most of the Iraqi fortifications along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border, the 1st Infantry Division was to punch straight through, clearing safe lanes through the belts of obstacles for the British 1st Armoured Division. The Big Red One (as the 1st Infantry Division is known) would then dash nearly straight north to meet up with the 1st and 3rd Armored Divisions, which were rolling in a wide curve inward from the west. There, in the wastelands of northwest Kuwait, the 1st Infantry Division joined in fierce battles against the vaunted Republican Guard.

The author commanded one of three battalion-sized task forces within the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division. This Brigade was the 2nd Armored Division (Forward) brigade from Germany. General Brown's tankers faced several tough missions: breaching, fighting, passage of lines, long range advancements through enemy sectors, and multiple, shared objectives. These challenges demanded near perfection at all levels. Sometimes, as the author points out, this was an unattainable goal, despite the superior training and technology of the US forces. But in the end, the 1st Infantry Division accomplished its mission and more.

Through snapshots of action and insight, General Brown offers an analysis of key character traits and the relevance of those traits to modern combat operations. The true value of traits such as discipline, attention to detail, and truthfulness gives American military leadership the vital edge. In the end, the author shows, character matters, and not only at the individual level. General Brown's experience also shows that when these traits become part of a unit's character, they become tremendous combat multipliers. Leaders of character

build units of character. And as we see in this account of small unit warfare in the Gulf War, units of character win battles.

At 2338 hours, on 26 February 1991, the brigade-sized 2nd Armored Division (Forward), attached to the 1st Mechanized Infantry 'Big Red One,' pulled on line after a forward passage through the VII Corp's 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment. The cavalrymen, arrayed along the 70 easting west of Kuwait, passed intelligence that the battlefield was clear for 3 kilometers forward. They were precisely correct. At the 73 easting, the brigade's leading M1A1 tanks rolled into a fierce exchange with dug-in Iraqi tanks and infantry. The bloodiest single engagement of the Gulf War, the battle for a map overlay goose-egg code-named 'Norfolk,' was on.

The patch of trackless desert being contested may have had a name other than Norfolk; if it did, the Americans fighting for it didn't know it. The 2nd Armored Division (Forward)'s attack was but a small fraction of the gigantic tank battle in which VII Corps crushed Iraq's elite Republican Guard. Norfolk itself was an objective split north from south and shared with the 1st Brigade of the 1st Mechanized Infantry Division, and the sprawling all-night battle through its 200 featureless square kilometers was representative of the worst of the Gulf War fighting. Unlike the elegant precision that television coverage suggested was characteristic of the campaign, this particular ground fighting was nasty, brutal, and confusing. Technology counted for much, but not for all, in its ultimate results.

One definition of discipline is an ability to induce men – and women – to do that which they would not themselves choose to do. Another is to drill sufficient to ensure the reliable execution of rehearsed actions despite personal risk to those who must carry them out. Both definitions applied to American combat behavior on Norfolk. Few soldiers in the vehicles beetling across the horribly exposed desert tabletop amid the surreal confusion of incoming and outgoing rounds would not have preferred to be elsewhere at the time. They nevertheless performed their duties capably, each soldier a small but important player in a huge military system of systems that performed as designed. Consider the nature of the fighting to appreciate the role of discipline in its successful conclusion.

Iraqi defenses on Objective Norfolk were oriented southwest in three belts facing an anticipated attack up the Wadi al Batin; vehicle revetments oriented 225° magnetic. Forty-one days of aerial bombardment had littered the battlefield with wrecked equipment. Nevertheless, 60-plus surviving tanks and several dozen personnel carriers – for the most part from the 37th Brigade of the Iraqi 12th Armored Division – were hidden in the 2nd Armored Division (Forward)'s sector among more than 200 destroyed vehicles and pieces of other types, mostly trucks and artillery.[2] The Americans attacked at night due east out of the desert. The attacking brigade rolled in a tightly organized mass with task forces three abreast and a total of eight companies in the first wave: frontages of 1,500 meters

per company, 100 meters per tank. Within companies, vehicles were actually 50 meters apart, with several times that distance separating companies and over a kilometer between task forces. M3 Bradley scouts worked the intervals between the task forces.

The first exchanges were easy American wins. The Iraqis had no thermal sights, could not see through the darkness, and were facing the wrong way. Some Iraqi tanks could not adequately traverse because of spoil - turned-up earth – flanking their revetments; others presented perfect flank shots when attempting to shift to better positions. The leading M1A1 tanks pushed through this first belt, and the fight became more difficult. Now burning vehicles were behind the Americans, and Iraqis in the second and third belts had illumination with which to see to fire. Task force commanders had already pulled their scouts back behind the M1A1s, realizing that the thinly armored Bradleys would not survive the fire from successive Iraqi positions. The withdrawal of the scouts was anticipated and is in accordance with doctrine. Once they pulled back, however, the leading tanks became the sole source of battlefield intelligence. They had little choice but to bull forward through the obstacles they encountered with little warning, all the while reporting en route. Enterprising M1A1 gunners had discovered that thermal sights would detect the temperature differential of mines under shallow sand. Gunners talked drivers through gaps in the minefields; other vehicles followed precisely in the tracks left by the tanks. The terrain featured more relief than the map suggested, and tank ditches complemented natural obstacles. These were invisible in the darkness. Eleven M1A1s, including a battalion commander's, fell into tank ditches or through the roofs of Iraqi bunkers. Most crews self-recovered, but a few had to be rescued by intrepid M88A1 Medium Recovery Vehicles. The M88A1 crews had to rush forward to find the stricken vehicle in the confusion and darkness, and had to conduct a major portion of their work dismounted amid the threat of mines and incoming fire.

The most dangerous aspect of the obstacles and recovery efforts associated with them was the proximity of Iraqi infantry. Bunker complexes, well supplied with ammunition, laced together in rabbit-warrens of mutually supporting positions. Fortunately for the Americans, the fighting positions were designed in such a manner that Iraqi riflemen and Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) gunners had to expose their heads and shoulders for aimed fire. Readily distinguished as thermal hot spots against cold desert sand, these provided all the target well-drilled M1A1 gunners needed. Sheets of M240 machine-gun fire swept through every position where an Iraqi raised his head.

As the lead tanks struggled through the obstacles toward the second belt of defenses, a desperate fight erupted in their rear. Five T-55 tanks and some associated Iraqi infantry with ATGMs, inadvertently missed in the darkness by the M1A1s, rose behind them and opened fire on a trailing M2 Bradley company. We will examine this engagement in some detail later. The fierce exchange destroyed the Iraqis, but left four Americans dead, eighteen wounded, and three

M2s disabled. Meanwhile, the leading tanks swept on through the second belt of Iraqi defenses. Here they encountered fewer obstacles, poorly dug positions, and less infantry. The Iraqi gunners missed most of the time and hit without penetrating the rest of the time. The Americans never missed and always penetrated. In little more time than it would have taken to simply drive through without fighting, the M1A1s were on their way to the third belt.

In the third belt the American tankers found themselves in the midst of an entrenched Iraqi infantry battalion. Obstacles were patchy and vehicles few, but resistance determined. The M1A1s paused to avoid allowing ATGM teams to their rear again. With desperate courage, Iraqi ATGM gunners crawled on their bellies past temporarily stationary American tanks, hoping to come up behind them for a grill door shot. With equal determination, American gunners in the second echelon machine-gunned Iraqis crawling through intervals in the first. Task force commanders recognized the extreme risk of remaining in melee with Iraqi infantry at such close quarters. To have dismounted American infantry at this point would have hopelessly intermingled friend and foe. The brigade commander authorized a 500 meter withdrawal and a temporary pause, intending a deliberate artillery preparation before continuing.

Artillery preparation proved unnecessary. As dawn broke on the desert horizon, something broke in the Iraqi will to resist. Perhaps daylight gave them their first full appreciation of the mass of armor opposing them. Starved as they were for supplies of all types, perhaps they were discouraged by the businesslike refueling and resupply they observed executed directly in front of them, but just out of range. Perhaps they despaired when two of their tanks attempted to move in daylight and were immediately destroyed by single rounds from over 2 miles away. Perhaps they had simply had enough. They came in unit sets, bringing their wounded with them. Unlike prisoners the brigade captured elsewhere, prisoners from Norfolk seemed well-fed, well-led, and proud of the fight they had put up. Nine hundred and thirty-seven surrendered to 2nd Armored Division (Forward) on Norfolk that day.[3] Perhaps a third as many lay dead in tanks, bunkers, and spider-holes throughout the sector – that figure can never be certain. We do know the American losses: six dead and twenty-five wounded. In retrospect many Americans concluded that the lopsided casualties indicated a fight that had been easy. It was not. The superiorities American soldiers demonstrated with respect to discipline, teamwork, and training radically broadened a margin of tactical advantage that was not as great initially as most might think.

Attention to detail is a trait most military establishments pride themselves upon, and American military leaders have extended that characteristic into a prescriptive fraction of its training system that defines tasks, conditions, and standards for individuals and units at every level. The American penchant for such ‘checklist training’ emerged from the unmilitary character of the American people. Given tiny peacetime military establishments, wars prior to 1965 brought paroxysms of expansion that could have been impervious to order. American

managerial talent asserted itself, however, and over time Americans developed techniques to quickly create usable combat organizations where there had been none. This concept reached full fruition in the methodical Army Training Program of World War II, and officers and soldiers in the United States Army remain the beneficiaries of volumes of carefully written checklists defining what is expected in each of a wide variety of training circumstances. Units work through these painstakingly, time and again, in environments as close to war as training can approximate. No system could more thoroughly rehearse units for tactical circumstances they have correctly anticipated.

Army training programs did in fact correctly anticipate most of the tactical circumstances encountered in Southwest Asia. Take, for example, the forward passage of lines that carried the 2nd Armored Division (Forward) through the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment immediately prior to Norfolk. This was a complex maneuver, executed on the move in the dark virtually without notice on the heels of 100 kilometers of deployed combat operations. It required nineteen separate actions at the battalion level and compressed a brigade moving on a 10-kilometer front through six individual passage lanes following linkups under blackout conditions. If poorly executed, units would have intermingled, the attack would not have occurred on time or in a coordinated manner, and prospects for fratricide would have been enormous. A fortuitously preserved leaf from a battalion commander's notebook captures the complexity involved: contact points, passage lanes, release points, friendly identification, challenge and response, train locations, and critical intelligence. This coordination occurred over the radio from the turrets of moving vehicles under blackout conditions. Nevertheless, commanders who had never met – home stationed as far apart as Bavaria, Lower Saxony, and Fort Riley, Kansas – flowed through each other with a smooth virtuosity. They may not have known each other, but they knew the mission and they knew the detailed coordination necessary to carry it out.

At an entirely different level, tank gunnery provided yet another example of the efficacy of detailed checklist training. The M1A1 represented amazing technical advance, but it did not maintain or shoot itself. Boresighting and applying established zero was a painstaking sixty-three-step daily process involving the entire crew. A trained crew could be through the process within fifteen minutes of first light; many wartime commanders did not permit their crews to eat until they had first boresighted. This daily ritual carried forward countless exacting training hours on snakeboards, in motor pools, in Unit Conduct of Fire Trainer (UCOFT) simulators, and on ranges. What experienced M1A1 gunner could not recite the tasks, conditions, and standards for each of ten engagements on Tank Table VIII?

M1A1 gunnery translated to the Norfolk battlefield with awesome results. Dozens of Iraqi tanks, destroyed with a single round, revealed neatly defined 120mm entry points centered on the turret ring. Vehicles that were exposed mere inches above their revetments were annihilated at the same pace as more horribly

exposed brethren attempting to shift positions or escape. USAREUR gunners had trained to the standard of bringing down individual E-type silhouettes at 600 meters with their 7.62mm M240 coax machine guns. Iraqi ATGM gunners and infantrymen slumped back into open foxholes, precisely drilled through helmets and upper torsos. Whatever one may feel about the human consequences, one must acknowledge the technical skill demonstrated by American gunnery.

By this author's count, Norfolk required the translation to the battlefield of nineteen battalion Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) tasks, twenty-three company ARTEP tasks, twenty-nine platoon ARTEP tasks, and each of the Tank Table VIII and Tank Table XII engagements less NBC (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical). How one trains is how one fights. The brigade had trained hard; it fought well.

The greatest danger in checklist training and its commitment to drilled responses appears when unanticipated – as opposed to anticipated – circumstances emerge. No one can foresee all that will develop in battle. As near a fit as 2nd Armored Division (Forward)'s training was to the battle it actually fought, there were surprises. A penchant for attention to detail can become a straitjacket if it is not wedded to the flexibility necessary to deal with the unexpected.

An example of the flexibility required in war emerged from contradictions inherent in the purposes the brigade's attack was to serve. It had orders to clear its sector, yet it also was enjoined to sustain a rapid pace of advance to facilitate the expedient destruction of the Iraqi Army. Both were legitimate priorities; the first sanitizes terrain for the subsequent passage of vulnerable logistical assets, the second accelerates the collapse of an already disordered opponent. Unfortunately the two concepts – certainly insofar as they had been exercised in training – have antithetical characteristics. Clearance is painstakingly methodical search and destruction involving considerable dismounted activity. The pace of the advance that senior commanders sought to sustain, on the other hand, had already been 100 kilometers in a day. No one was wrong in dictating both priorities. Follow-on logistics had to push forward quickly, the pressure on the Iraqis had to be sustained, and there was insufficient 'ramp strength' – dismounted infantrymen – in an M3 Bradley battalion to leave infantry methodically clearing Norfolk while other battles remained to be fought. This world is an imperfect place. The most feasible dual-purpose solution was adopted: eight companies' worth of armored vehicles came on line and rolled through the sector in such a manner that no point was more than 100 meters from the path of an armored vehicle in the first wave. A second echelon of combat vehicles covered much the same ground before combat support and combat service support vehicles attempted the crossing. Vehicles encountered en route were destroyed, and prisoners of war disarmed and directed to march to the rear unescorted but in column and fully erect. The matrix of oncoming American vehicles, all of which were in communication with each other, was dense enough

that such a column of dismounted Iraqis could be kept under continuous observation until they finally reached the trains and were loaded into a cargo Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT) or trailer and moved to the rear.

This improvised clearance technique worked reasonably well without much inhibiting the pace of advance. However, several dozen Iraqi infantry and five T-55s remained quietly hidden in deep revetments with their engines off. These were invisible to the thermal sights of the M1A1s that moved past them during the hours of darkness.

The circumstance of T-55s to the rear of the advance was further complicated by the forward movement of combat trains – the small contingent of fuel trucks, cargo trucks, mechanics, and medics tucked inside a battalion task force engaged in a prolonged advance. Doctrine is clear; these supplies and services are so critical that they cannot be allowed to disappear rearwards of thousands of combat and combat support vehicles churning along in the wake the leading tanks. As a rule of thumb, the combat trains accompany the task force – generally inside its armored envelope – in advances of 20 kilometers or more. In training, few task forces encounter circumstances wherein they actually move their combat trains with them. Even at the spacious Fort Irwin National Training Center, task forces generally complete their missions, then bring combat trains forward when consolidating on an objective or realigning their defenses. The sustained charge into Iraq permitted no such neat pauses; combat trains rolled with the tanks. The working mechanics of maneuvering relatively unwieldy collections of trucks – few of which had radios – and thin-skinned vehicles on the battlefield had been rehearsed but were incompletely resolved. In the brigade's central task force the leading tank companies became heavily engaged and the task force commander called the trailing tank company forward of the trains to reinforce his fight to the front. This tank company rolled past two of the hidden T-55s, closely followed by the combat trains. When the T-55s rose behind the task force to join the battle, M977 HEMTTs were between them and the M1A1s that could have destroyed them. It was not supposed to work out that way. The resolution of this dilemma is a tribute to the flexibility of the NCOs who found themselves closest to it. Another phenomenon distinguished the battle for which task forces trained and the one they actually fought. Few gunners had previously engaged hard – i.e., solid metal – targets instead of plywood panels with service ammunition. None had ever fired at a vehicle that was firing back at them; it was their first battle. Through a thermal sight, a tank firing creates almost the same image as a tank being hit. The image created by destroyed vehicles and by those which have not recently moved can be much the same. A tank that is already burning can appear to be firing if the turret remains on, distances are great enough, and flames are not yet catastrophic. Men recently killed are still warm. The actual thermal imagery of the battlefield was new to the gunners fighting on it. It was not uncommon for tanks to fire on vehicles their comrades had already destroyed, or for gunners to

machine-gun Iraqis who were already dead. The multiplication of reports of such 'hot' targets inevitably complicated the tasks of officers and headquarters attempting to manage the battle. When Norfolk turned into a 360° battle, such target identification problems became even more acute.

An overall training assessment must characterize the Americans attacking Norfolk as superbly prepared for the mission they undertook. They executed dozens of tasks very well, and many flawlessly. In a full night – eight continuous hours – of fierce fighting only a few circumstances evaded easy mastery: reconciling the details of clearance with the need for speed, small pockets of Iraqi tanks and infantry left in the rear, and difficulty distinguishing the firing from the hit and the living from the dead.

If any single characteristic most impressed the American public with respect to Operation DESERT STORM, it was the technology with which it was fought and the technical competence of the men and women who wielded it. Throughout the Cold War, American economic capabilities manifested themselves in technical advantage rather than in mass per se. Social and political realities precluded the sorts of huge conscript armies that potential adversaries maintained, so American dollars purchased qualitative advantage. If the time came to fight, the American Army would have had the advantages money could buy: high-tech intelligence reinforced by satellite photography, sweeping maneuver led by the world's most formidable helicopters and fastest and most lethal tanks, precise yet quick and overwhelming artillery, a capable fleet of combat engineer vehicles, sophisticated air defenses able to destroy not only planes but also missiles, computer-facilitated communications, and repeatedly demonstrated worldwide logistical capabilities. The American Army and its allies had prepared to defeat the might of the Soviet Army; they were actually called upon to fight something less.

Cold War dollars proved to have been well spent. As 2nd Armored Division (Forward) raced toward Norfolk from its breach in the Iraqi border defenses, it witnessed the devastation wrought by fourteen battalions of artillery on a single division's front. High-tech intelligence had produced detailed sector photographs depicting individual vehicles, foxholes, and fighting positions. These were exploited by American artillerymen with horrific effect. The breach itself was entirely mechanized; not a single American soldier exposed himself outside of the roller and plow-bearing M1A1 tanks, armored engineer vehicles, or over-watching M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles carrying it out. The devastated wake of hundreds of air strikes littered the brigade's route to Norfolk. Superb combat service support brought virtually every combat vehicle onto that battlefield fully-mission-capable and redundant communications linked the lead tanks through networks of command to Riyadh and beyond. The apotheosis of the American way of war on Norfolk itself was the awesome M1A1 tank. Iraqi munitions in all calibers ricocheted harmlessly off its high-tech integrated Chobham armored front slopes; M1A1 crews did not even know they had been hit by rounds as formidable as the 125mm sabot. We have already discussed the

incredible precision and lethality – day or night – of the M1A1's 120mm cannon and 7.62mm M240 machine-gun. Its 1,500 horsepower turbine and T158 live wide track bulled through obstacles no other vehicle in the world could have traversed. The M1A1 was a metaphor for the material supremacy of America that night.

No soldiers and hopefully few civilians have the impression that all of this highly technical equipment sustains and fights itself. M1A1 crews, for example, were used to peacetime maintenance regimes that put two hours of work into their tanks for each hour of actual operation, and I have already discussed the 63-step boresighting and zeroing process. Wartime did not reduce the detailed attention that tankers were called upon to pay to their tanks. The swirling dust and fine sand that threatened to jam moving parts, irreparably damage sights, and clog air cleaners proved a particular concern, as did the heat building up in suspension systems bruising through mile after mile of sand and rock. During each pause when not under fire, crews carried out a frenzy of checking, cleaning, wiping, lubricating, and banging or blowing out air cleaners. Longer stops witnessed even more intense maintenance efforts. Replacing track, road wheels, hubs, and even power packs progressed so smoothly as to be arts in themselves. It was no accident that the brigade rolled onto Objective Norfolk with every single M1A1 combat ready after a rapid advance in challenging conditions through 150 kilometers of tough terrain. The accomplishment was tribute to the tanks themselves, and to the technical skill of the personnel who manned them.

The technical competence of the M1A1 crews was a metaphor for the technical competence of the United States Army as a whole. Never before had so few soldiers manned so much equipment through the rigors of combat, and never before had that equipment been so well maintained. From the Bradley infantryman assembling, cleaning, and reassembling his M16 rifle through the Patriot crewman preparing to hit one speeding missile with another, the American soldier knew his equipment and his craft. His officers knew the importance of this competence, and knew their responsibility to encourage and sustain it. This characteristic alone gave the Americans a great advantage over their Iraqi counterparts, who abandoned a substantial fraction of their equipment as maintenance deadlines without taking a hit or firing a shot.

The American noncommissioned officer shares the mystique of his British counterpart. Whatever the American people may feel about officers and the upper levels of the military hierarchy at any a given time, they have always seen their NCOs as working-class heroes – men not of the privileged classes – who have advanced through the school of hard knocks. In the American tradition, these men combine experience and personal leadership with a keen technical mastery of the equipment in use in their unit. The image of 'Old Bill', the ideal NCO, has remained unchanged since the nineteenth century, although hasty mobilizations and contractions in fact created a qualitative roller-coaster from 1917 through 1972. Since Vietnam, however, NCO professionalism has been a consistent Army

priority: centralized merit promotions, restrictive retention policies, formal schooling at every level through Command Sergeant Major, sophisticated technical training, and a highly structured rating system. In an era of technical advance, NCOs still master soldiers and equipment alike. On Norfolk this proved to be a faith well placed.

Some fraction of NCO performance on Norfolk was straightforward heroism in the old style. We have mentioned two Iraqi tanks that rose into position immediately behind the combat trains of the center task force. They appeared within 100 meters of the Command Sergeant Major (CSM) of that task force, who had gone back with three drivers armed with M16s to flush what they thought was a single sniper.[4] The CSM had seen green tracers – ours are red – and was concerned for the security of the fuel trucks. What followed was a confused melee as the tiny contingent was drawn first to one ATGM position, and then to another. The Iraqis revealed themselves by firing ATGMs and the M16 marksmen cut them down. The ATGM positions featured bunkered larders of munitions; these the Americans methodically blew up with thermite grenades. At one bunker the CSM met an Iraqi coming out as he was going in, and killed him at the muzzle of his caliber 45 pistol. When the T-55s rose, the CSM clambered aboard the nearest and tossed a thermite grenade into its hatch. The second T-55 was destroyed by fire from an unknown source. For a few moments the most critical action on Norfolk was one NCO and three soldiers fighting outnumbered in the dark.

Most NCOs fighting on Norfolk were involved in the execution of painstakingly developed gunnery skills. Gunnery – preparatory maintenance, boresighting, simulations, drills, and the tank tables themselves – is NCO business. Gunners are buck sergeants, and most tank commanders are senior NCOs. The battalion master gunner – an NCO charged to facilitate gunnery training – is a revered figure at the pinnacle of technical proficiency. We have already described the extraordinary marksmanship demonstrated on Norfolk. Tank commanders made lightning-fast decisions in adverse circumstances. One M3 scout platoon sergeant tells of riding the interval between two task forces when a T-55 jerked out of a nearby pit and had him in its sights.[5] Before the T-55 made its final lay, two American M829 sabot rounds whistled past, one over the platoon sergeant's front slope and one past his rear ramp. The T-55 burst into flames and the sergeant continued his mission, altogether serviceable except for his drawers.

We mentioned eleven tanks fallen into tank ditches or through the roofs of Iraqi bunkers. Eight of these self-recovered. The typical 'stick' progressed as follows. The crew recognized they had hit a ditch when the hull jerked to a dizzy angle and threw them across the turret. The accompanying wingman tank, recognizing that the tank commander would soon expose himself, sanitized the vicinity of the stricken tank with machine-gun fire. The tank commander climbed through his hatch and clambered along the fender of his tank to avoid mines likely to be in the bottom of the ditch. When he shined his red lens flashlight down

along the tracks, he saw some variation on stuck vehicle circumstances he had encountered dozens of times before. In all cases on Norfolk the sturdy T158 track had held together, but the tank itself angled diagonally nose down into the ditch without traction on one track or the other. With a virtuosity gained only through years of experience, the NCO shouted instructions to the driver who backed, advanced, or neutral steered the 67-ton bulk through incremental shifts, inching its nose toward a right angle with the far side of the ditch. All the while the loader, in night vision goggles, manned his machine-gun above the turret; if the recovery lasted more than a few minutes, mechanics arrived and assisted with recovery and security while the wingman tank caught up with the battalion formation. When the tank commander had talked him into achieving purchase with both tracks and a perpendicular attack angle into the far side of the ditch, the driver slammed the 1,500 horsepower engine into full throttle. The mighty M1A1 virtually leapt forward, ripping off the ditch's far lip with its snout, teetering dizzily for an instant on the far side and easing down onto its shock absorbers – ready to roll.

What of the three tanks that could not self-recover? An example is the M1A1 that crashed through the roof of an Iraqi bunker, collapsing into an excavation that almost precisely fit the dimensions of the tank. The wingman thought to assist with a tow, but another Iraqi bunker was aligned with the first in such a manner that the wingman would have collapsed through it in his approach. The M88A1 medium recovery vehicle, called forward from its position 300 meters behind the leading tanks, soon arrived. That vehicle's commander jockeyed around to create mine-safe footpaths with his vehicle tracks, and then got out on the ground to examine the stick. Out came the main cable, manhandled through a half-dozen vehicle lengths of tortured ground and then forced onto the M1A1's tow fixture, which the tank crew had already hastily exposed in a frenzy of digging. Down went the M88A1's blade and up went its front slope, perching the great drum of its main winch in the most advantageous position. A few quick instructions to the tank commander and a carefully choreographed sequence began: the cable pulled taut; the winch inched the rear of the tank toward the lip of the ditch; at precisely the right point of purchase the M1A1 assisted – but not too fast or it would have pitched into the second bunker – with its tracks; as the M1A1 teetered on the saddle between the bunkers the winch quickly let out the cable; the tank spun into a ninety-degree neutral steer; and the tank pitched clear of both excavations even as the saddle between them collapsed under the violence of the maneuver. The recovery would have been a credit to the Recovery MOS (Military Occupational Specialty) in any circumstances; it was phenomenal when executed under fire in the dark.

The catalog of NCO contributions on Norfolk was uncountable. Postwar debriefings established that virtually every NCO did some amazing thing to keep the great mass of armor beetling forward through the inferno. Those with thermal sights guided those without them through the minefields. Dozens of hasty maintenance saves – some by mechanics and most not – brought every combat

vehicle not destroyed by fire through the night intact. C3 (Command, Control, and Communications) NCOs jumped nets and spelled each other to keep the volume of coordination flowing. Medical NCOs snatched the wounded from flaming vehicles while combatant counterparts conducted local counterattacks to secure areas wherein vehicles had been hit. The advancing tankers talked to each other, covered each other, and hosed each other down with machine-gun fire when Iraqi infantry came too close. As sources of fire became apparent, M1A1 commanders talked lighter vehicles into the lee of their tanks, shielding them like great pachyderms protecting their young. In the immediate wake of the M1A1s and Bradleys, HEMTT trucks rolled along with the fuel and ammunition upon which all future success depended. In each of these miniature wheeled vehicle serials, crossing the battlefield with no more protection than one might have in one's personal car, the lead driver was an NCO. It in no way diminishes the contribution of officers and private soldiers to assert that the characteristic that most distinguishes us from our potential adversaries is the caliber of our NCOs. No army exceeds and few approximate the combination of experience, leadership, and technical knowledge represented by pay grades E5 through E9. The battlefield is a complex and confusing place. An incredible number of miniature – but life threatening – crises erupt simultaneously. Small clusters of men must accomplish extraordinary things with no notice, little help, and under adverse circumstances. Bulling across Norfolk was an arduous task for all parties involved. It would not have succeeded if the only tactical circumstances resolved had been those of which commanders were aware.

What of the truth? Army officers would much rather be characterized as stupid, ugly, or lazy than as dishonest. Yet powerful incentives exist to equivocate in a profession with such high and competitive standards. Despite its favorable results, the Gulf War was no exception in pressuring leadership to want to show well rather than to show accurately. Strength of character is not so much the absence of temptation as it is the refusal to succumb to it. Of all the incentives the Gulf War offered for misrepresentation, none was more tempting than denying potential involvement in a fratricide, the most agonizing of battlefield mishaps.

We have already mentioned that when penetrating the first belt of Iraqi defenses the leading M1A1s passed by five Iraqi T-55s with infantry support in two positions. By accident or design these tanks, hidden in revetments with their engines off, were invisible through thermal sights even though American tanks passed within 100 meters of them. When the trailing tank company and the combat trains of the central task force had passed, the T-55s rose from hide to firing positions. The right task force's left trailing Bradley company was just pulling into formation from the passage lanes. This company oriented north in column rather than east on line because its commander had been forced into a circuitous route. His own M2 Bradley, with Global Positioning System (GPS) aboard, had become disabled during the passage of lines. He rightly jumped to

another vehicle, albeit necessarily to one without GPS, to continue in the lead of his company. He quickly got his bearings from the company commander to his right, who had a working GPS, and turned north to assume his assigned position. This carried him forward in the direction against which Iraqi defenses had been organized; when his leading platoon came into the illumination cast by burning vehicles, the surviving Iraqis opened fire from three sides.

The initial Iraqi volley missed with two tank rounds and two ATGMs and hit with one ATGM. This ATGM destroyed the second Bradley in column, killing three men aboard. The trailing tank company of the central task force identified the Iraqis as they sprang their ambush, recognized that they met their own engagement instructions, and destroyed the three T-55s closest to the Bradleys before they could get off a second round. Unfortunately, a second ATGM fusillade hit the Bradleys, now totally intermingled with Iraqi vehicles, and the American tankers mistook them for additional T-55s facing and firing at them. An impression of how intermingled the T-55s and Bradleys were emerges from an anecdote shared by a Bradley platoon leader. One of the T-55s rose so close to him that he rammed it with his own Bradley in such a manner that the Bradley wedged between the T-55's gun tube and its hull, preventing the gun tube from traversing to take aim. The platoon sergeant then leaped from his vehicle onto the tank, putting a grenade down its hatch to destroy it. The M1A1 tankers fired on the Bradleys, hit two directly and one by ricochet, and killed one man while wounding some fraction of the eighteen Americans injured in the ambush. It is important to note that the M1A1 gunners 'saw' every vehicle as a T-55. It may not have been what was actually there, but it is what they saw. The M1A1 could engage and destroy targets in the dark at ranges considerably greater than those at which its gunners could adequately identify them. We have already discussed the gunners' relative lack of experience with the actual thermal imagery of the battlefield. The circumstances asked a lot of fatigued young gunners fighting desperately through a junkyard in the dark against T-55s that could put yet another round every ten seconds into thin-skinned vehicles or into the rear of our tanks.

As bad as this fratricide was, it could have been much worse. In a matter of seconds all parties involved recognized something was wrong. Over the radio the company commander being hit forthrightly acknowledged his direction of movement and orientation. The company commander firing acknowledged the direction he was firing to hit his present targets. The battalion commander to the south and the one in the center simultaneously gained a frank appraisal of what was going on, a picture which they quickly shared with each other. In less than a minute the firing ceased; if it had not, the entire Bradley company might well have been swept away by ferocious and accurate M1A1 tank fire. If ever there was an argument for speed, accuracy, and truthfulness in reporting, this was it. Subsequent investigation reinforced the propriety of forthrightness; the corps

commander himself reviewed the findings and determined there was no fault involved. With respect to fratricide, this was not always the case.[6]

No one knows at seventeen what they will be doing when middle aged. More often one thing leads to another over time, and senior officers find themselves carrying responsibilities they could not have imagined in their youths – without particularly understanding how they acquired them. Be that as it may, one can always rest assured that character will matter. Traits such as discipline, attention to detail, flexibility, technical competence, faith placed and inspired in subordinates, and truthfulness will serve one well regardless of the path life takes. If an entire organization is imbued with such traits, it proves that much the stronger. The 1991 battle for Norfolk witnessed such an organization, and it proved the principle.

Notes

1 See Stephen A. Bourque and John S. Brown, *Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War*. Department of the Army; Center of Military History: Washington DC: 2002.

2 The number of surviving Iraqi tanks at the beginning of the tank battle were identified in a G-3, 2AD (FWD) equipment survey of the Uqlat-al-Udhaybah (Objective Norfolk) battlefield. Colonel Clint Ancker was the G-3 at the time. The equipment survey included specialists able to identify the type of munition that had destroyed the vehicles, in most cases. The tanks destroyed by 120mm tank fire in that sector had to have been destroyed by us, and therefore had to have survived until we came upon the battlefield.

3 My colleague and our FSB commander, LTC Steve Marshman, collected all of the prisoners we had policed up and accounted for them and their provenance. My S4 served as liaison to him, and reported this and related information.

4 The CSM was Vince Conway, my own CSM. This account originated with the men who were with him and a version of it appears in his Silver Star citation.

5 The M3 Scout platoon sergeant was also my own. In the several months between the end of the fighting and our return to Garlstadt I interviewed many of our people and collected their stories. The same applies to the story from the Bradley PS.

6 The company commanders involved in the friendly fire incident all spent a lot of time talking to me and my colleague LTC Jim Hillman as we attempted to reconstruct the incident. The incident was also investigated by the VII Corps IG, who took statements from all of us and made a formal report. This incident came to be considered particularly instructive, and was further drilled by Colonel David Bird in the postwar Combat Identification Program project.

2

ATTACKING THE REPUBLICAN GUARD

Major General Eric T. Olson

Lieutenant Colonel (now Major General) Eric Olson commanded the 2nd Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment (Task Force 2-18) during the Persian Gulf War. His battalion was part of the 197th Infantry Brigade, one of three brigades in the 24th Infantry Division. The 24th, along with the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, formed the XVIII Airborne Corps – the second of the two US Corps that fought in the Persian Gulf War. The 24th served as the XVIII Corps' primary heavy asset, maneuvering in M113 Armored Personnel Carriers and M1 tanks. The division, based in Fort Stewart, Georgia, would be the first American heavy force to arrive in theater. It arrived in Saudi Arabia toward the end of September 1990 to prepare for combat operations.

The XVIII Airborne Corps' mission was twofold: to secure the Euphrates River valley to prevent Iraqi reinforcements from arriving in the theater of operations, and later to prevent the escape of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The 24th ID's role in this mission was first to attack and establish a blocking position in the valley, and then later to attack eastward to destroy Iraqi forces. The 197th Infantry Brigade formed the westernmost flank of the division. Then-Colonel Olson's unit, as the leftmost unit in the sector, had the additional responsibility of coordinating actions along the division's boundary with the 101st Airborne Division as the attack progressed.[1]

The attack itself was of such ferocity and speed that the division nearly outstripped its logistical tail. But when ground combat ended, that blazing speed paid great dividends: the 24th had defeated the equivalent of six Iraqi divisions. Additionally, it had effectively trapped many of the remaining Republican Guard divisions to the south.

On the surface, Task Force 2-18 contributed to victory by simply accomplishing its mission. And although General Olson's narrative style implies a simple, textbook operation, it is clear that the simplicity of the operation stemmed directly from thorough planning and excellent command and control. It is also clear that throughout the inevitable chaos of battle, Olson maintained perspective. He made it his personal mission to maintain an understanding of the overall situation and to consider how his unit should react to the inevitable changes. He remained constantly aware of who was on his left, to his right,

behind him, and of the enemy situation to his front. This 'situational awareness' proved to be a solid foundation upon which his task force operated. And because of this battlefield awareness, Task Force 2-18 was successful. General Olson's account provides excellent insight into battalion level operations during this war and also into how his West Point training prepared him for the chaos of combat.

The 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) received the alert notice to deploy at its headquarters in Fort Stewart, Georgia, on 7 August 1990. At that time I was assigned as the Chief of Course Development at the United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia. I was a newly promoted (eight months) lieutenant colonel and had been assigned to Fort Benning for a little over a year – 'prepositioned' at the Infantry School to take command of the 2nd Battalion 18th Infantry Regiment, one of the infantry battalions in the 197th Separate Infantry Brigade at Fort Benning.

The 197th was a separate mechanized infantry brigade consisting of two infantry battalions and one armor battalion. As a separate brigade, we also had our own assigned artillery, and support battalions, an organic cavalry troop, an air defense battery, and an engineer company. The 197th was virtually unique in the Army inventory of infantry units. Besides its special organization, at that time the Brigade was one of the only mechanized infantry units in the Army whose primary platform was the M113 armored personnel carrier. This vehicle truly served as an infantry carrier, as opposed to a fighting vehicle. Its principal weapons system was the .50 caliber machine gun. Most every other infantry unit in the active Army was equipped with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, armed then as it is today with the .25 caliber chain gun, a coaxial 7.62 machine gun, and a TOW antitank missile launcher.

The 197th was also different from other Army units in terms of its mission. Its primary role was as a separate combat brigade, assigned to the 18th Airborne Corps for contingency missions. Stationed as it was at Fort Benning in close proximity to the Infantry School, the 197th also took on a good number of School support missions, which was generally acknowledged to be a strong secondary role of the Brigade. The soldiers of Kelley Hill (the home of the 197th) knew the sands of the NTC very well, but also spent plenty of time on the ranges and maneuver areas of Fort Benning supporting the training of Infantry School students. The latter missions were not always viewed by the Brigade's leadership as contributing overall to good 'warfighting' readiness. In the Army the 197th had come to be viewed by many as being a sort of 'school support' brigade.

It came as some surprise when the word arrived at Fort Benning that the 197th would deploy, and even more that it would do so as part of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) Combat Team. The exact relationship between the Victory Division (as the 24th was known) and the Sledgehammer Brigade (197th) was not clearly established at first. Because the 24th was configured as a two-brigade division at Fort Stewart, there was always the possibility that the 197th could become its third brigade. The Sledgehammer leadership was proud of the

Brigade's heritage and distinction as a separate brigade and always harbored hopes that after deploying with the 24th it would fight as an independent combat team under the direct command of the corps commander.

Personally, I was taken very much by surprise at the deployment notification and it posed a dilemma for me. The original date of my change of command had been set in July, but was pushed back to a date that was at that time yet to be determined in late August or September to allow the outgoing commander to participate in a key training event scheduled for the battalion. The alert notice cast the status of the revised change of command very much in doubt. I was also dismayed by the prospect of the deployment occurring while I was assigned to the Infantry School. There was considerable doubt in my mind about whether or not I would ever be called to take command of a deployed unit in Southwest Asia from far-off Fort Benning. I decided early on to take on two seemingly impossible tasks – obtaining a release from my position at the Infantry School and finding a position in the 197th in which I could be gainfully employed until my assumption of command. In short, deploying with the 197th became an imperative to me.

The initial responses to both of my requests – release from the Infantry School and assignment to the deploying brigade – were not favorable. There were scores of officers who were attempting to seek release from the School to deploy as part of the force headed to Southwest Asia. The Assistant Commandant reserved to himself the authority to make such decisions – probably a necessary step if he didn't want to see the entire School slip away from underneath him. I will always owe a great debt of gratitude to my boss at that time – COL Wayne Crawford, a combat veteran himself – who made a convincing case to the AC that I should be released from my position to deploy with my future battalion. Obtaining a position in the 197th became the next challenge. Initially, the brigade commander felt that my assignment to the 197th solved his problem of finding a rear detachment commander to take care of business on Kelley Hill while the Brigade was deployed. I objected strenuously to this plan, telling him that if he chose this route I would never command in his brigade. He reviewed his decision with the Deputy Brigade Commander, a personal friend of mine who took up my cause and eventually was able to carry the day. The final decision was to deploy me initially as a second DCO (Deputy Brigade Commander), to focus primarily on deployment issues, until such time as conditions permitted a change of command to occur. I was delighted to be deploying with the Sledgehammer Brigade, but somewhat disconcerted at the uncertain nature of my impending change of command.

Deployment

The deployment phase of Operation DESERT SHIELD can be characterized for all units at the time as a period of great confusion. This is perfectly understandable given that we were an Army that had primarily focused on fighting and winning a war against the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe. That war was to have been

fought initially by in-place divisions who would roll out from European-based casernes to carefully preplanned alert and defense positions. These forces were to be reinforced by CONUS-based units which had set deployment, reception, and onward movement plans to draw equipment that had been prepositioned in Europe and get them into the fight along set timelines. All this had been carefully planned and rehearsed for years, though with the 'warming' of the Cold War in the late 1980s, 'full up' large scale deployments and training were no longer being conducted. A deployment involving thousands of soldiers and their equipment into an immature theater where no existing US forces were stationed, and into an area of operations where a virtually unopposed attack had already occurred, was a daunting prospect.

An additional complicating factor for the 197th was the challenge of being integrated into the 24th ID (M) for the deployment. At first the feeling on Kelley Hill, the post area where the 197th was based, was that we wanted to be deployed directly into Southwest Asia from Fort Benning, with integration occurring in theater. The Brigade's leadership did not relish the prospect of deploying first from Fort Benning to Fort Stewart/Savannah and then again with the Division from there to Southwest Asia. The Commanding General of the 24th, MG Barry R. McCaffrey, was convinced that integration should occur prior to deployment and that the 197th should be moved to Fort Stewart and then to the theater. As it turned out, this proved to be a wise course of action. The period before actual deployment from Fort Stewart to Southwest Asia proved to be a time during which the entire Division combat team could come together and do much useful planning and training. But this approach added a couple of degrees of difficulty to the 197th's deployment.

The special challenges of the 'double deployment' faced by the 197th in no way hindered a remarkable operation. The initial assumption was that we were well postured for a smooth deployment because of our training experience. The Brigade had recently completed a training deployment to the National Training Center, so a good number of the soldiers were relatively familiar with deployment procedures and many of the associated administrative and logistical tasks. However, this was the first time that the 197th had ever been deployed in its entirety. There were a myriad tasks that required attention. The soldiers and leaders of the Brigade worked long hours to the point of exhaustion to get the Brigade ready for the move to Fort Stewart and from there to Southwest Asia.

In the capacity of Deputy Brigade Commander, my first challenge during the deployment was to receive hundreds of tons of ammunition at Kelley Hill and get it prepared for distribution to the units of the Brigade and subsequent shipment. This was a feat never before attempted by anyone in the unit. Previous deployments had never included an upload of live ammunition for a unit of any size. We used the Brigade's wash rack as an ammo upload site, a procedure that violated every safety requirement imaginable. The control of the upload was left

to me and two assistants – one an NCO who was declared non-deployable and the second a major who was assigned to me after leaving an infantry battalion. This major had decided after the alert notification was received that he was too inexperienced and therefore ill-suited to serve as the operations officer of the battalion and could not in good conscience continue to serve. He went on to deploy with the Brigade and serve well in a staff position in the Brigade Headquarters. The three of us worked around the clock and successfully uploaded units of the Brigade without incident.

As an initial-deploying unit of Operation DESERT SHIELD, Victory Division soldiers and units prepared to enter a combat theater of operations. The assumption was that our mission would be to defend Saudi Arabia from the continuation of the Iraqi attack into Kuwait. Our pre-deployment preparations were focused accordingly – we trained defensive tasks and developed plans that supported what was commonly referred to as the General Defense Plan or GDP (drawing from our experience in Cold War Europe). A special point of emphasis was the preparation that we did to fight in an NBC environment, recognition of the chemical capability that Iraq was known to possess, and our presumption that the Iraqi leadership had no compunction about using it.

The statistics that are associated with the deployment of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) are as staggering as any in the history of the Gulf War or any combat operation in the history of the United States Army. The first ships with Victory Division equipment sailed within seven days of alert. All told we deployed over 18,000 soldiers, 1,600 armored vehicles, 90 helicopters, and 3,500 pieces of rolling stock.[2] As 10 ships wended their way on the trip from Savannah to the port of Ad Dammam in Saudi Arabia, a 15-25 day sail, the soldiers of the Division made the air journey on 57 aircraft sorties into the theater. The plan had soldiers arriving in theater just in time to offload ships and roll into the desert to reinforce a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division, which was the only US unit in theater, already deployed in defensive positions in the desert and awaiting the Iraqis' next move.

Worthy of special note in this tale of deployment is the significant contribution made by the family support groups of the Division. These groups, organized at the company and battalion level, were designed to provide assistance, care, and comfort to the families of deployed soldiers. They had been little tested to this point except during short deployments such as those to training centers like the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California. The shock of a rapid deployment weighed heavily on family members, especially on young wives and small children. This was doubly true in the 197th, a unit that had been viewed by its soldiers and their families as relatively unlikely to deploy. The work that family support groups did to soften the blow of the deployment of the Brigade was invaluable, and presaged more important contributions that would be made during operations to come.

Desert Shield

By mid-September the soldiers of the 24th Division (M) were fully assembled in Saudi Arabia, receiving equipment as it arrived by ship and deploying by brigade combat team into the desert to occupy assembly areas. The arrival of the Division in theater had been relatively smooth, though the delay of several of the ships carrying equipment made marrying up equipment and soldiers something of a challenge. The most significant of these delays involved the ship carrying the bulk of one of the Division's key support battalions which would jeopardize our maintenance posture during the initial stages of DESERT SHIELD. Soldiers awaiting equipment were garrisoned in a makeshift 'tent city' in the outskirts of Dammam which was rumored to have been constructed on a trash dump that had been hastily leveled and covered with a layer of sand to accommodate arriving American forces.

Operation DESERT SHIELD proved to be a complex but magnificent time for the Victory Division. Initially focused on the defense of Saudi Arabia, the Division was assigned a 4,200 square mile area of operations to defend with its three maneuver brigades. The defensive plan was based on a mobile defense of the Division's sector that would begin to engage attacking forces once they had penetrated approximately 90 miles into the desert south of the Kuwaiti border. The plan relied on defeating the initial attack, and then counterattacking to destroy the second echelon of the invading force. The operation would continue on order with an attack against the remainder of the Iraqi army in Saudi Arabia and, if necessary, on into Kuwait. During the early days of DESERT SHIELD the leaders of the Division worked this 'General Defense Plan' hard, conducting rehearsals, war games, and leaders' reconnaissances throughout September and into October. But by early October attention to the defense of Saudi Arabia began to diminish as it became clear from intelligence reports that the Iraqi army was adopting a defensive posture and fortifying its positions in Kuwait. From the perspective of the troops in the field at battalion level and below, a period of lull began as it became clearer and clearer that there would be no Iraqi attack and the exact nature of operations by coalition forces was yet to be determined.

We began to treat DESERT SHIELD as an opportunity to do some intensive training that would be useful no matter how the operation turned out. The focus was on training the full range of mission essential tasks assigned to each unit under all conditions – offensive, defensive, day, night, and NBC environment. The desert environment was harsh, so each day the soldiers got tougher and tougher to the conditions. Because the 'pipeline' had been turned on, units were receiving new types of equipment every day, so we had a chance to assimilate, experiment with, and learn how best to employ some of the latest in optical, fire control, command and control, and other types of state of the art equipment. The opportunities to lead and train during this time were unprecedented in my experience in the Army.

We also fine-tuned our logistical systems to the point where we were experiencing readiness rates at or above those maintained in CONUS. Achieving this status was a challenge. The delayed arrival of one of our cargo ships carrying key logistical materiel and equipment got us off to a rocky start. As a result, the leadership of the Division was forced to place limits on our training and operating tempo. Once all support units had closed in theater and were up and operating, the logistical posture of the Division improved dramatically. At the height of DESERT SHIELD when all units were training furiously, the supporters were, on any given day, tracking 'deadlined' (not functioning) vehicles piece by piece at the Division level, processing hundreds of repair parts requisitions directly back to CONUS, and receiving approximately 70 pallets of these parts into Dhahran Air Base for onward movement. These achievements at the direct and general support level, combined with ever improving techniques and procedures at the unit level, made for a superb maintenance and logistics posture that must be considered a miracle of modern warfare.

As the fall months passed, the future of US forces in Saudi Arabia became the topic of much discussion in the rank and file throughout the Sledgehammer Brigade. It was clear to all that the Iraqis had no plans to leave Kuwait any time soon. We began to hear talk of a continuous presence in Saudi Arabia somewhat along the lines of the posture of US forces in Korea, with individual replacements after one-year assignments. Another plan envisioned unit rotations by brigade after six months in theater – a regime that was relatively unheard of at the time.

Whatever was being contemplated for future operations at higher levels, it was taken as an article of faith at the tactical level that there could be no offensive plans in the works for us given existing force ratios. In fact, as we now know, such plans were being considered at exactly that time that would have relied upon the single Corps in theater as the principal element of a frontal attack to dislodge the occupying Iraqi force.

Desert Storm

At about this time my personal role in the operation was also taking shape. MG McCaffrey had decided that the time was right to change command of the 2nd Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment, placing me in command and reassigning the former commander, LTC Rich Stouder, to the Corps headquarters. There seemed to be no cause for concern that the disruption that is normally associated with such changes would have any serious effect on present or future operations. There was no indication at the time that hostilities were imminent. It appeared fully reasonable that the battalion could expect to spend a prolonged period of presence and training in Saudi Arabia to deter any Iraqi aggression, the prospect of which seemed remote. So on a cool and clear morning that dawned on 30 October 1990, the soldiers of 2-18 Infantry marched over the crest of a hill in the Saudi desert, parading into view in front of a small group of visitors who had come to witness

what had to have been one of the most unique change of command ceremonies in the history of the Regiment.

And what a magnificent history! The 18th Infantry Regiment was established in 1861 and earned a glorious reputation during combat operations in the Civil War doing battle at Shiloh, Chickamauga, Stones Creek, and Kennesaw Mountain among other significant actions. After seeing action in the Indian and Spanish American Wars, in World War I the regiment was awarded two French Croix de Guerre with Palm and the French Fourrangère for its part in the Soissons offensive on 18 July 1918 and conducted numerous operations in the Lorraine valley. In World War II the Regiment as part of the 1st Infantry Division played a key role in the Omaha landings and continued the fight with the Division across Europe. At the time of Operation DESERT STORM, the Regimental Association was one of the most active of any in the Army, the ranks being filled mostly by veterans of the Regiment who had fought in World War II and the Vietnam War.

Taking the colors of the 2nd Battalion, 18th Infantry meant that I joined ranks with a unique group of fellow battalion commanders, brothers in arms, all of us having had very similar experiences en route to combat commands in DESERT STORM. (Interestingly, because the crisis in the Persian Gulf broke out around the time of the eighteenth anniversary of the graduation of the USMA Class of 1972, there were literally scores of my classmates in command for the war. At one point in time when we were lined up on the Iraqi border preparing to kick off the ground war, there were four members of my class, side by side, commanding infantry battalions. Also located in our immediate area of operations were an aviation battalion commander, who had been a close friend at West Point, and an engineer battalion commander, who had been our First Captain.) There were 34 battalion commanders in the 24th ID (M) combat team alone. None of us had any combat experience, with the exception of one support battalion commander who had served as an infantryman in Vietnam. We had all been commissioned in the early 1970s into an Army that was at one of the lowest points in the nation's history. As lieutenants we led soldiers who had been accessed into the force by means of a personnel acquisition system that is now widely viewed as having been totally bankrupt. The equipment we signed for was old and literally falling apart from neglect. I remember signing for an M114 (mechanized command and reconnaissance carrier) as my command and control vehicle. When I went to check it out, I saw that it, along with all the M114s in the battalion, had been barricaded behind a concertina wire fence in the motor pool because it had proved impossible to keep any of them running if they were ever used. Our training was infrequent and unfocused. Most of our time was spent dealing with the manifold personnel problems caused by Vietnam veterans who wanted nothing to do with the Army except to get out of it. The leader development programs in most of our units were nonexistent.

Those of us who stayed with the Army in the late 1970s and 1980s saw steady improvements as captain company commanders and as majors, serving as

battalion S-3s and executive officers. During this time, the leadership of the Army successfully saw us through the conversion from an Army filled with draftees to an all-volunteer force. We brought on line the 'Big 5' major fighting systems – tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, helicopters, and artillery pieces that were the best of their kind in the world. We participated in a revolution in training management and doctrine and leader development that literally changed the way we were doing business before our very eyes. The battalions that we commanded in the late 1980s and 1990s were a far cry from those we had joined as lieutenants in the early 1970s.

Regardless of how historians have chronicled the war, for me DESERT STORM began within two weeks of my assumption of command. On 8 November 1990 President Bush made a public announcement that a second US corps would be deployed to Southwest Asia, and for the first time offensive operations seemed to us to be a possibility. The announcement came as a total surprise to those of us serving at the tactical level. When it came, the commanders of the 197th were just arriving in Dhahran to do a video-teleconference with families back at Fort Benning. We drove from our desert assembly areas in HMMWVs, stepped out into the street in front of a huge hotel (for many of us, it was the first time standing on any hard surface for weeks), and were immediately assaulted by a ravenous press corps who wanted to know what we made of the deployment of a second corps. In fact, the planning for offensive operations had been going on for at least a month. But at our level, there was no inkling that any change of mission was occurring.

We were aware, however, that the Iraqis were reinforcing their defensive positions in Kuwait. There was a general understanding that large numbers of regular army troops were being massed along the border between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, evidently in anticipation of a frontal attack – the only feasible offensive option available to the coalition with a single US corps in theater. We also knew that Saddam was holding his Republican Guard divisions at the northern border between Iraq and Kuwait. This appeared to be his killing blow, waiting to counterattack into any coalition offensive into Kuwait while the regular army troops ground down the assault in its defensive obstacles, using massive artillery barrages and the direct fires of defending divisions. With the announcement of the plan to deploy a second corps of US forces, we began to hear of a new planning priority, our training regime changed, and we undertook a huge effort to prepare our soldiers mentally and physically for war.

Whereas for the first months the operation was focused on the defense of Saudi Arabia, in November and December a furious planning process was conducted that centered on what emerged to us as a classically simple but ingenious offensive plan. It would be built around a feigned frontal attack by land forces into the main Iraqi defensive belt (the feint would later include the threat of a US marine amphibious assault from the Gulf). The purpose of this maneuver was to fix the first line of Iraqi defenses and draw the attention of the Republican Guard divisions. It was hoped that these divisions might at least reposition towards the

south (in preparation to reinforce the main defense) or maybe even begin their counterattack in that direction. The coalition main attack would be launched against the Republican Guards once they had reacted to this feint. It would be executed by a US corps whose mission would be to strike the flank of these divisions as they were oriented (or moving) to the south. A second US corps would execute a deep, penetrating attack oriented on the Euphrates River Valley, which was vital terrain in the Republican Guards' rear area.

This last maneuver – the so-called 'end run' – became the mission of the 18th Airborne Corps and the sole focus of the 24th ID (M). As it was conveyed to us, the success of Victory Division's operation would signify the end of the war for the Iraqi army. Once the 24th ID (M) was firmly established on objectives in the Euphrates Valley, Saddam's pipeline to his army in Kuwait would be cut. Commanders of the Iraqi divisions to the south would realize that with a US heavy division in their rear, they faced imminent annihilation. Additionally, they would realize that any hope of a fighting withdrawal from the onslaught of the flanking main attack would be out of the question. It was with this understanding of the operational plan, and the significant role that the 24th ID (M) would play in it, that we undertook our planning and preparation tasks.

These tasks were extensive and formidable. In the planning arena, the weeks of late November and December were murderous. Planners at the Division, brigade, and task force level worked around the clock to develop and refine the attack plan. Because the 24th ID (M) was still deployed in a defensive posture over an area of operations that covered more than 4,500 square miles, planners were constantly on the road to higher and lower headquarters, attending planning sessions and coordinating the effort. Rehearsals were conducted at every level. The main Division rehearsal was conducted in four 18-hour sessions that some of us in retrospect consider to have been more grueling than the war that followed. Each refinement of the plan by higher headquarters occasioned a string of plan changes and new rehearsals at lower echelons.

Our training regimen changed and intensified as the planning developed. Based on the emerging operation, task force commanders began to train tasks that appeared to be most relevant to the upcoming operation. The 197th was selected to develop a live fire training exercise that included a demolition breach of a complex obstacle built to model the types of obstacles that Iraqi forces were thought to have in place in front of their defensive positions. My task force trained movement to contact and assault on heavily defended objectives. This training was the first time I had ever maneuvered a full task force in the field. In fact, it was the first time I had ever seen a battalion-sized element fully deployed for any type of operation.

We fielded and trained with new equipment – night vision devices, new optics, command and control, and communications equipment and the like. Infantry units in the 197th replaced the .50 caliber machine guns on M113s (armored personnel carrier) with the MK-19 automatic grenade launcher on two of the four carriers

in every platoon. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the tank battalions throughout the Division were fielded the M1A1 tank to replace our M1 basics, significantly enhancing the firepower and protection of our armored units.

For me the most difficult part of getting ready for combat was the psychological preparation that had to occur. The first hurdle was to convince myself that this fight was really going to happen. Many of us, myself included, hoped against hope that some sort of peaceful resolution was still possible. We hung on every word of radio reports about meetings between the US Secretary of State and the Iraqi Foreign Minister. We scoured intelligence reports for signs that Iraqi forces were preparing to withdraw. But by mid-December, I had decided that the best personal course of action was to abandon any hope of a peaceful outcome and to steel myself and my soldiers to go to war.

The first and most critical part of this process was information. The troops wanted to know what was going on, so I went to great lengths to let them know. I regularly visited each company-sized element to brief the soldiers on every facet of the operation – what the enemy was doing, what the most recent iteration of the plan entailed, what the strategic and political landscape looked like. These briefs provided the necessary foundation for the rest of our preparations and helped the soldiers make sense of what we were asking them to do.

We also prepared psychologically by establishing strict regimens of discipline in everything we did in our daily routines. A vigorous PT (physical training) program with plenty of foot marching not only helped toughen the troops physically but got them into the right frame of mind. We trained hard and long, focusing only on tasks that were derived from the attack plan that we were developing. Standards of uniform appearance and wear were tight, and we always enforced the routine health and hygiene regimens that were in place. The leadership of the task force made regular contact and coordination with the battalion family support group at Fort Benning. Soldiers who were making calls back home were hearing that their families were being kept informed and were being well looked after.

Amid the serious preparation for battle, the battalion's leadership also looked for opportunities to integrate some leisure time activities. We conducted sports activities and had a battalion 'organization' day to relieve some of the stress of the intense preparation. On Christmas Day, we gave the troops a day off and allowed them to celebrate at the company level. In a blinding shamal (dust or sand storm), the battalion chaplain and I visited every company assembly area and brought Christmas greetings. I read a Christmas story to each company from a book that my wife had sent me for the occasion.

By mid-January we had planned, prepared, and trained to the point where we were as ready as US forces have ever been for combat operations. We had spent over four months in the field and were desert tough. Most of this time had been spent doing exactly the kind of training we knew was necessary – directly tied to a mission we knew we were going to execute. I have never seen such battle focused training before and doubt that I'll ever see it again. We had worked the

plan hard, briefed it to the lowest levels, and rehearsed it in every conceivable way – on maps, terrain boards, and with leaders in TEWTs (tactical exercises without troops) and full-up dress rehearsals on terrain similar to that into which we were planning to attack. The combined effects of this preparation and deliberate planning produced a confidence throughout the formation such as I have never experienced in any other Army unit. We were ready for the early morning air attacks of 16 January 1991. Even so, the call I received at around 0300 that morning was a sobering one. And in the days that followed, as we watched wave upon wave of attack aircraft flying north and listened to the distant rumble of the bombing, we knew that, no matter how prepared we felt, nothing could prepare us totally for what lay ahead.

To position for the ground attack, my Task Force and the 197th participated in a remarkable and massive movement of forces from the central Saudi desert to the western portion of the coalition attack line along the Iraqi border. The Division move to accomplish this repositioning entailed a 320-mile road march along a two-lane highway, 67 serials each of approximately 150 vehicles that took about 10 days to complete. Each serial took between 18 and 30 hours to make the trip. The weather was at its worst for this time of the year in the Saudi desert – bitter cold at night, rain, and blowing sand as a frequent occurrence.

On the night that I received my operations briefing prior to moving the task force, the Assistant Division Commander informed me that we needed to be prepared to defend against possible Iraqi attack. Word had filtered to us that the Iraqis had launched a major offensive into Saudi Arabia along the road march route in the vicinity of a town named Khafji. The prospect of fighting Iraqi armor in tanks and infantry carriers that were strapped down on flat bed trucks was disturbing to me, to say the least. The true nature of this attack was never clear to us at the time – and fortunately never materialized as a threat to our forces. The rigors of the march itself proved to be the most demanding challenge that we faced, and we completed the movement in good order. By mid-February we were arrayed in attack positions along the border ready to conduct combat operations.

The first of these proved to be small raids and reconnaissance missions, which in retrospect had an extremely salutary effect on the Task Force. Every task force in the 24th ID (M) was directed to conduct at least one cross-border combat mission prior to the start of the ground war. TF 2-18 conducted two. The first of these was an operation to destroy a guard post on the Iraqi side of the border that had been used intermittently by troops conducting surveillance of coalition movements. It is impossible to know if the Iraqis conducting these surveillance operations ever provided useful information to their headquarters, or if this first mission ever in any way contributed to the overall war effort. Nevertheless in the early morning hours of 19 February, I took my command track (M113) and a Fire Support Team (FIST) vehicle with a small security element to a concealed position overlooking the border post. We observed the building for an hour or so. Then on my order artillery tubes from 4-41 Field Artillery (direct support [DS] of

the 197th) fired two laser controlled copperhead rounds which my FIST guided into the border post – the first shots fired in anger in DESERT STORM by the 197th! We got direct hits, collapsing the roof of the building. Later, a scout team confirmed what we believed to be true at the time from our observation post – no Iraqi casualties.

The second cross-border mission conducted by TF 2-18 was a reconnaissance deep into Iraqi territory. On the evening of 22 February, Team D/2-18 (an infantry company reinforced with tanks) led by the 2-18 Scout platoon crossed over the border headed north on a route reconnaissance. I accompanied the recon in my command track. On our right flank, TF 1-18 was conducting a coordinated mission of the same nature. The purpose of the recon was to determine the nature of the terrain along our attack route and to determine the likelihood of encountering any enemy resistance (positions or obstacles). We traveled approximately 70 km into Iraq, finding no enemy obstacles or positions and learning that the terrain was remarkably well suited to support easy movement and a high rate of advance for the initial part of the attack. As both TF recon parties returned, the forces in the TF 1-18 sector reported contact with an enemy anti-aircraft radar site, which they attacked and destroyed with MLRS rockets and M1 tank fires. The sight of the MLRS rockets being fired by the DS battery from 4-41 FA was impressive to my soldiers, even as far from the target area as we were. As we expected an imminent order to cross the line of departure to begin the ground phase of DESERT STORM, TF 1-18 and 2-18 left Scout platoon elements of their recon parties on screen lines about 25 km inside Iraq while the remainder of both teams crossed safely back into Saudi in the early morning hours of 23 February.

As the task force reset after the successful reconnaissance mission none of us were sure exactly when we would receive the order to attack. The commanders in the brigade had set the end of February as the estimated time when we would roll. But attack preparations across the theater seemed to be quickening and the pace of coalition cross-border activity picked up rapidly, indicating an earlier than expected LD (line of departure) date. We were confident about our state of preparation from the standpoint of planning, rehearsals, training, and our psychology – the troops had been briefed and were anxious to get going. The cross-border operations had raised everyone's level of confidence about our ability to accomplish the mission.

The mission of the 197th was to lead the attack of the 24th ID (M) into the Euphrates River Valley on its left flank, providing security on the left (to the west) and maintaining contact with the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). Once in the Euphrates Valley, the Brigade would establish blocking positions oriented to the west while the remainder of the Division reoriented from a northerly attack and turned east, in order to continue the attack toward Basrah on order. Positioned this way, the Brigade would be expected to do more than just protect the Division's west flank. We would also have the mission to interdict any

Iraqi forces or supplies headed down the Euphrates on the vital Highway 8, the main route between Baghdad and Basrah.

TF 2-18 would lead the Brigade's attack on the left flank, TF 1-18 on the right, and TF 2-69 (an armor-heavy task force) would follow in support and prepare to assume the lead of the attack in either sector on order. I saw the purpose of our attack to be initially to protect the Brigade's (and therefore the Division's) left flank and to maintain contact with the 101st on the 24th ID (M) left flank. Since the 101st was conducting a classic air assault, the latter task would be no small feat for a heavy task force. The plan was to make a first link-up at a 101st forward operating base close to our intermediate objective (called Objective BROWN) which was located east of the Iraqi town known as As Salman, about 100 km inside Iraq. The next time we could expect to make physical contact with the 101st would be in the Euphrates River Valley. Once we had reached the Euphrates, the TF mission would be critical – essentially to 'close the back door' and protect the rear flank of the Brigade and Division from any threats while we reoriented to continue along with the Division's attack to the east.

Just back from our reconnaissance mission on the morning of 23 February, I received a call from the Brigade Commander that we were to attack that afternoon. We greeted this news with some consternation, yet with excitement and anticipation. We had just returned from an all-night mission that had yielded only negative results – we knew where the enemy wasn't along a line approximately 70 km into Iraq. That information had been hard won through a tense and grueling ground recon and the troops were tired. And we still had only a sketchy picture of the enemy situation beyond the point to which we had physically reconned. Nevertheless, word that the attack was about to begin spread rapidly and was greeted with excitement and anticipation about beginning the operation for which we had planned and prepared over several months. By nightfall, TF 2-18 had assumed responsibility for the attack zone on the 197th's left flank out to the screen line that had been established by our scouts the night before. This would become our line of departure the next day. Soldiers of the TF slept fitfully throughout the night of 23 February, everyone sensing that the battle was about to begin.

At 1500 hours on 24 February the ground war began for the soldiers of the 197th. The soldiers of TF 2-18 led the Brigade's attack on the left, many of them with the words from the attack order written by our Division Commander, MG Barry R. McCaffrey, ringing in their ears:

> Soldiers of the Victory Division – we now begin a great battle to destroy an aggressor Army and free two million Kuwaiti people. We will fight under the American flag … There will be no turning back when we attack into battle. One hundred thousand American and French soldiers of the XVIII Airborne Corps will fight on our flanks. We have the weapons and the military training equal to the task. We pray that our courage and skill will bring this war to a speedy close.

The initial attack lasted through the night and progressed without any incident. By midnight we were about 125 km into Iraq. Just prior to daybreak, the TF held up in attack positions overlooking Objective (OBJ) BROWN (our intermediate objective) where we had reports that the Iraqi 45th Infantry Division had taken up positions. This was also where we hoped to link up with the 101st on our left flank. We controlled air strikes into the vicinity of OBJ BROWN and observed several secondary explosions, indicating that there were in fact some military positions in the area. When we rolled across the objective we received scattered small arms fire and virtually no resistance. TF 2-18 was credited with taking 11 prisoners at the close of the engagement, all of whom were evacuated and interrogated. Later we were to find out that these soldiers came from an air defense unit, and that the majority of the fighting forces of the 45th Division had displaced to the French sector to the west. That afternoon I personally traveled west from OBJ BROWN on a road that led to As Salman to make the prearranged linkup on our left flank. With no little surprise, I was able to make contact with and do face to face coordination with my West Point classmate who was the battalion commander from the 101st on our left flank.

We declared OBJ BROWN secure at about 1000 hours on 25 February and began to prepare for the continuation of the attack into the Euphrates River Valley. The plan called for a night move into attack positions some 70 km away. By nightfall a heavy rain was falling and the winds had increased dramatically. Though there was no enemy contact anywhere in the Division sector as we moved into attack positions, the movement was slow and extremely difficult. It wasn't until 0800 hours, on 26 February that the TF was closed in attack positions and prepared to continue the attack. In the attack position, I pulled leaders together for a quick huddle to discuss the upcoming attack to our final objectives. From higher headquarters we had received very erratic intelligence reports of several battalion-size elements in our sector of the Euphrates River Valley, but no clear picture of where they were or what types of division they had come from. Additionally we had no good information on the nature of the terrain that lay ahead, a factor that would come to significantly bear on the conduct of operations over the next 24 hours. We quickly shared information, did some hasty planning, and prepared for the attack, which we commenced in a blinding sandstorm at 1400 hours, on 26 February.

We had planned to attack in a task force diamond formation, with a mechanized infantry team (reinforced with tanks) moving in the lead, and infantry teams on the flanks. Our tank team would trail, prepared to 'flex' either right or left in reaction to contact with the enemy. The task force formation would be preceded by the Scout platoon who would gather intelligence and provide early warning. By nightfall, weather conditions and terrain would conspire to foil our initial plans. The trafficability was so poor that the TF reformed into a single column of vehicles that attempted to wind its way on a trail through dry desert

lake beds (sahbkas). On this trail I was following Team D, our lead company sized element, which was preceded by the Scout platoon.

At the time I was receiving reports from 1-18 IN, our sister battalion on the right, that they were making relatively good progress toward the Euphrates River Valley. They had temporarily paused prior to the final assault to allow the Brigade's DS artillery battalion the time to get into position to provide supporting fires for the assault. Just as I was receiving this report, word came back to me from the TF Scouts that conditions on our trail were deteriorating. I myself had noticed that my command vehicle, an M113 Armored Personnel Carrier, was laboring to make its way through the thickening mud. The time had come for a decision about continuing to make our way along this trail, or turning the TF around and trying an alternate route.

At this precise moment I monitored a report that the TF 1-18 Scouts were under fire. They had gone out ahead of TF 1-18 into the river valley to find a good approach and had made contact. Two men were wounded. The TF commander, my West Pont classmate LTC Bill Chamberlain, was calling for artillery fire to support them, but the DS battalion was not yet set. As he gave the order to his TF to move forward, it was clear to me that the enemy in the valley would be able to focus undivided attention on 1-18 as they moved forward to rescue their Scouts. Turning the TF around at this critical time was no longer an option. I gave my executive officer the order to take command of the portion of the TF that was behind me, about three companies, and to find an alternate route into the valley. The TF Scouts, Team Delta, and I continued to work our way north towards the Euphrates.

The first indication that we were entering our objective area came from my TF Scouts. They began reporting sightings of numerous trucks and personnel on the ground in a complex of revetments and bunkers. As they moved into position to better observe, the lead Scout vehicles reported that they thought they were being fired at by small arms. I told the Scout platoon leader to hold fire until he was certain that he was in contact with enemy forces. My fear was that we could possibly be engaging civilians (there were numerous Bedouin bands in the area) or, worse, that we might have made contact with elements of our sister task force's Scout platoon which we knew had already reached the river valley. Despite the repeated requests from my Scout platoon leader, I had him hold fire as I worked my way to the front of the formation to assess the situation myself. I arrived on the scene at the same time that the Scouts made positive identification of enemy vehicles and positions that were firing rockets and small arms at us. I gave the order to open fire and began to move my tanks and infantry carriers forward to join the fight.

We were to find out later that the enemy positions we were attacking were manned by the 3rd Commando regiment of the Iraqi RGFC (Republican Guard Forces Command). Their soldiers were mostly dismounted and firing at us from bunkers although we spotted several vehicles placed between the bunkers. We

attacked the troops and vehicles with small arms and grenades launched from MK-19 automatic launchers that we had mounted on our M113s. Eventually the Team D commander moved his tanks forward and engaged the enemy vehicles with effective main gun fires. The TF FSO who was in my command track called for supporting artillery fires which arrived almost immediately and were quickly adjusted onto the objective area, with devastating effect. For approximately two hours we battled the enemy in this fashion, attacking by fire and moving only to secure better firing positions. Gradually the enemy resistance weakened, and at about midnight I gave the order to dismount our infantry soldiers and completely clear the objective. The rest of the night was spent clearing bunkers, the majority of which were abandoned or undefended, or manned by Iraqis who proved more than willing to surrender. By daybreak, the remainder of the task force, commanded by my XO (Executive Officer), had worked its way along an alternate route and joined us on the objective. We had counted 50 enemy soldiers killed in action and taken no friendly casualties.

In the early morning hours of 27 February as the sun rose over the Euphrates, we reorganized the task force and established a hasty defense. The defense was oriented to the west, protecting the Division's rear as other maneuver task forces moved into the river valley and turned east, prepared to continue the attack toward Basrah. Supplies were moved up, refueling commenced, and a hasty planning process began as word came down that we would indeed be continuing the attack. Some were able to get some much-needed rest, as most of us had gone three days without any significant sleep. Little did we know that there would be less than 24 hours left to fight. In that time the 197th would conduct a major attack on an Iraqi airfield at Tallil (executed by TF 2-69 who passed through our formation to execute the attack). The 24th ID (M) would conduct two more major operations – an attack on Jalibah airfield and a counterattack against retreating Republican Guards forces that would result in the destruction of the better part of two RGFC divisions. But for TF 2-18 the fight was essentially over. We would follow and support the attack to the east and would do significant duty in taking prisoners and destroying enemy equipment. After the cease fire, we supported several civil affairs operations until we were withdrawn from Iraq on 9 March to arrive back in Saudi Arabia to prepare for redeployment to Fort Benning at the end of the month.

Analysis and conclusion

The statistics recorded that represent the successes of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) are remarkable indeed. In 100 hours of battle, the Division had attacked 370 km into Iraq. In defeating more than six divisions or their equivalents we had destroyed 363 tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, 314 artillery pieces, and over 1,200 trucks of various types. During and immediately after the war, the Division had destroyed over 100,000 tons of munitions.[3]

Virtually every other ground combat division that participated in DESERT STORM can boast a similar record of success. How to explain this remarkable record?

At the most basic level of analysis, ground maneuver units were successful in DESERT STORM because we fought our doctrine; that is, we brought to bear the full force of the combined arms team. Tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and attack helicopters engaged enemy vehicles and personnel with lethal effectiveness from long distances, while supporting artillery pounded the enemy in his positions. Artillery was also used with extraordinary effectiveness in response to incoming enemy indirect fire. Iraqi artillery could not place accurate fires on friendly forces without risking immediate and deadly counter-battery fire. Combat engineers cleared obstacles, ensured mobility, and built roads through the desert to support the movement of these fighting forces. These combat units were supported by enormous intelligence and logistical systems that had been developed during the Cold War years to support high intensity conflict in the European theater and adapted relatively quickly to the environment in Southwest Asia.

US forces also were equipped with superb equipment built around some of the latest innovations in the field of military technology. Most important of these were optics and fire control systems that allowed us to engage enemy forces at long range distances before they even knew we were in the area. Communications and situational awareness technology also made a huge difference. For the first time in the history of warfare, combatants were able instantaneously to locate themselves precisely on the battlefield and under any conditions, and to communicate these locations reliably to higher headquarters and adjacent units. We also had an unsurpassed capability to determine and communicate accurate locations of enemy forces, which greatly aided our ability to destroy them.

We were ready for this fight because we had trained for exactly this kind of battle at our Combined Training Centers – combined arms, high tech, open terrain, fire and maneuver. True, we had the advantage of being able to spend several months during DESERT SHIELD tuning up for the fight. But our training advantage began in the late 1980s when we really figured out how to train – beginning with the analysis of detailing a mission into specific supporting training tasks, and then establishing conditions and standards associated with each task that would support effective training.

The well-trained units and soldiers were also well led. We were the beneficiaries of a system of leader development that had produced NCOs and commissioned officers who had no equal anywhere in the world. It has often been remarked that we could have switched equipment with our foe, and fought using Iraqi weapons with our soldiers, led by our leaders, and achieved the same results.

The notion of *duty, honor, country* and what it means to our Army was never clearer to me than it was during DESERT STORM. The firm belief that it was this set of values that guided all of us who were experiencing such hardship and sacrifice in service to our nation was invaluable in the confusion and disorder of combat. It gave rise to a sense of trust that was indispensable to all of us. Soldiers trusted their leaders to make the right choices to accomplish a mission while subjecting

the unit to the least possible danger. Commanders trusted their comrades on the left and right and in higher headquarters even when they couldn't see or communicate with them. And leaders trusted their soldiers to do the right thing – to have the courage to face the enemy and fight even in the face of grave danger, and to show compassion to that same enemy and not abuse or degrade him when the fighting had ended. In the final analysis there are virtually no instances in the recorded history of the war where that trust was unfounded or betrayed.

A sense of contribution to a greater good was very clear to all of us in the task force that I led in DESERT STORM. We understood that the necessity to protect the left flank of the brigade's attack was important only because the brigade needed to guard the division's attack into the Euphrates River Valley. The division attack in turn was designed to block reinforcement of RGFC forces in Kuwait. To accomplish that task would facilitate the defeat of the Iraqi Army in Kuwait, its eventual withdrawal, and the success of the coalition effort. This success would signal the resolve of America to resist aggression in Southwest Asia and by extension anywhere where its vital interests were threatened. In the run-up to our attack, I drew these connections for the soldiers in the task force so that they would understand how their individual actions were important to the nation.

Notes

1 See 24th Mechanized Infantry Division Combat Team, Attack Plan OPLAN 91-3, Department of the Army (Fort Stewart, GA, 1991), pp. 2-6.
2 See Jason Kamiya, *A History of the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division Combat Team during Operation Desert Storm*, (Fort Stewart, GA, 1991), pp. 2, 3.
3 Ibid., p. 40.

3

AIRBORNE UNIT OPERATIONS

Lieutenant General (Retired) James Johnson

The 82nd Airborne Division has long served as the US Army's rapid response combat force. As part of the XVIII Airborne Corps headquartered at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the 82nd had already proven its quick-reaction capabilities in several missions, including the 1989 invasion of Panama. From then until today, the Army has consistently looked to the XVIII Airborne Corps and the 82nd Airborne for first-response forces.

Thus, it was not a surprise when the first ground force ordered to the Persian Gulf was the 82nd Airborne Division. Within 18 hours of notification, the division's ready brigade was flying out of Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina. The date was 8 August 1991. By August 24, most of the division had arrived in Saudi Arabia.

In the first part of the campaign, the XVIII Airborne Corps comprised the total ground force designated for combat operations against Iraq. At first, its mission was solely the defense of Saudi Arabia, although few believed the mission would end there. As American combat power in the theater waxed with the arrival of additional forces, war planners began to prepare for offensive operations. Under the initial 'one corps' plan (the XVIII Corps), the 24th ID would make the main attack; the 82nd would serve as the Corps reserve and protect lines of communication.[1] *From the start, airborne operations were considered implausible on the open desert, because of the perceived risk involved. This was an armored war.*

After General Schwarzkopf asked for and got another corps (VII Corps) to put into the fight, the XVIII Airborne Corps' mission shifted to executing a long, difficult envelopment of the Republican Guard. The 82nd's role in this 'left hook' would be to follow and support, and then to seize Iraqi airbases at Tallil and Jalibah.

General Johnson provides a unique perspective on the 82nd's role in the Persian Gulf War's armor-heavy combat. As the commander of the Division during the Gulf War, he argues that the 82nd could have had even greater combat effectiveness had it conducted airborne operations. Beyond that, Johnson provides insight into training for combat operations, the force structure of the division, and reasons for the division's success in battle.

The mission of the 82nd Airborne Division is simple: To deploy anywhere in the world on short notice, fight and win. It is the toughest, most demanding mission of any division in the Army. It requires units that are capable of rapid deployment and forced entry operations. It requires units that are capable of employment across the entire spectrum of conflict. It requires soldiers of extraordinary caliber who are trained to fight in any environment – in the Arctic, in the jungle, in the desert, or in urban and complex terrain.

After the Arab-Israeli War in 1973, the 82nd Airborne Division was reorganized to add armor-killing firepower and tactical mobility so that the Division was better equipped to sustain combat operations against a heavy enemy force in the desert. Specifically, an anti-tank (TOW) company was added to each infantry brigade and a light armored (Sheridan) battalion and attack helicopter (Apache) battalion were added to the Division force structure. Soon after that, the Division became involved in the Southwest Asia (SWA) Contingency Operations Plans. During the 1980s, the Division continued to develop anti-armor doctrine and routinely trained with organic and mixed forces to fight against heavy enemy forces in open, desert-type terrain. At the time of Operation DESERT SHIELD/ DESERT STORM, the 82nd Airborne Division was not just another Army 'light' division.

In order to meet its strategic requirement to deploy combat forces worldwide on no-notice, the 82nd Airborne Division maintains one brigade task force – called a Division Ready Brigade (DRB) – on two to six hour recall, to assemble and begin deployment in 18 hours, 365 days a year. This level of readiness is sustained by maintaining three DRBs and rotating them through three distinct cycles: (1) a 'go-to-war' or mission cycle, (2) a 'train-for-war' or intensified training cycle, and (3) a 'support' cycle. What it takes to get ready and remain ready is a tough, realistic training program that stresses physical fitness, small unit drills, courageous soldiers, tactically and technically competent leaders, and the collective warfighting skills that are the hallmark of our military doctrine.

In December 1989, the 82nd Airborne Division proved itself to be a combat-ready joint contingency force by making a no-notice, night-time, combat parachute assault onto Torrijos International Airport in the Republic of Panama. By the time the sun went down after the first 24 hours of the invasion, all four of the Division's D-Day assault objectives had been secured. For the next three weeks, the Division conducted stability and support operations in Panama City to help make the country free for democracy. The Division returned to Fort Bragg in late January 1990.

In July 1990, as tensions in the Persian Gulf began to intensify, the 82nd Airborne Division, along with other units of XVIII Airborne Corps, participated in a CENTCOM-driven Command Post Exercise (CPX) called INTERNAL LOOK 90. This exercise took place concurrently at Fort Bragg, North Carolina and Hurlburt Field, Florida. The CPX scenario postulated an Iraqi attack into Saudi Arabia with six heavy divisions. XVIII Airborne Corps was deployed to the region (on computer) to establish a defense of the eastern sector of Saudi Arabia.

The security of Dhahran, Ad Damman, and the Abqaiq oil facilities turned out to be very similar to the missions later assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division during Operation DESERT SHIELD.

Only weeks after the conclusion of CPX INTERNAL LOOK, Iraq invaded Kuwait. The 82nd Airborne Division was alerted on 7 August 1990 for immediate deployment to the Persian Gulf. Several days earlier, I had accompanied the Training Cycle's DRB to its scheduled rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Chaffee, Arizona. By the time I returned to Fort Bragg, North Carolina in the middle of the night, the Division was already six hours into its alert notification and assembly sequence. Because of existing readiness procedures and the intensity and frequency of the Division's Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise (EDRE) Program, everyone knew what had to be done and was already in the process of doing it. The next day, lead elements of the Mission Cycle's DRB were on their way to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Over a period of the next three weeks, we moved by strategic airlift, using 581 C141 equivalents: 12,400 paratroopers and the bulk of the Division's combat capability; 54 Sheridans from the Division's organic light armored battalion; 188 HMMWV-mounted TOWs, the Division's long-range, anti-tank weapon system; and an aviation task force, including 18 Apache attack helicopters, the Army's best tank-killer, day or night.[2]

We arrived in Saudi Arabia on 9 August 1990. Our initial mission: establish a lodgment and secure air and sea ports of debarkation for follow-on coalition forces. On 12 August, the Division's lead brigade moved north along the coast of the Persian Gulf to secure arrival sites at Al Jubayl for the US Marine Corps. The remainder of the Division continued to defend in depth along high-speed avenues of approach leading to the international airport at Dhahran and the seaport at Ad Damman. President Bush's statement of having 'drawn a line in the sand' demonstrated the seriousness of the US commitment to defend Saudi Arabia. The President chose to do this with the bayonet of an American paratrooper.

On 18 August, US Marine Corps units began to arrive at Al Jubayl. On the 26th, the Marines assumed responsibility for their sector, while the 82nd Airborne Division continued to block high-speed avenues of approach from the north. My intent was to array combat power in depth and to engage the enemy with long-range, anti-tank weapon systems and indirect fires, forcing the enemy to deploy, so that his extended lines of communications became vulnerable to US Air Force and Navy close air support.

On 29 August, the 82nd Airborne Division deployed an aviation task force to positions along Tapline Road near An Nuayriyah. Their mission was to conduct a battle handover with Saudi forces, if necessary – and to continue security operations to attrit enemy forces attacking south from Khafji. Responsibility for this covering force was turned over to the 101st Air Assault Division on September 4th, when there were sufficient XVIII Airborne Corps units arriving in theater to defend the Eastern Area Command.

Toward the end of September and in early October, the 82nd Airborne Division moved to defend the Al Ghwar Oil Fields, the largest known oil reserves in the world. A brigade task force was used to block approaches and to protect critical oil facilities in the vicinity of Abqaiq and Al Hufuf. Later, in early December, I moved another brigade task force to the capital city of Riyadh to interdict a potential terrorist threat and to protect key facilities.

We used the period known as Operation DESERT SHIELD – September through December 1990 – to make soldiers 'desert tough.' Individual training placed special emphasis on physical fitness and chemical defense procedures. Collective training focused on small unit drills using live fire exercises to breach obstacles, clear trenches, and take down bunkers – during both day and night operations. Battalion and company commanders routinely integrated artillery, mortars, attack helicopters, close air support, armor, and engineer support in combined arms live fire exercises. All of this built confidence in soldiers – confidence in themselves, confidence in their equipment, confidence in their buddies, and confidence in their leaders.

My priorities as Commander, 82nd Airborne Division, during Operation DESERT SHIELD were: (1) wartime operational requirements; (2) individual and collective training; (3) taking care of soldiers (quality of life); (4) force protection (even before it became fashionable, there was always a comprehensive security plan to deal with any potential terrorist threat); (5) safety; and (6) respect for host nation sovereignty and culture.[3] The Division focused on training at the team, squad, and platoon levels. These units are the building blocks for everything else. Proficiency in the basics, under tough, realistic conditions, builds confidence and a winning spirit among soldiers and their leaders.

Operation DESERT STORM's air campaign, beginning on 17 January 1991, provided cover for the 82nd Airborne Division to move north and west to the extreme western edge of the Allied sector, near Rafha, along the Iraqi border. This unprecedented operational maneuver of 16,200 troops, 3,091 vehicles, and 109 helicopters – by air and by ground, some 750 miles – placed the Division in its forward tactical assembly area, just inside the Saudi border.

During the air campaign, we remained in the open desert, where we dispersed our forces, dug-in, camouflaged, and continued battlefield preparations. Extensive ground and aerial patrolling along the Iraqi border paved the way for deep attack and armed reconnaissance operations that would follow later. These deep operations – 100 miles inside Iraq – began seven days prior to the ground campaign. Under cover of darkness, the Apache attack helicopter, with its Hellfire anti-tank missile and 30mm Gatling gun, targeted enemy armor, artillery, logistics sites, and command and control facilities in the Division's zone of action.

The ground campaign began on 24 February, with the 82nd Airborne Division moving north with the 6th Light Armored Division (French) to seize the town of As Salman. We then moved east and passed through the 101st Air Assault Division with the intent of relieving the 3rd Armored Cavalry. Instead, as the 24th

Mechanized Division turned east toward Basrah, the 82nd Airborne Division was directed to move north into the Euphrates River Valley to seize the Iraqi airbases at Tallil and Jalibah. By the time the '100 hour war' was over, we had traveled almost 250 miles in three days.

The 82nd Airborne Division remained in the Euphrates River Valley for three weeks, conducting denial operations and providing security and humanitarian assistance to refugees and displaced civilians along Highway 1 and Highway 8 leading into Basrah. We were relieved by elements of VII Corps on 24 February 1991 and began to move by ground and by air to our former positions in Saudi Arabia. Ultimately, we moved to Dhahran – where we redeployed by commercial air to Pope AFB and Fort Bragg, North Carolina – the majority of the troops arriving home by early April 1991. The 82nd Airborne Division lost two soldiers during the entire eight-month deployment to the Persian Gulf. Ten troopers were wounded in action (WIA) during the 100-hour war.

During the Division's eight-month deployment, the Theater Commander opted not to allow the movement of the Division's parachutes and accompanying equipment. As a result, the Division could not realize its potential to conduct airborne operations. During Operation DESERT SHIELD, this capability would have given my paratroopers the opportunity to sustain their jump skills, while providing a visible deterrence against further Iraqi aggression in the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, the presence of mass tactical airborne training exercises and demonstrations would have effectively complemented the Theater Commander's deception plans and operations for Operation DESERT STORM. Later, the Division's airborne assault capability would have greatly accelerated operational maneuver by seizing and securing objectives deep inside of Iraq. From our point of view, there were several situations in the Persian Gulf that were suitable for the employment of airborne forces that were high payoff, logistically supportable, and low risk.

One of the hallmarks of the Army's warfighting doctrine in the late 1980s was the use of mixed forces during battle focused training activities. Heavy–light and light–heavy operations were routinely exercised at the Army's combat training centers – at the National Training Center (NTC) and at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). Unfortunately, during Operation DESERT STORM, the cross reinforcement of heavy and light units did not take place among the various combat divisions of XVIII Airborne Corps. Mixed forces operations would have enhanced command and control, simplified tactical maneuver concepts, and given all combat division commanders greater flexibility. In the case of the 82nd Airborne Division, mixed forces operations would have added considerable lethality, tactical mobility, and survivability to its warfighting capability in Iraq.

Many failed to fully appreciate the significant role of the 82nd Airborne Division during Operation DESERT SHIELD, and this view adversely affects the capability of the Division today. Since the Gulf War, the Division has lost its organic light armored battalion (Sheridan) and attack helicopter battalion

(Apache). What some have forgotten, apparently, is that throughout the entire month of August 1990, the 82nd Airborne Division represented the only credible US ground force in northeastern Saudi Arabia. It was the only combat division in our armed forces that could be strategically deployed on 'no notice' and be capable of fighting enemy armor immediately upon arrival in the Persian Gulf. Armored and mechanized units are simply not capable of such rapid strategic force projection. Today, our nation's strategic mobility – by air or by sea – still reflects a major shortfall. The Division remains our nation's foremost strategically responsive ground combat force, but it must be made more lethal and tactically mobile in order to be employed across the full spectrum of warfare.

During the Gulf War, the 82nd Airborne Division validated the concept of 'battle focused' training that is the centerpiece of the Army's training doctrine. We revised the Division's Mission Essential Task List twice in the Persian Gulf, based on changing operational requirements. We trained and evaluated each of its battle tasks in numerous, multi-echelon command post exercises, staff exercises, field training exercises, and external evaluations. Realistic, challenging live fire exercises (LFXs) were absolutely essential in developing soldier and leader confidence, fire discipline, fire control, and teamwork. We built two firehouses in the desert – one single-story, the other a double-story version – to allow fire teams and rifle squads to conduct LFXs with grenades and individual weapons, to become proficient in the skills necessary to clear a building successfully. We also built a company-sized Iraqi strong point with 1,500 meters of obstacles: including a large tank ditch covered by bunkers, a minefield 400 meters in depth, also covered by bunkers, and a large wire obstacle that had to be breached in order for infantrymen to get into the trench system. I used this Iraqi-style strong point to validate each infantry battalion task force in a multi-echelon, combined arms LFX that required the integration of artillery, mortars, close air support, attack helicopter, and engineer support, while synchronizing the movement of troops and armor to seize an objective. The 82nd Airborne Division experienced no fratricide, yet evacuated more enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) during Operation DESERT STORM than all other XVIII Airborne Corps units combined. This can be directly attributed to the confidence and discipline derived from frequent and realistic combined arms LFXs at every level.

The force structure of the 82nd Airborne Division, however, was barely adequate for the conduct of sustained combat operations during Operation DESERT STORM. For example, the Division was forced to purchase trucks on the commercial market in Riyadh in order to transport two of its three infantry brigades during the ground campaign. Unfortunately, the Division still lacks tactical mobility and has less warfighting capability today than it did ten years ago. There is an urgent requirement to (1) reactivate within the Division an organic light armored battalion, equipped with the armored gun system (AGS); (2) assign to the Division's aviation brigade an organic attack helicopter battalion, equipped with the Apache attack helicopter; (3) assign to the division artillery an organic general support 155mm artillery battalion and target

acquisition battery; and (4) add enough infantry carrier vehicles to transport at least one infantry brigade.

Today, the 82nd Airborne Division remains our nation's premier rapidly deployable, strategic forced-entry response to small-scale contingencies and stability and support operations. The goal of the Army's transformation is to build a strategically responsive force – capable of employment across the full spectrum of warfare – yet it is disappointing that nothing has been done to enhance the lethality or the tactical mobility of the 82nd Airborne Division. Three of the Army's interim brigade combat teams (IBCTs) could easily be imbedded in the 82nd Airborne Division in the near term. All that is needed is the addition of a light armored battalion (AGS) and sufficient infantry carrier vehicles (LAV III) to transport one infantry brigade. Moreover, Division Ready Brigade (or IBCT) organizational and operational concepts, doctrine, training, and readiness procedures are already in place in the 82nd Airborne Division, ready to meet the goals of Army Transformation.

The Division succeeded in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM for four critical reasons:

1 *Quality of the American soldier*. Soldiers were extraordinarily courageous in battle and compassionate in their dealings with EPWs and the large number of refugees and displaced civilians encountered in the Euphrates River Valley. As always, these soldiers were absolutely committed to the service of their country for all the right reasons.
2 *Tough, realistic training*. Both prior to deployment and during the 'defend and deter' phase of Operation DESERT SHIELD in Saudi Arabia, soldiers trained as if their lives depended upon it. This was a direct result of the Army's training revolution in the 1980s.
3 *Leadership*. Leadership at every echelon of command proved outstanding – both officer and NCO – especially at the small unit level. This was a result of the Army's extraordinary emphasis on leader development during the 1980s and a greatly expanded NCO education system, as well as the Division's success in graduating large numbers of junior leaders from Ranger School.
4 *Support of the American people*. Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM was a great victory for the armed forces of the United States because of the overwhelming support of the American people – people of all ages – people from every walk of life – people from all across our country, indeed, from all across the world – and, most important, support from our veterans, whose prayers and concerns were a tremendous inspiration to everyone involved.

Notes

1 See Robert H. Scales, Jr., *Certain Victory* (Washington, DC: Office of Chief of Staff, 1993), p. 126.

2 The numbers used to define the strategic deployment, the operational move to the Forward TAA, and to describe battle losses came from the author's personal notes as the Division Commander, used in briefings to senior leaders at the time and based on 82nd Airborne Division records and reports.

3 In an editorial interview, General Johnson communicated his discomfort with the words 'I' and 'my' in this text, stating that it was always a team/Division effort. However, as all responsibility rested firmly on his shoulders as the Division Commander, we opted to retain the first-person perspective when possible.

Part 2

COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT AT THE THEATER LEVEL

4

THEATER LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

Dr (Lieutenant Colonel, Retired) Kent Laudeman

The 22nd Support Command oversaw the entire logistical support operation of the Gulf War. Its mission included moving and supplying every piece of equipment and every soldier into the theater, and then sustaining their needs throughout the war. The 22nd Support Command was provisionally constituted on 19 August 1990. The entire command at that time consisted of General William 'Gus' Pagonis and 21 officers.[1] *By the end of the month, the Support Command was fully functioning, filled with various personnel from staffs in Europe and the US, and through the activation of reserve units.*

Dr Kent Laudeman's organization – the 21st TAACOM CONUS Augmentation in Indianapolis, Indiana – was one of those activated units. The 21st TAACOM (CA) deployed to Saudi Arabia in mid-December of 1990 to augment the 22nd Support Command. The 22nd quickly assigned 17 of those personnel to a newly formed 22nd Support Command (Forward) and deployed them towards the front lines at King Khalid Military City in northern Saudi Arabia. Dr Laudeman became Lieutenant Colonel Laudeman, and his new team became responsible for 'Host Nation Support.'

In this capacity, Colonel Laudeman's cell served as the primary interface between the US military's forward logistical needs and Saudi Arabian businesses and private citizens. Saudi Arabia had already agreed to pay for all contracted support, but someone had to identify the logistical need, find the source(s), and get those sources to agree to provide whatever logistical function or item was needed. The 22nd Support Command (Forward)'s Host Nation Support team accomplished that mission.

The myriad requests ranged from basic utilities to mortuary services to cooks, and everything in between. The reserve unit personnel were well trained in their fields, but the logistical challenge posed by an army of a half million soldiers and all associated vehicles and equipment was daunting. In addition, this was Saudi Arabia – a culture and a country vastly different from Germany and the NATO countries with whom host nation support personnel had expected to work and had worked in the past. Despite the ethnic, religious, linguistic, and customs differences, Colonel Laudeman's organization met challenge after challenge with

success. That success was often the result of the dedication, professionalism, and ingenuity of American officers and soldiers, both active duty and reservists, working face to face with the Arabian and Kuwaiti peoples.

My United States Army Reserve (USAR) unit, the 21st Theater Area Army Command (TAACOM) CONUS Augmentation (CA) located in Indianapolis, Indiana, was informed in early December of its mobilization to staff the 22nd Support Command Headquarters located in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The 200 members of the USAR unit, with the exception of a few active duty personnel, were reserve soldiers and full-time civilians engaged in various professions in the city of Indianapolis, the state of Indiana, and surrounding states.

The 21st TAACOM (CA) was mobilized on 4 December 1990 and, after two weeks of home station training, arrived by C-130 Hercules aircraft at a desert airport approximately 15 kilometers northwest of Dhahran on 18 December 1990. Following one week of orientation and training, a small cell was further deployed as the 22nd SUPCOM Forward (Fwd) on 26 December to King Khalid Military City (KKMC) in the Northern Province of Saudi Arabia. KKMC was a brigade-sized Saudi Arabian military training post designed by US Engineers in the middle of the desert approximately 100 kilometers from the point where the Saudi, Kuwaiti, and Iraqi borders meet. We called it the Emerald City because it looked like an oasis in the middle of the desert: buildings, infrastructure, nine special, deep water wells, including one which supported an elaborate fountain in the center of the Saudi Headquarters complex. Logistics Base Bravo at KKMC, which was several thousand acres in size, became the primary forward logistical nerve center for Operation Desert Storm. As the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Host Nation Support for the Northern Province, I served as the primary US Military Liaison Officer for all issues involving the host nation and the logistics mission of the 22nd SUPCOM Fwd.

The 22nd SUPCOM Fwd Host Nation Section's 17 personnel (one Deputy, ten Officers, four NCOs, one Specialist, and one host nation linguist/translator) served as a logistics 'force multiplier' in order to coordinate with and request from Saudi points-of-contact various forms of host nation support. Our requests included the use of Saudi buildings for the 22nd HQ Fwd and attached units (office, billeting, mess, warehouse, covered storage, maintenance, PX, hospital/clinic, etc.), land (unit location/operation, logistical bases, convoy support centers, ammunition issue and storage, equipment collection sites, firing ranges, etc.), access to the KKMC airfield, and the use of highways and roads in the Northern Province.

Additional support included access to utilities (gas, non-potable water, electricity, trash collection and disposal, mechanical refrigeration, etc.), telecommunications, and potable water. Other forms of support involved the use of equipment (trucks, front-end loaders, graders, bulldozers, cranes, etc.) and the

requests for various supplies (fuels, lubricants, fresh produce, baked goods, construction materials, tools, office supplies, etc.).

Other standard requests involved the provision of various services (dining, billeting, maintenance, bath, laundry, mortuary and burial, decontamination, fire fighting, material handling, vehicle service, etc.). Special requests included barrier and other materials and various forms of civilian labor (cooks, mechanics, equipment operators, maintenance personnel, drivers, material handlers, etc.) to augment the US logistics mission.

During DESERT SHIELD, DESERT STORM, and DESERT FAREWELL, more than 600 ad-hoc US requests for host nation support were drafted in English, translated into Arabic, and submitted by the Host Nation Section to Saudi Liaison Officers or senior Saudi counterparts on the staff at KKMC. Following the review of each host nation support request, the Saudi response was returned to the Host Nation Section, translated from Arabic to English, and reported to the 22nd Command Section or the US Unit and briefed to the CG, 22nd Support Command Fwd.

My prior military experiences as a US Army Reserve officer included the Civil Affairs (CA) Advanced Course, various CA Company Team Leader positions, Commander of the 415th CA Company/Battalion, Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Military Operations with the 21st TAACOM (CA). I also had experience as a participant in six Field Training Exercises and Command Post Exercises in the Netherlands or Germany. Without question, the most valuable Civil Military Operations and logistics hands-on training for DESERT STORM was the REFORGER (Return of Forces to Germany) exercise of 1987.

My REFORGER 1987 experience involved both a host nation support and a logistics mission. The US Host Nation Support personnel at the logistics headquarters in northern Germany served as the command's single point-of-contact in coordinating a variety of issues with the German National Territorial Command. Much of the work included the execution of pre-positioned contracts (access to land, buildings, military posts/compounds, roads, bridges, and rail; food and water; telecommunication assets and access; support services; and various supplies) that were implemented with the arrival of US forces. Host Nation Support also involved ad-hoc military support and services during all phases (Deployment, Simulated Combat with Opposing Forces, Sustainment, and Redeployment) of REFORGER. Throughout these phases, the Host Nation Support personnel were also responsible for various forms of damage control where they conducted an assessment of the damaged facility, building, or equipment and made a recommendation for US compensation to be paid to the damaged German party.

Many of the same real-time, hands-on, ad-hoc host nation requests experienced in REFORGER were executed again throughout the various logistics phases (Preparation and Pre-positioning, Corps Movement, Ground Offensive, Defense of Kuwait, and Redeployment) of DESERT SHIELD/STORM/FAREWELL. The REFORGER exercise served for me as a precursor to the host nation requirements faced in DESERT STORM in terms of realism and training.

Whether in exercises or combat situations, Host Nation Support, coupled with the logistics mission, has served as a resource multiplier for US forces. Near the end of the twentieth century, the US war concept was to deploy our forces as quickly as possible. This rapid deployment concept placed great demands upon host nation contracting and support. During DESERT STORM, it was interesting to hear some of the senior military and civilian logisticians talk about DEFORGER (the reverse of REFORGER) as they referred to the movement of forces and equipment out of Germany and various US POMCUS (pre-positioning of material configured to unit sets) Sites to the Persian Gulf. The combination of numerous civil affairs training and exercise opportunities and the coupling of host nation support to a logistics environment provided an invaluable background for future deployments.

The 21st TAACOM (CA) was in a reasonable state of personnel and individual equipment readiness when we received the order to mobilize. During the two weeks of home station preparation for mobilization a series of tasks were completed. They included weapons qualification, individual soldier task training, equipment issue, medical records review, personal affairs, initiation of wills, etc. Our mobilization tasks were completed with the assistance of personnel from Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN. In retrospect, USAR officers and enlisted personnel, as civilians, brought a wealth of logistical experiences and range of professional knowledge and skills to their assigned positions and teams.

The 21st TAACOM (CA), located in Indianapolis, IN, has had a long relationship in supporting the 21st TAACOM stationed at Panzer Casern in Kaiserslautern, Germany. During two- to three-week annual training exercises and Command Post Exercises (CPXs), personnel from the 21st CONUS Augmentation unit fell in on and supported the command's Logistics Operations Center (LOC) for the 21st TAACOM HQ in Germany. The staff officers and NCOs, in both commands, were like brothers and sisters. The active duty and reserve personnel of both commands wore the same shoulder sleeve insignia or unit patch and worked as one unit. Inevitably the names of the active duty military players changed; however, the primary logistic mission, support functions, and the special issues relative to working in a host nation country remained the same. Following 2-3 days of orientation and acclimation, US Army Reserve (CA) officer and NCO personnel were always up-to-speed in working with their active duty counterparts in the LOC. Beyond the 2-3 weeks of annual training that brought the two units together in Germany, there were numerous other opportunities that involved war planning, wartime stationing, command conferences, and other events that occurred throughout the year.

In addition to the opportunities for combined logistics exercises, the 21st TAACOM (CA) provided organized training opportunities for Reserve and National Guard Area Support Groups (ASG) that were located west of the Mississippi in the United States. The ASGs, when mobilized, had the wartime mission to support the 21st HQ in Germany. The CPX enabled the 21st

TAACOM (CA) Commander and Staff to interact with subordinate unit commanders and staff who participated in contingency planning and could be activated and mobilized to support the 21st TAACOM HQ in Germany or in some other of United States Army Europe's areas of responsibility.

With the Army's increased emphasis on using the National Guard and Reserve Units in power projection to provide combat service support, the 21st TAACOM (CA) US Army Reserve staff, officers, NCOs, and enlisted personnel brought a rich background of experiences when they were mobilized. In addition to the military logistics experience indicated earlier, the members of the 21st TAACOM (CA) worked full-time in various professions. Many were employed by small or large businesses that stocked and moved material, parts, and equipment. Others worked in government offices, hospitals, and agencies that provided services to a wide range of customers. Unit members included those who worked as engineers, journalists, TV commentators, newspaper reporters, in advertising, as law enforcement personnel, lawyers, teachers, professors, health care workers, technicians, office supervisors, and a wide variety of managers. Some owned and operated their own small businesses. The 21st TAACOM (CA) was so successful in mobilizing for DESERT STORM that five years later (December 1995) it was again mobilized to support the movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies to Hungary and Bosnia under Operation Joint Endeavor. In both situations, the officer and enlisted personnel in the 21st TAACOM (CA) have served in a dedicated, committed, and exemplary manner.

We expected when we deployed to execute the theater logistics mission in support of the 22nd Support Command in Dhahran. Generally, a theater Army support command would serve as the single point of contact for logistics in a theater. The 22nd SUPCOM was split between the HQ Main in Dhahran and the HQ Forward in KKMC. The Main HQ was responsible for receiving combat and combat service support personnel, equipment, and material by ship (Port of Dammam) and by air (Dhahran Air Base). Through the use of ports of debarkation, transportation assets, main supply routes (MSRs), convoy support centers, and logistics bases, personnel, units, equipment and material were moved to various locations in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. As the plan for the ground war developed, the 22nd SUPCOM HQ Forward was assigned the responsibilities for the receipt of material and supplies to support the logistics mission in the Northern Province.

The plan included the development of forward logistics bases (Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, and Echo). Log base Bravo, located at KKMC, was the largest and covered more than 1,000 acres. The plan utilized assigned land, buildings, personnel, and transportation assets to orchestrate the stocking and distributing of major supplies used by US forces. Supplies included the following: Class I, MREs, T-Rations, B-Rations, hot meals, bread, juices, milk, etc.; Class II, bottled and bulk water; Class III, bulk and packaged petroleum; Class IV, construction, fortification, barrier materials; Class V, ammunition; Class VII, major end items, and Class IX, spare parts and components. The supplies supported the movement

of the XVIII Airborne Corps from the east coast to tactical assembly areas near Rafah, the VII Corps movement from the port to tactical assembly areas along Tapline Road and KKMC, and the three days of the ground war.

We had a good working knowledge of what the mission entailed from our experiences in working the logistics mission while supporting the 21st TAACOM in Kaiserslautern over several FTXs, CPXs, and Annual Training opportunities. We were inexperienced, however, relative to the huge requirements involved in moving two corps in a desert environment where we found a limited infrastructure in terms of railroads, paved roads, buildings, and military compounds compared to what was available for use in the Netherlands and Germany. Also, unlike Europe, where the US Army had developed extensive plans for wartime stationing and pre-positioned equipment, supplies, and contracts for host nation support, host nation support in Saudi Arabia was all on the fly and ad-hoc.

We, as reserve soldiers, unrealistically expected to be gone approximately 60 or more days and then return to our civilian occupations. We literally assumed there would be a short term (artillery mentality of shoot and scoot) tour where the US forces would engage the enemy in January, and we would redeploy the force, and be home by March! In order to mobilize as quickly as we did, our strength was augmented with some personnel acquisitions (individual volunteers) for other units. Home station preparation included the normal mobilization training of weapons qualification, vaccinations, NBC training, first aid instruction, equipment and clothing issue, and the completion of other common soldier tasks. In addition all individuals completed a finance record review and initiated a will.

This latter requirement provided a serious jolt for some of our younger members and especially for those who were single parents. Weekly and monthly bills had to be paid and in some cases professionals, as enlisted personnel or junior officers, earned much less as reservists than they did as civilian professionals. Some had small businesses that could continue for a short period of time. Over an extended period there could be serious problems, however. Two or three months were perhaps manageable, but no one was thinking about another three-month extension or the possibility of being mobilized for nine months or a year! Reserve members with babies or children had to leave them with sisters, brothers, parents, grandparents, other relatives, or friends if they were not released from mobilization due to a hardship. The longer the tour, the greater the strain was on the reservist and his/her family members. Given a rapidly changing and hostile environment, the strain placed upon the family, and an inadequate home support system, additional days of mobilization weighed heavily on the minds of our reserve members. The home station support group members did their best where there was a concentration of family members and an Army Post (such as at Fort Benjamin Harrison). For those reserve members who came from distant areas of the state and other states, however, there was no nearby Army post and either limited support or none.

As far as the actual operation went, we fully anticipated an intense, fast, and massive movement of personnel, equipment, and material into the country. We expected a forward movement of the material into an area, and anticipated that the movement could be interrupted or delayed by hostile activities from an unknown Iraqi Army that was poised at the Iraqi, Kuwaiti, and Saudi borders.

All of my prior host nation and logistics experience gave me a false expectation of entering a theater with a mature and a developed host nation support system. To my surprise, the Persian Gulf War in Saudi Arabia provided a host nation structure and organization that needed to be developed from scratch! We were very fortunate that a small number of the senior Saudi Officers could speak English, but the language problem proved to be a challenge when Host Nation Officers were required to interact with Saudi junior officers, enlisted personnel, or civilians.

The mission of the 22nd SUPCOM was to organize and provide the theater level logistical support for military operations in Saudi Arabia. The arrival of the 21st TAACOM (CA) provided headquarters and operational personnel for the 22nd SUPCOM. The Host Nation Support (HNS) Team's mission was to establish contact with the host nation, organize a host nation support structure, and obtain resources for the theater logistics mission. Unlike our prior planned area of operation (Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Germany) where we had developed directories of locations for wartime stationing and HNS points-of-contact, Saudi single points of contact (SPOC) in the Eastern and Northern Provinces had to be identified and developed. Once the province SPOC was identified, the general plan for logistics and combat was shared. This led to the initial and sustainment logistical requirements to support the US forces. The requirement might be filled through available military host nation or civilian contracted support. Next began the flow of ad-hoc requests, the Saudi review of the request, and the provision of or contracting of the requested resource, material, and/or supplies.

When we arrived in Dhahran, there was a small cell from Company B of the 96th CA Battalion providing host nation support for the 22nd SUPCOM. Soon after our arrival, the 22nd SUPCOM AC of S for Host Nation Support Office was further organized into Host Nation Support Fwd (KKMC) and Host Nation Support Main (Dhahran). In January, the 96th CA Battalion Team was reassigned to a Special Forces Command and the USAR 304th CA Group arrived in the country to support the 22nd SUPCOM. At the same time, COL Robert Sholly, a Foreign Area Officer with eight years of experience in Saudi Arabia, arrived to serve as the AC of S HNS for the 22nd SUPCOM. The HNS Fwd Team at KKMC in the Northern Province included me and fifteen 304th CA Group Officers and NCOs when the Air Campaign began on 16 January.

The earlier arrival of the more lightly equipped XVIII Airborne Corps was completed by the end of October. The later arrival of the heavily armored VII Corps from Germany, however, placed additional demands on the theater logistical system and its arrival was formulated into six phases.

The first phase, Alpha, included the repositioning of thousands of tons of supplies and moving the VII Corps to its tactical assembly area (late November through 16 January 1991). Phase Bravo (21 days) was the additional movement of the two Army Corps to their attack positions. Phase Charlie (24 February on) supported the ground war with the construction of new forward logistical bases (Charlie, Echo) and the movement of various supplies (fuel, ammunition, food, water). Phase Delta (28 February on) included support for the defense of Kuwait and the provision of civil–military affairs to restore various services in Kuwait. Phase Echo (March on) included the redeployment of personnel and equipment from the northern portion of the theater. Phase Foxtrot included the establishment of Camp Freedom in Kuwait City, the positioning of a brigade set of equipment at Doha, Kuwait, humanitarian relief efforts for the Kurds in northern Iraq, and the restoration of Kuwait.

During the period from late December 1990 through August 1991 (when the first group of the 21st TAACOM (CA) and this writer returned to civilian professions), the HNS Team Fwd for the 22nd SUPCOM located in the Northern Province (KKMC) received and filled more than 600 requests for host nation support. All requests were written in Arabic and submitted to either a Saudi Military Liaison Officer or the Saudi Northern Province HQ G4 (staff logistics officer). During the Air Campaign and the Ground War, the HNS Team worked with recognition and respect for the Muslim culture and Ramadan. The 600 requests included support for access (KKMC), land (desert surrounding KKMC), KKMC air field, tactical assembly areas, main and secondary supply routes, convoy service centers on the MSRs, forward log bases, ammunition supply points, paved areas/hardstand, Weapon System Replacement Operation, life support areas (LSAs), training and firing ranges, enemy prisoner of war (EPW) camps, redeployment assembly areas, wash and USDA inspection areas, and a Concentrated Equipment Group Southwest Asia area.

Other requests included buildings (quarters, hospitals, medical clinics, cold storage, dry storage, maintenance, office/work areas), utilities (electrical, water, sewage), water (access to public wells, contracted-private wells, Reverse Osmosis Water Purification (ROWPU) unit wells), fuel (MOGAS, diesel, Jet A, packaged products), containers (20 foot, 40 foot, storage, refrigerated, liquid and dry containers), fortification and barrier material (cement, wood, stone, wire, pickets, lumber), food (bread, fresh fruit, milk, juices), personnel (cooks, drivers, mechanics, security guards, laborers, interpreters/translators, burial personnel for Iraqi dead), equipment (buses, trucks, engineering-crane, bulldozer, backhoe, etc.), supplies (tents, cots, blankets, clothes, cooking utensils, tools, etc. for EPW camps, office supplies), war damage claims, and Saudi sources for contracting supplies and services that could not be gained through host nation support.

Providing the necessary HNS services offered some unusual challenges. Late one night, Brigadier General Shehri informed us of a truck farm in the desert and offered us 490 trucks for use by the US Army. After confirming that the trucks

were needed to support the forthcoming ground attack, we left at 12 noon to find them.

We headed north from KKMC to Hafar al Batin on MSR Sultan for 50 kilometers, then turned east on MSR Dodge and traveled to an electrical power plant on the left hand side of the road. At this landmark, we turned south and traveled about 4 kilometers over a desert dirt road until we came to what was supposed to be a Nigerian camp. What we really found was an Egyptian camp at 3 kilometers, a tactical petroleum terminal at 5 kilometers, and an EPW camp at 8 kilometers. There was no Saudi Colonel by the name of Nasser at any of these camps. Keep in mind that locating a Saudi officer by the name of Nasser is like finding someone by the name of Bob.

This was not going to be an easy problem to solve, although we had not thought it would be hard to find 490 trucks in the desert! The terrain was flat and you could see for miles on a clear day when the sand wasn't blowing. Finally, out of frustration, we stopped at a Saudi command post that was identified by the numerous radio towers and antennas. Here I used what little Arabic language skill I possessed to gain us access to their dirt walled compound. Luckily, I walked into a tent where five Saudi officers were having tea and talked to a First Lieutenant by the name of Mohammed Algomdi who volunteered to help us. Here we used a field telephone and called back to KKMC to obtain new directions. A second call was placed to COL Nasser, the commander of this group of trucks, to obtain detailed instructions.

From our current location we were to travel farther east to a barrel that was stuck in the sand and turn south. The time was now 1600 hours and again we set out for our destination. Now we had four individuals in the vehicle. One spoke Arabic, one spoke French, one spoke German, and I myself understood and spoke a little German and Arabic. This time we came upon another Nigerian camp. Speaking in French, we obtained additional directions. In the middle of the desert we had drifted too far west and missed our destination. We followed new directions to yet another dirt-walled compound and drove up to the guarded entrance. This time we were successful and were directed to drive inside and follow a dirt road to a parking area that contained one vehicle. We were still looking for all of these trucks but could not see any!

We dismounted from our vehicle and were led down some sandbag steps, through walkways and eventually into an underground bunker. Here we found COL Nasser. In a bunker the size of my office he sat on the floor with commercial, tactical, and field telephones. He was also watching cartoons on color TV! This was not unusual since they receive two channels in the desert and they watch cartoons for light entertainment. Now that I think about it, I do recall there was some coaxial cable running across the desert when we came into the complex. We were offered some tea and Arabic coffee while he read the sealed order I delivered to him. After drinking the tea, he called a lieutenant on the field telephone and asked him to report to his bunker. Fifteen minutes later the

lieutenant arrived and entered the bunker. Within minutes he led us out of the bunker and asked us to follow him in his pickup.

Again, we headed south and deeper into the desert. After following a one-lane path for roughly 6 kilometers, we came upon another dirt road and traveled another 2 kilometers. There to our right appeared 35 tankers (fuel trucks) in a dirt walled compound and after that came a larger compound where we saw row after row of tractor-trailer trucks (18 wheelers) and what we call straight trucks (6 to 10 wheelers). Here we inspected the trucks relative to their hauling capacity (low boys for light tanks and armored personnel carriers), tractor-trailer flats (ammunition, Milvans), and the straight trucks (food, water, mail, general supplies).

Just as the sun was setting, we struck a deal. The US could have 100 flats without sides, 90 flats with sides, and 300 straight trucks. The next morning the Army transportation people would return to organize the use of the trucks for long hauls (600–700 kilometers to the ports at Dammam) and short hauls (50-100 kilometers) in and around KKMC. Oh, there was one additional bit of information. One hundred eighty of the trucks came with drivers! Most of them were Third Country Nationals who would sleep in their trucks, carry their own prayer rugs, but would also need to be fed. Just another small problem to manage during their use!

Two days later, most of the trucks were being used for numerous projects on both long and short hauls. I ran into the transportation people later. They said thanks for the trucks but not to bother them again with all of the headaches they had encountered. Amazingly, there were more than 800 trucks parked in this truck farm in the desert! All private trucks located in Saudi Arabia had been contracted by the Saudi government to support the US, British, French, and Arab coalition movements. They had just completed moving supplies for the Syrians, the Egyptians, and the Nigerians. This was probably our biggest effort in providing host nation support for the United States Army in the last two weeks. These trucks would move thousands of tons of supplies to support the attack phase of Desert Storm. In the theater as a whole, the 490 trucks represented maybe 5 percent of all truck transports being used at this time.

One of my highest priorities as the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Host Nation Activities was the recruitment of Kuwaiti civilians and military personnel who could speak enough English to work as translators in the two US Enemy Prisoner of War camps. There were approximately 2,000 Kuwaiti military or civilians at KKMC who had volunteered for military service to free Kuwait.

I submitted a letter to General Jabar Al-Khalad Al Sabah of the Kuwaiti Army who was located near the city of Dhahran. My work at KKMC had been with three Kuwaiti officers with the names of MAJ Ahmed, MAJ Fasal, and COL Rashad. All had been extremely polite and helpful in meeting US requests. After interviewing my first three recruits (Nayef, Awwad, and Salaam), I spent the next

three days on secure telephone lines to obtain the General's approval to release them for work in the EPW camps. The first three were very interesting recruits. Nayef had a B.S. Degree in computer science from Fullerton State University, Awwad had an M.S. Degree in Business from St Louis University, and Salaam had a B.S. Degree in Chemical Engineering from Kuwait University. All were professionals and spoke excellent English. They shared their tea and their life stories of their experiences of 2 August when Iraq invaded Kuwait and their subsequent escape to Saudi Arabia.

Each one began the morning of 2 August not knowing that Kuwait had been invaded at 0100 hours. Nayef was going to work and noticed that traffic was heavy and everyone was in a hurry. He also noted he could not tune in to his usual Kuwaiti radio station. However, he did not know the Iraqi soldiers had captured the station and stopped its broadcasting. When he arrived at work, his fellow workers were heading to the airport to fight the Iraqis. Salaam's wife, who had heard about the invasion from a neighbor, awakened him. Since he was a member of the Kuwaiti Army Reserve force, he reported to his unit for further instructions. Awwad had been out late with some friends during the previous evening. He did not learn of the Iraqi invasion until later in the morning when he saw tanks sitting at the intersection of the street where he lived. His immediate concern was for the safety of the members of his family.

Nayef, Salaam, and Awwad reacted with shock, disbelief, and fear when they learned of the invasion. Most Kuwaitis had little knowledge of Iraq's intention to invade Kuwait. Prior to the invasion, relations with Iraq had been normal and most Kuwaitis were aware of the Iraqi military force massed at the Kuwaiti boarder. Everyone had seen this as a routine military exercise conducted by the Iraqi Armed Forces. During the first two days of the invasion, the Iraqi forces positioned themselves at key intersections and captured important communication, government, and business buildings and facilities. Near the end of the second day, the Iraqi soldiers began to break into stores, shops, businesses, and restaurants. Cars were taken for personal use and wrecked after they served their purpose or ran out of gas. Kuwaiti resisters were either shot or captured and placed in secure areas.

During the second day of the invasion, Nayef, Salaam, and Awwad had to consider the safety of their families and made arrangements for an escape to Saudi Arabia. Each shared his personal story of his escape during the following days. Since their escape, they have lived in one or more Kuwaiti settlements in Dhahran, Riyadh, Dammam, and other Saudi cities. Initially they stayed with their families crowded into small quarters provided by the Saudi government. After living in these quarters since late in August, they finally realized that Saddam's Iraqi soldiers were going to remain in Kuwait. In February, they volunteered to support the Kuwaiti Army in Saudi Arabia.

Many of the volunteers found their way to Kuwaiti compounds in Dhahran, Riyadh, KKMC, and other locations. In January, they learned of my involvement in identifying and interviewing Kuwaitis who were needed to serve as translators

in the US Enemy Prisoner of War camps located in the east and the north. Following their identification and interviews, their names were submitted to the commander of the Kuwaiti troops. The approval process required three days and it was during this period that I spent some time drinking tea with them and learning of their invasion experiences. Each of the volunteers was married and all had small children. All believed they were supporting an allied/united Arab effort to free Kuwait from Saddam and his Republican Guard soldiers who had invaded their country and now laid it to waste. They were willing to endure individual hardships in supporting any effort to free their country.

Within a week, I had recruited thirteen Kuwaitis who volunteered to serve as translators. The second four Kuwaitis were civilian policemen (Mohad, Saad, Eid, and Dukame) and the next six Kuwaitis (Haider, Ambr, Abdulsalam, Hussien, and Jasem) were Air Force Officers. All in the latter group were married, had children (four, five, six children), and were older. I would guess that their ages ranged between 30 to 45 years. One had graying hair and was most eager to help in any way that he could. It's amazing how people with common interests are willing to help in any way they can. Many times during my assignment in recruiting, interviewing, and describing what they would be doing in the EPW camp, I've asked myself if I would be as trusting of a stranger and willing to do the same thing. How would you feel if you were being recruited to work in an enemy prisoner of war camp in the middle of the desert?

The KKMC Saudi Command placed an unusual requirement on the Host Nation Section by insisting that all requests be submitted in Arabic. In an effort to accommodate the requirement, the section first used a translator from the 4th Special Forces unit. With the assignment of 304th CA Group to the 22nd, we received a US captain who could read and write Arabic. However the latest assignment lasted one week until the 22nd SUPCOM Commander, LTG Pagonis, pulled him from the section to ride with the Egyptian Battalion's Heavy Equipment Transports that were moving VII Corps M1/A1 Abrams tanks and M2/3 Bradley fighting vehicles form the port to the KKMC TAA. After searching the KKMC area of operation for another US soldier who had Arabic speaking and writing skills, we discovered a SGT Morris at one of the Transportation Battalion Headquarters. A quick swap of a 4x4 Jeep, desperately needed by the Battalion Commander, for SGT Morris, whom we desperately needed, solved our immediate problem and we were back in business in submitting host nation requests. Later, under a service contract, we arranged to hire a third-country national from Sudan who assisted us with our translating requirements.

The Saudi Government, through the Joint Command, desired to establish five graves registration (GRREG) platoons to bury the Iraqis killed in combat. The Saudi military command had neither the experience nor the personnel to pursue this mission. We were starting from scratch in organizing personnel, equipment, and training. The US forces, on the other hand, had a GRREG Battalion in its Support Command and the equivalent of a GRREG Company to support each of

its Corps. Within US division maneuver elements, there were GRREG detachments to support either division or regimental units. A rather elaborate US GRREG organization had been established for this theater of operations.

The US procedure involves evacuating our dead soldiers to a rear corps collection point, transferring them to an evacuation point, and then air lifting them out of the theater. The movement of US soldiers killed in combat and the processing of their remains follows very specific procedures, which included the use of a body bag, dedicated airlift assets, and the return of the deceased to the next-of-kin. The interment of those of the Muslim faith in the Middle East involved burying the body of the deceased wrapped in a white cloth and placed in the ground in a natural state with neither a burying case nor a casket.

I had several meetings with a Saudi general to explain our procedures and to introduce him to one of our 22nd Support Command GRREG experts. One day I had a meeting with Brigadier General Abdulmomen, his representatives, Saudi Liaison Officers from each of the corps, and the US GRREG Battalion Commander. Its purpose was to answer questions concerning the mission of the Saudi GRREG platoons and their attachment to the Corps for life support and operations. Prior to that meeting, we discussed the personnel strength and composition of the Saudi Platoons, personal equipment, heavy working equipment, and life support issues (blankets, clothing, water, food, tents, fuel). Each platoon would have an officer as the platoon leader and would also have two personnel who could speak English and serve as translators. The platoon would be composed of 44-45 processing personnel and an additional 10 soldiers who would serve as truck drivers and heavy equipment operators (bulldozer and front-end loader) for mass grave preparations.

The meeting ended with the following agreements. First, US personnel would provide one day of training on the following Tuesday. Second, the Saudis, prior to the deployment of the platoon, must provide transportation and heavy equipment. Third, the Saudi GRREG platoon would be collocated with the Corps GRREG Company/Detachments. Fourth, the US Corps Support Group would provide life support. Fifth, further training could be conducted once the Saudi Platoons deployed to the Corps sectors of operation. Two ‘war stoppers’ or potential problems were also identified. First, the Saudis had identified temporary Iraqi burial sites approximately 5 to 10 kilometers south of the Iraq–Saudi Arabian border. Second, the Saudi Platoons would not be permitted to cross the border. US procedures utilize GRRGG teams to bury enemy dead at the battle site after it becomes a no-fire zone. This particular policy saves transportation assets that are needed to transport injured or dead US and allied soldiers to the rear and to haul forward supplies, water, and ammunition to soldiers at the front. The access to trucks and any other means of transport is extremely important in the forward battle area. We attempted to persuade the Saudis to reconsider their policy of crossing the border and the temporary burial of Iraqis at the battle site.

It appears that when the Saudi GRREG platoons were initially identified and the Saudi Command finally issued the order, they feared the Iraqis would raid the

temporary graves and move the bodies to create an international incident. They protected themselves by publishing an order, which did not allow the Saudi Platoons to cross the border, and identified gravesites that could be watched by the Saudi Border Guards. On the other hand, we argued the temporary gravesites would be protected since they were in the Corps rear sector and if the Saudis desired they could move them south of the border after the hostilities had ended. We urged them to consider the fact that most soldiers and their kin would prefer temporary burial in their own country. These issues are 'war stoppers' because they limited the operational movement of the Saudi GRREG platoon to the battle sites.

The next day brought more dialogue and messages to both the US and Saudi higher headquarters and commands. The other problem facing us was the immediacy of this issue if the US and Allied Forces were to start the ground offensive soon. How nice it would have been to have a week or more to work on a problem! Here, given the need for immediate answers and decisions, 24 hours is about all you get. The pressure of obtaining answers, given the ensuing ground attack, leads to sleepless nights and mental fatigue. Failure to arrive at a solution may result in the loss of US and Allied soldiers' lives.

We take one day at a time and most of us cannot imagine something being a week away. There is so much to be done and so little time to accomplish it. The US mentality was one of immediate answers and impatience, while patience was a cultural characteristic of the Saudis. When they cannot resolve a problem or have gone as far as they can, given the information and resources, they say 'Insh-allah' which in Arabic means 'God Willing'. There certainly are some virtues of the Saudi culture that could be incorporated into our American way of business and life. This difference in respect to time and religion, however, led to many frustrations on the part of American liaison officers who worked with the Saudis. Those soldiers who are a type 'A' personality, 'airborne all-the-way', and don't appreciate the cultural values of the Saudis, were the Host Nation Team's worst advisories and made our lives miserable.

Following the Ground War, a major from one of our divisions met with the wife of the Emir (settlement mayor) of Dhabhah. Through a verbal agreement, she allowed the 1st Armored Division to use a crop irrigation well if they would repair one of two wells located in the village of Dhabhah. Dhabhah was a small Saudi settlement (15 adobe/block houses) located approximately 20 kilometers outside of KKMC and in the wadi of Hafar Al Batin. It was also 5 kilometers from the division's redeployment area (DRA) and provided the closest water source for the division.

The DRA, which measured 25 kilometers by 20 kilometers, was a piece of the desert where the division's 16,000 troops would redeploy when they returned from Iraq to Saudi Arabia. It was a flat desert area where division units would

erect their headquarters and living tents and prepare for redeployment of their personnel and equipment to their home in the Federal Republic of Germany.

One week after the arrival of the division, the Host Nation Office was called to help resolve a problem. The division was drawing water from the well and holding it in two 50,000-gallon water bags where water trucks would come and draw water for various divisional units. All of a sudden, the well owner refused to give them any more water. First, two division officers attempted to talk to the well owner and still they were given no water. Then the division sent another field grade officer and some armed MPs and demanded the water. The owner brought his friends from the settlement with their AK47 assault rifles. This situation resulted in a temporary standoff. Finally the US troops left and later we arrived on the scene. The issue: the US troops demanded the water because they thought they had a right to it based upon the earlier agreement. The owner indicated that the American Forces had promised to fix his settlement wel, but they had done nothing and continued to use his water!

Water in Saudi Arabia is a very precious commodity. In fact, a gallon of diesel fuel costs 19 cents whereas a gallon of water costs 70 cents. The US forces used an enormous amount of water to support their units and adequate water sources had been a constant problem. Most of the drinking water requirements were met with contracted bottled water that came from desalinization plants in Saudi Arabia and other sources in the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. Other bulk water requirements were met by placing ROPUS (Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units) on wells in KKMC, the wadis, or other areas in the desert. The standard well depth is 1,500 to 2,000 feet in Saudi Arabia whereas in the United States wells are 100 to 200 feet in depth. A Corps unit could use up to 1 million gallons per day!

In order to avoid a small skirmish between the settlement residents and the division, some serious discussions were needed. The owner said the Americans had promised to fix his settlement well. They did not; consequently he shut off their water! The owner also stated he normally would have sold water to the Bedouin who used it to water their sheep and goat herds. Since the arrival of the Americans, he had sold very little water to the Bedouin and he still had to make payments (90,000 SR) on a new pump motor. He stated he needed 120,000 SR ($32,000) per month. We offered him a lower price and finally settled on 30,000 SR ($8,000) per month and a lease for two months. This agreement had been made three weeks ago. The US division was now preparing to leave and still he had not been paid. Now he thought the Americans were going to leave him with an empty bag and no cash!

Just as happens with most lease agreements, it was taking time to get this approved and a check issued. Mr Badr was calling us daily and getting more and more impatient. Within 48 hours, host nation personnel delivered a check for 60,000 SR, to cover the cost of two months of water. The division was long gone and could probably not have cared less. This was just another example of a successful solution to a problem where host nation personnel provided the

interface between the US Military and a Saudi civilian. Without a Saudi well, the desert can be very dry when the winds blow, the temperature rises, and there's no water.

Another mission had been brewing for several days as the US military hospitals located at KKMC attempted to discharge Iraqi patients and associated family members who had come from US field hospitals located in the combat zone in southern Iraq. In order to assist the EAC hospitals, our requirement was that all patients must be discharged in good physical health. They would be transported to a US occupied area in Iraq north of Kuwait. Transportation requirements included two busses, one military ambulance, and my 4x4 jeep. The preliminary arrangements were made and we were ready to roll the night before the move.

Suddenly, late the night before the move, the hospital coordinator called and indicated that only two patients wanted to be moved. The rest requested political asylum or asked to speak to a Jordanian Embassy representative. Most were Shi'ites and since they were not Ba'athist they feared either execution or harm from Saddam Hussein. In Saddam's eyes, the Shi'ites in southern Iraq and the Kurds in northern Iraq were enemies. A decision was made to proceed with the mission in spite of this discouraging news. All together the three EAC hospitals had over 300 patients and family members. One hospital was approaching its bed capacity.

At 0730 hours, the busses were picked up at the transportation motor pool and driven to the hospital. To our surprise, 20 patients requested transportation to Safwan. A roll call revealed most of the patients either lived in Safwan or in surrounding villages. The patients and family members included four women, four children, and 12 men. All patients were in good health and were ready to be discharged. At 0900 the patient convoy left KKMC and proceeded to Safwan, Iraq.

After traveling for two hours, we were 40 kilometers north of Hafar Al Batin and 40 kilometers south of the Saudi–Kuwait border. At this time, one of our busses stopped running. Our location was on a hardball (blacktop) road with nothing in sight. After attempting to start the bus several times, I decided to leave the stalled bus and the ambulance with instructions for them to get help and return the bus to KKMC. The medics were loaded on the patient bus and we moved once again. The next problem was the Saudi–Kuwait border crossing.

The border crossing presented a problem since neither Saudi Arabia nor Kuwait wanted the Iraqi refugees in their country. I had traveled the route several days ago and believed we could clear the checkpoint if all of the US personnel were placed in the front of the bus and the Iraqis ducked below their seats. We proceeded through the border point without incident. A US military uniform enables American soldiers to pass through most checkpoints run by Arab soldiers. This is not the case for US checkpoints. We continued our trip into Kuwait.

Near Kuwait City we stopped at Convoy Support Center Liberty. Since it was now 1300 hours, we fueled the vehicles, used the makeshift portable latrines, and obtained hot food for the patients. All went well and we were on the road again in 30 minutes. Next came 6th Ring Road around Kuwait City and then we turned north toward Iraq. Ten kilometers outside of Kuwait City we entered the Valley of Death. This is the only northern route out of the city that leads to Basra, Baghdad, and other cities in southern Iraq. Here were hundreds of destroyed and disabled cars, trucks, tracks, and other vehicles. The stench of death hung in the air. Iraqi soldiers and civilians had attempted to escape the US and Arab coalition forces as they entered Kuwait. The patients looked with awe and disbelief at the destruction that had occurred.

Twenty kilometers further north we observed the faint outline of a narrow orange burning object. As we approached the object, we could see a number of burning oil wells. This field alone accounted for more than 50 oil well fires. Overhead, the tumultuous clouds of black, sooty smoke billowed. Day turned to night in the middle of the afternoon as we proceeded toward Iraq.

Near the village of Safwan we were stopped at the Third Armored Division's checkpoint and were informed we could proceed no further on this road. We were required to use a bypass road north to the division's next checkpoint. At the second checkpoint we were granted permission to enter the village. Safwan was a village of 1,500 to 2,000 residents who were surrounded by another 4,000–5,000 refugees in tents and makeshift shelters. It was a very poor village. US soldiers provided limited food and water. The village was not damaged by the war; however, there was no electricity. People were milling around and as soon as we stopped several of them came up to the bus.

The patients left the bus and were given their medical records, water, and an MRE. They immediately mixed with those standing on the curb and moved off in the direction of several side streets. As we left Safwan, the sun was setting above the tents, shelters, and buildings. Our patients were happy to be home.

As we moved deeper into redeployment we learned that there were approximately 475 patients in the three evacuation hospitals at KKMC. Two hundred and eighty-five of these patients were ready to be discharged and returned to Iraq. Each Chinook could lift 25 or 26 patients, two medics, two host nation representatives, and its crew of four. Finally, plans were made to pick up the patients from the hospitals beginning at 0730 and bring them to Med base America by 0830.

At Med base America, they would depart at 0900 and arrive at Safwan at 1100 hours. A second lift each day would occur at 1300 with an arrival at 1500 hours. Each flight would be met by Third Armored Division G5 personnel and the patients would be transported to the village of Safwan. Current estimates indicated there were now nearly 10,000 Iraqi refugees in the Safwan area and 13,000 to 15,000 Iraqi refugees north of Rafa in Iraq.

Safwan was 5 kilometers northwest of Kuwait and was located in the middle of the DMZ (a zone 9.5 kilometers into Iraq and almost 5 kilometers into

Kuwait). It was a poor Iraqi farming village of 2,000 that included 50 vegetable farms around the community. During the war, those who lived in Safwan continued to grow tomatoes, melons, and onions while US aircraft attacked Iraqi soldiers who were near the village. Their homes had holes in the walls, cracked ceilings, and there were craters in the streets. US soldiers were friendly and provided food, water, and medical help to the village's citizens and the refugees who lived either there or in tents and shelters surrounding the village.

The refugee camp 40 kilometers north of Rafah was on the Iraqi side of the Saudi–Iraqi border. Rafah was approximately 200 kilometers northwest of KKMC and the Saudis managed the refugee camp. The camp was located in the desert where there was no village. The camp consisted of Saudi tents, a water tanker, and food. Life was desolate for the refugees in the Rafah Camp. Iraqis in the camps felt desperate and feared for their safety.

All Iraqi refugees who were airlifted to the camps once lived either south or north of the Euphrates River. Many were from An Nasiriya or Basra where there had been severe civil unrest and fighting between the Shi'ite rebels and Saddam's Republican Guard. Both of these cities were in southern Iraq and neither was under US military control. The refugees waited in fear that Saddam might send someone to execute them or that the US troops would leave and they would be unprotected. In the Safwan camp, the 3rd Armored Division was caught between a rock and a hard place. The press and people in the US wanted the troops to return home. Refugees in Safwan indicated a fear that prompted them to lie down in front of the departing tanks to prevent the American soldiers from leaving.

We pursued the return of Iraqi discharged patients to Safwan because this was the only place in southern Iraq that was under US control where we were providing food, water, and medical support. They could neither stay in Saudi Arabia nor could they return to the home that was not under US military control. Some refugees had no choice other than to remain in Safwan for an indefinite period of time. Iraqi patients are a proud and resourceful people. They want to get as close to home as they can but fear for their lives. The Kurds in the north were suffering a fate worse than the Shi'ites. On the Turkish and Iranian borders they lacked adequate food, water, shelter, and medical aid and were in a cold environment.

Day after day we took two Chinooks with 25 patients each to Safwan and it became harder with each lift to continue this mission. There were women, men, and children. It was very easy to become attached to people who looked to you for trust and comfort. One day, we had a father and his son. The son was 12 years old and was an amputee. Khalid had lost his foot when he stepped on a mine. As we were talking with the Chinook pilots, one recalled this particular boy who had been medevac'ed to the rear with the amputated foot. Family members accompanied many of the patients. Not all had combat injuries. Many of the patients had sought US medical assistance for an assortment of illnesses.

Late one night, I received the mission of escorting a man and the body of his father to An Nasiriyah, a town located 5 kilometers south of the Euphrates River

in Iraq. A Blackhawk helicopter was requested through G3 Air and was scheduled to depart from the airfield on the following morning. Arrangements were made to pick the son up at the Evacuation Hospital on KKMC and take him to the helicopter for an 0830 lift off. The father would be placed on the chopper in a body bag and transported approximately 300 kilometers north to a helipad near the Iraqi town of An Nasiriyah.

The father had come to an American medical unit near the front line and had asked for help. He had an amputated leg that was infected with gangrene. They moved the father and son to the corps rear of the battle area; however, the father died of complications. Now the problem was to return the son and the father to Iraqi-held territory. The chopper left as scheduled and flew over the battle area where the Iraqis had built trenches and bunkers and laid mine fields. One tank trench was filled with oil and stretched as far to the east and west as the eye could see. Hundreds of Iraqi trucks, tanks, tracks, and other vehicles had been destroyed in their defensive positions.

Approximately 75 kilometers south of our destination, we landed for a hot refill (hoses are hooked up and fuel is pumped into both side tanks in a matter of a minutes). Soon we were circling over our destination and spotted the tents, vehicles, and defensive tanks and Bradleys that supported our landing zone and served as a life-support/staging area for combat troops. Also within this area were 75 to 100 enemy prisoners who were held within an encirclement of concertina wire. After landing at the medical dust-off pad, we arranged transportation in an HMMWV and a 2.5-ton truck. The son and his father were loaded into the truck. We moved toward the DML (demilitarized line) under the escort of an MP vehicle. After traveling 5 kilometers we passed a road sign that read Baghdad to the left and Basra to the right. We proceeded to the next checkpoint and were stopped by US Military Police personnel. There we inquired about an Iraqi camp called Camp Mercy. (Also at this checkpoint were two news personnel with TV cameras. The son and his father could not be left here and there was some risk in going to the Iraqi camp.)

Camp Mercy was approximately 1.5 kilometers to the east and would require special permission to enter. This was a makeshift Iraqi refugee camp with a huge dirt wall that encircled it. Permission was obtained from the nearest US Commander and we proceeded to the camp. As we pulled up to the camp, we immediately turned the vehicles around so we were headed away from the entrance. I peered over the dirt berm and there was very little activity. As we proceeded to unload the deceased, who was placed on a stretcher, 60 to 70 women, children, and a few men began to form a circle around us. All were curious and some began to offer help to the son in moving the deceased into the confines of the camp. Within minutes, we had unloaded the father and the son from the truck, distributed food and water, and left the camp. This camp had at one time been supported by the XVIII Airborne Corps and now received limited support by troops of the VII Corps.

The son, Khalam, was approximately 25 years old and spoke a little English. We had an opportunity to talk while we were making the trip with his father. He indicated he was a teacher of mathematics and taught in a school near the town of An Nasiriyah. He had learned some English (a little) and mathematics in his hometown. The curriculum requires that there be a one-hour lesson on the English language during grades one through five. During the entire trip and even when we removed his father from the back of the truck, he stated he was sorry with the little English he understood. He was a very humble, appreciative, and understanding young man.

During this entire mission, I wondered if I could have been as strong. When I left him, I gave him the US flag that was sewn to my uniform. As tears came to his eyes, he said 'many thanks,' 'God be with you,' and 'I'm sorry.' God help us understand innocent people like Khalam who are victims of any hostilities.

Last and omnipresent throughout all phases of the logistics mission was the question asked by LTG Pagonis, 'Laudeman, where is our host nation support?' My answer on too many occasions was: 'Sir, Insh-allah or God willing, we will get it for you!' Throughout DESERT SHIELD/STORM, the pace of US operations simply did not match the life style of the Saudis even if their country was being threatened!

As we pursued the host nation mission, our biggest, immediate obstacle to overcome included learning the Arabic language, understanding the Saudi culture, and realizing that life in Saudi Arabia was more relaxed and lived at a much slower pace (Salat was the recitation of prayers five times each day, Friday was the Muslim day of rest and worship, and during the month of Ramadan there were additional changes with the Saudi Officers and in the Saudi Headquarters). Additional challenges included gaining an in-depth understanding of both the military and civilian structure of the country. Beginning immediately with mobilization, we listened to language tapes, initiated an area study of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and surrounding countries, and talked to college/university specialists who knew about Islam and the Arab culture. All of my previous experiences in working with different people in different cultures and in different countries enhanced the learning process.

As a team of 16 people in the 22nd SUPCOM Forward HQ, we were instrumental in obtaining land, fuel, food, water, buildings, supplies, services, equipment, and material to support CENTCOM's mission in the Northern Province in order to defeat the Iraqi Army and free Kuwait.

We were well prepared through training and experience to identify, request, and obtain host nation support as a force multiplier for the 22nd SUPCOM. We were fortunate to be in a country that quickly identified transportation resources (port facilities, airports, KKMC, trucks, busses, etc.) and could provide the open land, fuel, and other resources that were necessary to quickly move Army personnel and equipment to combat.

We were aware of normal wartime host nation support that was generally governed by general or technical agreements between the United States and the

government of the host nation. These agreements provide guidance, procedures, types of support, priority of support, and specify the conditions for taking certain actions. DESERT SHIELD/STORM/FAREWELL presented a situation where the Host Nation Sections of the 22nd Main and Fwd relied upon ad-hoc requests and the importance of contingency contracting for supplies, material, services, and other resources.

As a United States Army Reserve Unit, all of our host nation support training prior to DESERT SHIELD/STORM had focused on the Cold War in Europe. Through extensive training, we had a good understanding of this particular theater: climate, countries, cultures, structure of the NATO military, general country infrastructure, and the German language. However, there was no advance preparation for the new theater in the Persian Gulf. Five years later the training in Germany again became important when the 21st TAACOM (CA) was mobilized to Kaiserslautern in December of 1995. During Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, the unit provided HQ and operational personnel to support the movement of personnel, equipment, and material to Hungary, Croatia, and Yugoslavia.

As reservists, we thought we were being mobilized for a short war and then realized that as theater logisticians we would be the last to leave. Remaining in the theater became a very sobering thought for many civilian employers and reservists. I was fortunate to be supported by my family and to be employed in higher education. Thus, I viewed mobilization as a professional sabbatical from my position. Others were less fortunate when they lost their small businesses or experienced family problems from far away.

The experiences and lessons learned in DESERT SHIELD/STORM were invaluable when the 21st TAACOM (CA) was again mobilized for Operation Joint Endeavor in December of 1995. Since more than 60 percent of the unit had Gulf War experience, we quickly mobilized and on Christmas Eve of 1995 the Indianapolis unit fell in to support the 21st TAACOM's Logistical Operation Center at Kaiserslauternin Germany. I immediately assumed the position of AC of S for Civil Military Operations and once again began to request and coordinate host nation support as a force multiplier.

Note

1 See Robert H. Scales, Jr., *Certain Victory* (Washington, DC: Office of Chief of Staff, 1993), p. 60.

5

MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT

Colonel (Retired) Richard A. Pomager

Prior to deployment, the 14th Military Police Brigade served in Germany as a VII Corps asset. The Brigade consisted of two US battalions and two German battalions. When it was ordered to deploy in November of 1990, it had to do so with only a fraction of its organic strength: the German battalions were left behind, and two National Guard battalions were added. V Corps, also in Germany, provided most of another battalion.

Deploying in such a hastily arranged task force posed tremendous leadership challenges. Beyond the organizational challenges, however, the unit faced the tough battlefield missions of Main Supply Route (MSR) security, rear area security, and EPW (Enemy Prisoner of War) operations. On the ground, the Brigade leadership met these challenges with flexibility, patience, and ingenuity.

The Brigade leadership and staff met the challenge of providing MSR security by modifying standard MP tactics and improvising navigational techniques. The Brigade covered the full 180 mile length of MSR Dodge (Tapline Road) while simultaneously providing rear area security in some decidedly forward logistics bases.

In fact, the Brigade was tasked with serving as the screening force for the entire VII Corps along the Kuwait/Iraq border. To meet that mission, the Brigade matched its mobility with the firepower of attack helicopters, providing an effective first alert and defense against the potential Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia.

But perhaps the 14th Military Police Brigade's greatest challenge was that of EPW operations. The VII Corps planning staff did not quite grasp the complexity or the potentially huge numbers involved and wanted the 14th simply to 'handle it.' Through diligence, planning, and persuasiveness, the Brigade managed to get a feasible EPW plan approved. But things do not always go as planned. Colonel Pomager describes how his staff and the Corps sorted out the monumental task of processing 40,000 prisoners of war.

Deployment concept

The first elements of the Brigade deployed from Germany in late November 1990. A battalion headquarters and four military police companies were among the first deployed Corps units. The Brigade headquarters joined them on 13 December 1990, approximately three weeks later.

The sequence of events for arriving Corps military units involved air transport for troops to the theater and a temporary bivouac at seaport facilities until the arrival of unit equipment at the port. Corps planners expected the TO&E (tables of organization and equipment/standard unit) equipment to arrive in under a week after the soldiers were in Saudi. The unit was readied for operation and deployed to the desert staging area. The time sequence began to lengthen by mid-December as the sea transport lagged behind the airflow, with many units remaining at the port for three or more weeks.

Initial combat support missions

Within 24 hours of their arrival in theater, brigade elements began to conduct rear area support operations. The Brigade's initial mission was port security. Each MP company performed the port security mission immediately upon arrival at the sea port. Since brigade units would arrive over a three-month period of time a rotation of missions was established between newly arrived MP companies and MP units that had received the TO&E equipment. The mission-ready companies moved forward toward the Iraqi border and assumed the MSR security mission along with companies of the 18th and 89th Military Police Brigades already deployed to field locations.

As additional Corps units deployed to staging areas in the desert, the brigade's mission increased. Brigade units were performing combat support missions at the seaport, along the 180 mile MSR (Tapline Road), at the forward Log Base A, and in the Corps assembly area which measured approximately 60 by 80 miles. Security operations in the port continued until all Corps assets had arrived and cleared the port, just days before the start of DESERT STORM. The MSR and log base security remained a primary mission of brigade soldiers throughout the deployment to Saudi Arabia. Based on the nature of preparations to go to war and the conduct of DESERT STORM, brigade soldiers were involved in area security for two log bases at a time. As the Corps shifted positions to move forward, another log base would be built as a former based was closed, i.e., from Staging Area, to Assembly Area and then to the conduct area of the war.

As the Corps began to form on the desert floor, the brigade area security mission across the entire Corps footprint increased. The lack of terrain features, ambient light and blackout driving conditions necessitated developing a series of azimuths and back azimuths between all unit field locations. The MP squads on patrol used compasses and odometer readings to move between the units.

Distances between unit field locations reached five to ten to 20 or more miles apart. The only way to reach a unit was to shoot an azimuth and continue to drive.

About three days into the brigade headquarters deployment, the Corps Chief of Staff assigned the brigade the mission of defending the Corps Staging Area. An Attack Helicopter Battalion was attached to the 14th MP Brigade. The MP battalion was the only combat capable ground unit deployed in the staging area. The MP battalion commander conducted screening operations along the Corps front toward the Kuwaiti border using MP squads in coordination with the attack helicopter screening operations. The mission belonged to the 2nd ACR, but the ship transporting the bulk of that unit's armored vehicles required an emergency repair in route, delaying its arrival by nine days.

Training concept

In Germany, the brigade was composed of two US battalions with four MP companies each and two German battalions with three companies each. Command and control of the German units occurred only during war. On a day-to-day basis, however, the German and US commanders would train together for their wartime mission. The German battalions were proud of their alignment and we considered them to be equal members of the brigade. Upon alert for deployment to Saudi, the brigade was directed to deploy as a composite brigade taking units from across Germany and not assigned units. The composite 14th MP Brigade consisted of one battalion headquarters and two companies from the 14th. An additional battalion headquarters and four companies were assigned from V Corps and Theater MP assets. As preparations for deployment began, Corps planners advised us that the National Guard would assign two additional battalion headquarters and nine MP companies to the brigade in Saudi Arabia. The assigned National Guard units came from nine different states and were at varying degrees of training readiness.

The brigade staff were instructed to develop a training concept to bring all soldiers and units to the same level of readiness. The training concept contained training objectives for units in the process of deployment. NBC, map and compass proficiency, weapon qualification, soldier skills, field sanitation, and call for fires, etc, were the types of training standards provided to units assigned to the brigade.

The second phase of the training involved skills to be tested in the initial deployment to the field location. Arriving units were directed to set up in the base camp of a unit deployed in the staging area. Newly arrived soldiers would be instructed and tested in areas of desert survival, squad operations, mounted land navigation across the desert floor, night operations, etc. At the end of the training, the company MP teams would be integrated into the squads of the host company to perform the unit mission with the objective of building confidence in the individual soldiers. Soldier and team proficiency were assessed through battalion

training sections. The company in training was directed to establish an independent base camp and conduct support operations in its designated sector of the staging area once the unit demonstrated confidence in the training skills and mission performance.

The desert environment brought new challenges to combat support operations. The area was flat and lacked vegetation or terrain features. Visibility reached out 10 or more miles. Although it was mostly flat, the ground did vary in elevation by 5–10 feet, providing concealment for vehicles and soldiers. Based on the topography, military police units were not able to identify their positions on the ground or to estimate distances.

The combination of the vast distances and the topography necessitated a change in the manner in which military police units would be tasked. Brigade MP teams routinely operated independently in defense of NATO nations. But team-level operations would not be prudent in this new environment of the desert. All day-to-day missions were assigned to squads. The change built confidence in the soldiers traversing the desert floor, confidence that would be essential during DESERT STORM.

Enemy Prisoner of War planning

Planning for EPW operations began in November 1990. Army doctrine provides detailed direction about the conduct of EPW control and handling processes. The capturing unit turns the EPW over to the Division Collecting Point pending interrogation and evacuation to the Corps Holding Cage. At the Corps cage, EPWs are medically checked, interrogated, segregated, and then evacuated to the Prisoner of War Camp in country. Operating the various holding areas requires the same amount of support as operating a military unit. Enemy prisoners must be fed, clothed, washed, treated by medical personnel, transported, and provided with other necessities as defined in the Geneva Conventions. The resources to perform these services are not part of a military police company. Such resources must come from the same supply system that supports the Corps war fighters.

Initially, the Corps leadership was preoccupied with movement plans and preparation for war. Each time EPW operations were mentioned, the subject was passed over as an MP mission. During an early Corps Battle Staff meeting, I presented a graph depicting the various responsibilities of Corps Combat Support and Combat Service Support units to the EPW mission. Although the mission was still an MP mission, the Corps Battle Staff recognized that the task was considerably greater than they had expected it to be. The Brigade staff was tasked with developing a concept for EPW operations to support ground movements.

From the start of tactical planning, the battle was anticipated to be fast-paced, cover large distances, and capture large numbers of enemy soldiers. The Brigade planners' task was to adapt Army doctrine to fit the desert ground campaign. The Corps Commander directed that EPW operations not hinder or hold up the ground campaign.

In the mid-1980s, the size of a division MP company was reduced from 165 to 141 personnel. The reduction in size was balanced against a trade off in mission to the Corps military police brigade. The trade-off involved releasing one MP company from the Corps to the division to assist in supporting the division. The new asset would assume the mission of running the EPW operation. The problem became one of satisfying the division commander's request for his asset while meeting the VII Corps combat support mission. Again, doctrine was the problem in that Corps MPs were to go forward to the division collection point and evacuate the EPWs to the Corps cage. With the anticipated numbers of EPW, the EPW mission would consume all the Corps MP assets and leave nothing to perform the other combat support missions.

The Brigade staff made three recommendations. The first called for the division collection points to be established on the division rear boundary requiring the division MPs to move EPWs to the rear of the division. Brigade MPs would move forward to the collecting point for evacuation. This reduced the distance the Corps MPs would travel to complete the evacuation. To understand the nature of the EPW evacuation problem you must review the distance involved. The initial VII Corps cage was established along Tapline Road, approximately 60 miles from the Iraqi border. The further the divisions advanced the greater the distance would extend.

The second recommendation called for Brigade battalions to move directly behind the advancing divisions to conduct evacuation. To support the evacuation, the VII Corps G-4 gave the Brigade approximately 50 commercial busses. The busses were driven by MPs traveling in the battalion route of march. Traversing the desert floor was not expected to be a problem since the corps engineers would construct road networks for supply vehicles supporting the divisions. We anticipated that the busses would be the main source of transportation until back-flow supply vehicles were available.

The third recommendation was to advance the Corps cage forward into the division collection point as the division rear boundary advanced. The purpose again was to reduce travel and turnaround time for the evacuation of EPWs. In effect, the concept for EPW operation was a series of jumps forward to partially constructed EPW compounds. With three divisions on line in the attack, the next jump forward would be consistent with the evacuation demand (the division with the highest capture rate). The concept was briefed to the VII Corps Battle staff and approved.

EPW operations in DESERT STORM

With the plan in place, the 1st Infantry Division constructed an EPW collection point just short of the Iraqi border, completing work the day the ground war started. The 1st ID's mission was to conduct the breech operation and thus make

the initial contact with Iraqi forces. In support of the planning, the 1st ID collection point would be the first jump point for the Corps cage.

The ground war started at 1500 hrs and by 2000 hrs the 1st ID was calling for assistance evacuating EPWs from the area of the breech. By 2200 hrs the 1st ID Commander made direct contact with the Corps CG for assistance. The Corps G-4 identified 45 trucks of various types (battle replacement fleet) and assigned them to the brigade. The vehicles were available without drivers, and any brigade soldier who could drive a truck was assigned a vehicle. The vehicles were sent to the 1st ID arriving at approx 0200 hrs the following day, just 11 hours after the start of the ground war.

The MP battalions advancing behind the divisions that had moved through the breech were turning over captured EPWs for evacuation. The bus service for evacuation was slowing. By 0200 hrs the turn-around time had reached six hours. In effect all brigade evacuation vehicles were either transporting or returning to their battalion areas while the demand for evacuation was increasing. Busses returning to parent MP battalions had difficulty finding the battalion as the battalion had advanced several miles further into Iraqi. The drivers of the busses soon learned that the vehicles were not holding up in the soft sand and transmission problems caused busses to stop and be abandoned. So the fleet diminished each hour. By the end of the second day of battle, all 50 busses were abandoned along the routes of march of the divisions.

Another surprise was that the divisions moved at a fast pace as did the advancement of their rear boundary. Instead of removing EPWs to the rear boundary, the MPs holding EPWs awaiting evacuation simply remained in the area in which they were captured and waited for backhaul to catch up. The brigade was faced with a new problem: pockets of EPWs left on the desert floor by advancing divisions. This number would increase to 15 known pockets spread across the desert on three axes of advance. Lacking terrain features or navigational device, the MP platoon and company leadership could not adequately pinpoint their locations.

The Brigade S-3 contacted the aviation brigade and asked that their air crews give us a fix on any EPW positions they observed as they traversed the corps area. Our logistical problem grew since captured EPWs needed water and food. Fortunately, passing units provided water and rations to many of the pockets. Other areas had to wait for a dedicated re-supply by air or ground. Some pockets of EPWs sat on the desert floor for up to 40 hours before transportation arrived. The aviation brigade agreed to use returning Chinook helicopters in the evacuation. The Chinooks were a big help in getting to the most distant units and in searching for EPW pockets closest to the advancing divisions.

The numbers of EPWs in the 1st ID area within the first 12 hours of the battle dictated that the corps cage jump to the division of collection point. The jump was directed at 0600 hrs the next day, much earlier than anticipated. By 1600 hrs of the second day, the Brigade headquarters and the corps cage were directed to move 40 miles into Iraq. The new location was the temporary holding area of the

1st ID and contained only barbed concertina wire as a barrier. Corps engineers began construction of a new cage facility in the immediate area. The EPW problem was growing in size and facilities as the brigade was managing three cage facilities over a 100 mile distance. Brigade MPs at the closed cages could not move forward until all EPWs were evacuated from the cage. The initial jump position was an active cage for less than 12 hours.

On the fourth day of the conflict, the brigade headquarters advanced to the Kuwaiti border northwest of Kuwait City and established a temporary cage. This facility would remain active for three days before closing the cage and returning to the EPW facility inside Iraq. A log based was forming in the immediate area, easing the supply and evacuation requirements of the EPW cage. The removal of all EPWs from the forward divisions would take another four days. In the brief period of the war and a few days following the cease-fire, the 14th MP brigade processed and transported over 40,000 EPWs.[1] The Brigade maintained daily EPW rates for EPWs processed through the VII CORPS cage during the war.

Note

1 See Stephen A. Bourque and John S. Brown, *Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War* (Department of the Army; Center of Military History: Washington DC: 2002), pp. 427–29. According to Bourque and Brown, 33,000 EPWs were captured during VII Corps' attack across Iraq, and an additional 23,000 were processed between the end of hostilities and the permanent cease-fire on 14 April.

6

STRATEGIC MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

Major Christine Carbone Sandoval

Major Chris Sandoval's Rear Operations Team provided much of the intelligence concerning enemy threats to friendly rear areas during the Gulf War. A small, yet vital unit within the 513th Military Intelligence Brigade (Echelons Above Corp [EAC]), the Rear Operations Team worked primarily out of Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, but also provided support in Kuwait just prior to and after the ceasefire. Major Sandoval's team provided critical support from the very early days of the campaign – deploying on 30 August 1990 – until the very last days of the operation.

Based in Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, the 513th MI Brigade provided intelligence support above the Corps level to ARCENT, the Army component of the US Central Command. This higher-level intelligence gathering and processing provided the clear picture of Iraqi forces and capabilities required for successful combat operations. The great 'left hook' would not have been possible without the direct role of the 513th MI Brigade in developing an accurate picture of the enemy disposition. The 513th and its subordinate elements, including Major Sandoval's Rear Operations Team, had the difficult task of turning national and strategic level intelligence into something that tactical commanders could use.

Major Sandoval's team was responsible for identifying all hostile intelligence collection activities as well as such threats to the rear area as Scuds, long-range aerial bombers, and terrorist actions. The effort grew so much that the team began to issue a separate intelligence report to the Corps and higher units. Additionally, the team took the extra step of simultaneously delivering critical information straight to division commanders.

Major Sandoval's strategic-level experience provides valuable insight into the complexities of intelligence in war and how information is gained, processed, and distributed at Corps level and above. But her ground-level experiences and reactions to the challenges of war should serve to inform combat leaders at all levels – from squad leader on up.

Pre-deployment training, planning, and preparations

In June 1990, I taught Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield at a seminar in Amman, Jordan, at the Jordanian Military Intelligence School with six members of my unit, including two from my team– WO1 John King and SGT Dan Darling. Little did we know that in the span of two months we would question the wisdom of that particular mission. Since US joint and combined exercises throughout the Middle East were not routine, but becoming common training events in the late 1980s, we were surprised two months later when Jordan did not align itself with the US-led coalition against Iraq. Nevertheless, the seminar was a success and the military-to-military mission went well.

Upon our return to Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, I readied my team – two warrant officers, five NCOs and four soldiers – to deploy to Hurlburt Army Airfield, Florida for Exercise Internal Look along with participants from the other battalions of the 513th MI Brigade, Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT) staff, and Air Force Central Command (CENTAF) staff. The objective of Internal Look was to exercise a scenario in which multiple aggressors threatened the Saudi Peninsula (in concert and independently) and to learn how well the nations individually and as part of the Gulf Cooperation Council could deter such a threat. As July progressed, we found ourselves monitoring not only the exercise scenario, but also real world developments that showed Iraqi forces massing on the Kuwaiti border. One warrant officer from the brigade, CW3 Iverson, and one captain from ARCENT, CPT Flowers, received orders to leave the exercise, to go home and repack their bags, and to deploy to Saudi Arabia as part of the Advance Team due to the impending threat of hostilities. The rest of us finished the exercise, continued to monitor the current events in the Gulf, and redeployed to Ft. Monmouth late in July.

On 2 August 1990, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait; on 7 August, the 513th received its warning order, and on 11 August, my husband William – an MI Lieutenant assigned to 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division – and I had our church wedding. (We had had a civil ceremony and married on 30 October 1989 so that we could apply for joint domicile as a dual-military couple; we had been planning since then for our August church ceremony.) We extended invitations to the entire Task Force 174 and had invited many of the members of Will's unit. Joint domicile at that point meant that he was at Fort Riley, Kansas and I was at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. It was a great ceremony and reception, even though some of our dearest friends found out they were on alert and had to return to their units while enroute to our wedding. Many folks came in and out of the reception at the Fort Monmouth Officers Club from the NBC Chamber[1] and weapons' qualification ranges to say hello and give their blessings. Those who were fortunate enough to be able to stay took advantage of the entire five hours of open bar took… 'Hey why not? We're soon off to war!' *Eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow we may die* became more than poetry. The evening was quite an emotional one. The band, led by Dominic La Penta, a friend of my father's from

high school, of course played Lee Greenwood's 'God Bless the USA.' Two of my closest Army friends, Chris (Bustamante) Bloss and John Sartorius, and I led everyone in song. We had everyone who was currently serving or who had served in the US Armed Forces stand, and we sang in tribute to each one of them for their service to the nation … not a dry eye in the house. The Intelligence Center boss MAJ Charles Truxton and the battalion commander LTC Thomas McNamara both authorized me to take a pass the weekend of my wedding. Given the circumstances, it was a great gesture of generosity and compassion. Naturally, we postponed the planned honeymoon to Spain, Portugal, and Morocco and I set about making sure my team was ready.

The previous Brigade Commander, COL Frank P. Oakley, had emphasized tactical deployment and set-up of our equipment over the past two years, and we had recently finished a major joint targeting exercise – so we felt ready. Our biggest concerns were how many months of supplies we'd need for all of our off-the-shelf, non-standard military intelligence equipment and how we needed to tailor that requirement in light of the desert climate. We knew the effect the desert would have on our sensitive communication and intelligence systems, but we were not sure how best to mitigate the expected harsh environment's sand and heat. My boss, CPT John Bullington, said 'Plan on three to six months of supplies before you can expect the system to be in place.' Our brigade was actually in the Time-Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL) to depart within a few days, but the brigade commander preferred for us to deploy as a unit instead of in smaller packages of people and equipment. Despite his preferences for unit integrity, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander, General Schwarzkopf, in conjunction with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and Forces Command, had to make some tough decisions. Essentially, he had to choose between deploying sensors and shooters, tank-killers and intelligence collection systems. This meant that we were bumped in the sequence and did not deploy until 30 August. We did in fact deploy piecemeal. The brigade's strength increased dramatically and rapidly:[2]

Month	*Strength*
August	190
September	291
October	409
November	628
December	1,220
January	1,672
February	1,996

As I recall, throughout the pre-deployment preparation, I drew most heavily from my previous deployments as an enlisted soldier and as a Second Lieutenant. I had

spent a year in Korea on 2nd Infantry Division's G2 staff and I had deployed as an Electronic Warfare Signals Intelligence Analyst in 1984 for Operation QUALITY DRAGON in Honduras. There I took notes from my senior NCOs. I learned the importance of situational awareness, having a contingency plan, and 'taking only what you need and needing everything you take.' While my battalion and company commanders ensured that the unit performed all of the preventive maintenance and combat checks, licensing, and qualifying on personal equipment and unit systems, I supplemented the readiness preparations with Arabic language and cultural training. Initially I provided this only to my team, but since most of the trained linguists were in other battalions, I also started teaching classes to the rest of the company's soldiers.

Pre-deployment expectations

My initial thought was, 'Oh dear, I can't believe I'm going to war with this staff I just spent a month with in Florida.' The exercise naturally pointed out our weaknesses – thank goodness. We knew where we needed to focus and what we needed to fine-tune. The intelligence cycle is so intertwined with every battlefield operating system that we knew how critical our products would be for the CENTCOM and ARCENT commanders. Since many of the unit's officers and soldiers had spent time in Southwest Asia – on readiness training temporary duty (REDTRAIN TDY), working in various embassies, taking part in military-to-military exercises, and Bright Star rotations – we were fully aware of what to expect environmentally. What caused us concern was how to work within the 'coalition' and how we could get the information in the most expeditious manner to those who needed it.

Set-up

Over time, our brigade units stretched from Tabuk in northwest Saudi Arabia to El Ain in the United Arab Emirates. The military intelligence equipment and personnel were deployed in such a manner as to take advantage of the terrain, the enemy's weaknesses, and our own command and control structure. Although logistical support was a consideration, it did not limit our decisions to place assets; we either created or requested the support we needed based on the mission we had to perform, which made possible the 1,200 nautical-mile distance between our brigade's assets.[3] In addition, one of our battalions – the 202nd Military Intelligence Battalion – established two enemy prisoner of war (EPW) cages, one with each US corps – XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps – in order to support interrogation, debriefing, and processing of prisoners.[4]

When we first landed in Riyadh at the end of August, we set up our operations in the basement parking garage of the Royal Saudi Land Forces (RSLF) building in the middle of downtown Riyadh. Over 600 Americans ate, slept, and worked

out of this facility – walking daily to the CENTCOM headquarters at the Ministry of Defense and to the Gulf Cooperation Council down the street.

My first impression of the basement was something out of *Beneath the Planet of the Apes*. After a week of catered airline food, little exercise, sleep, or fresh air, few glimpses of the sun, and breathing noxious car exhaust (since the basement windows were at the street level), we began to refer to our new home as CHUDville after the movie *C.H.U.D.*, which stood for Cannibalistic Humanoid Underground Dwellers. We would flock to the garage doors when food arrived and shuffle back to our individual nests like zombies, bored yet anxious to set up our operations. Because we had no access to a secure work facility, no equipment, and no intelligence message traffic to process, soldiers passed the time sleeping and playing cards when they couldn't get permission to visit their counterparts at ARCENT and CENTCOM headquarters.

All of the women had to draw abiyas (black, shoulder-to-floor-length robes) from ARCENT supply if they wanted to go outside. The uniform policy for women was sleeves down, covered with an abiya, and accompanied by a male escort to venture out of the basement – whether to go up to the fourth floor to use the only female latrine or to go outside. It was at this point that I envied my female counterparts in the desert. Digging a trench for personal hygiene was certainly more sanitary than sharing one toilet – really nothing more than a hole in the floor – with 600 other men and women.

Living conditions aside, I looked forward to every opportunity to coordinate and gather information from my counterparts. On the way, I would take the opportunity to practice my Arabic and generally met with a warm reception. The limited Arabic I spoke was almost enough to overcome the gender barrier with the Pakistanis who built our showers, the Egyptian gas station attendants, and the Turkish restaurant owners. Interaction with the Saudis, however, was rare and difficult. Rug and jewelry merchants were willing to engage in conversation, but my military counterparts would not. Many other nationalities appreciate Americans who make an attempt to speak the host nation language. Arabs in particular have high regard for mastery of the Arabic language; the more like poetry your speech, the more *muruwa* you possess.

Muruwa in Arab culture defines the components of virility, similar to *machismo* in Latin American cultures; and it has three additional components: loyalty, generosity, and honor.[5] The more trustworthy, gracious, eloquent, and esteemed you (and your family) are, the more *muruwa* you have. This is one reason Arab men are so protective of the women in their family and society. The women are the vassals of family honor and men see it as their responsibility to protect and safeguard them.

Nevertheless, I cannot express my frustration, when early in the deployment, a Saudi military policeman stopped me. There I was, a female officer, in uniform, driving a military vehicle, on a military installation, taking another soldier to the military hospital! Thank goodness it was not a life-threatening emergency, so I

had the time to explain the fact that I had authorization to engage in such a culturally unacceptable female activity as driving. I couldn't help but think, '… and I'm here helping you defend your country … hmmm.'

By 5 September, we were holding daily working sessions despite the lack of workspace. I was able to take my soldiers with me to coordinate at CENTCOM. This helped morale considerably. In the armed services, we all train to do a mission we hope we'll never have to execute – fight a war.[6] But, when called, we all want to work, feel productive, and contribute to the overall mission. When we are excluded from the planning, tempers soar and morale plunges. To the extent I could, I continued to hold Arabic classes for my unit and impart first-hand cultural sensitivity updates to keep soldiers engaged.

Another morale booster came on 8 September, when the chain of command felt comfortable allowing soldiers out on 'the economy.' We had the opportunity to visit *Al Suq Al Qadeem* (The Old Market); it was much more authentic than the commercial/tourist oriented *Al Suq Al Batha*. Shopping with my male counterparts, one of whom was fluent in Arabic, having been raised in Riyadh, helped ensure that we bargained as well as the natives. If I donned a head covering in addition to the abiya, I also received better treatment from the merchants and avoided getting hit over the head by the *mutawa* (religious police) and enduring the chastizing instruction to 'Cover your head!'

By 9 September, many of us longed to worship in fellowship with one another. We held 'illegal' meetings with our bibles until the military's religious services were in place. Occasionally we could travel to the US Military Training Mission (USMTM) in Riyadh where they held services. But, by order of the CENTCOM Commander, chaplains had to call these gatherings for worship, 'morale meetings.'[7] Chaplains could not wear their chaplain insignia outside of US controlled areas, shipments could not be marked with religious symbols and had to be addressed to the 'Morale Officer,' worship services could only take place in covered shelters or private settings, no public audio or signs could announce meetings, and chaplains were encouraged to increase the number of services to reduce the number of attendees at each service. Inter-faith ministry with local Muslim Imams was strictly forbidden. Benevolent social work, as with orphanages, could only be undertaken if specifically requested by the host nation.

Our faith sustained us in times of stress and uncertainty, in boredom, and in crisis. It took some of us by surprise when at one mass on the eve of hostilities, the chaplain gave everyone blanket absolution – a term used in the Catholic mass to describe the cleansing of our souls before combat; it was comforting, providing the inner strength, confidence, and reassurance we needed spiritually.

From a spiritual perspective, one of my greatest personal achievements during DESERT STORM was to 'plant the seed' to bring one of my counterparts to Christ. My very good friend CPT Andy Lombardo was a source of great inspiration and faith to me during operations in Saudi Arabia and helped me do this for David. Andy was my source of religious expertise on how to fellowship effectively. I had

many conversations with my friend David who was struggling with the recent loss of his wife to cancer a few months before he deployed.

On one visit to our Intelligence Center, David commented on a number of my co-workers' great attitudes and hospitality during his coordination visit. I stopped and evaluated what he had just said; coincidentally, he had just listed all of my co-workers present at work at that time with whom I regularly attended mass. My observation intrigued him. He was not religious in any sense of the word, he had no belief in God, had no personal spirituality that he recognized, and did not practice any faith.

Shortly after he departed that day, I asked Andy what I could do to encourage him to explore his soul. He advised me to ask David where he thought his wife was. This startled me. I thought it too forward, sensitive, and personal. But I did it. It made David pause. Totally uncomfortable on how to proceed, I ran back to ask Andy how to nudge David further. He told me, 'Chris, you have to remember, sometimes you only plant the seed.' So, I did not press but answered David's questions to the best of my ability throughout the rest of the deployment. Although we corresponded after we went home, it wasn't until a year-and-a-half later that I received a letter from David thanking me and sharing that he had found and accepted Christ into his life. I cannot equate the feeling to any previous experience.

After weeks of conducting 'hip-pocket' training since we could not set up operations, we finally obtained the workspace and authorization to set up our vans to house our equipment behind the RSLF building on 14 September.[8] Transferring the military intelligence operations from the 513th MI Brigade headquarters in the US took a few days to complete. Re-routing messages and information, establishing new communications circuits and paths, and calibrating all the equipment for the new environment took considerable effort. The soldiers and I were happy and relieved to finally be at work – we now had a purpose.

Operations

I have not detailed very much enemy activity and the corresponding intelligence process because of the classified nature of the information I handled. Even though so much of the information has since been declassified, I kept my records intentionally unclassified and focused instead on the personal interaction surrounding each event. Each day was a similar routine. The customers or consumers of our products changed but the process was very similar. We would analyze the threats and package them in such a way as to be useful to the unit or the commander who requested it. The Task Force (TF) to which I belonged as part of the 513th MI Brigade (EAC) actually became part of and integrated with the ARCENT G2 analysis staff. Below I have included the missions for the 513th MI Bde, TF 174 (Intelligence Center [IC]), and my team (Rear Operations Team) for reference.

- *513th MI BDE Mission*: Provide Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) to ARCENT and deploying forces during peace, crisis, war, and restoration.
- *174 (IC) Mission*: Provide strategic/operational multidiscipline intelligence capability to the supported theater commander and deployed forces. (The TF 174 became the 297th Operations Battalion [Provisional] during Operation DESERT STORM.)
- *Rear Operations Team Mission*: Maintain, monitor, and estimate the threat to the rear area and enclaves in support of ARCENT operations and plans.

The Rear Operations Team was one of four teams in the IC. The other three teams were the Current Situation (if you conceptualize a linear battlefield, think of this as close battle – led by CPT Steve Iwicki and CW3 Henry Crowder), the Targeting Team (primarily focused on deep targets at the operational level – led by CPT Ted Lemke with assistance from LT Jim Klotz for Battle Damage Assessment), and the IPB Team (Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield – led by CPT Skarbowski and CW3 Steve Miller with our Terrain Analyst, WO1 Terri Metzger[9]) the team whose focus it was to analyze the developing enemy situation for the next few days.

The specific tasks my team performed included identification of multidiscipline counter intelligence (MDCI) threats. These included any foreign, hostile, or enemy intelligence collection capabilities and activities directed against the US and coalition forces. Specifically, we analyzed signals, imagery, and human intelligence threats. Additionally, we reported on all threats not monitored by the Current Situation Team, as well as Scuds (numbers, location, disposition, and activity), long-range aviation (primarily bombers), terrorism, special purpose forces, dissident activity, and any threats that could range or affect the friendly rear area.

My team would receive reports from each of the major subordinate commands of ARCENT, the 513th MI Brigade subordinate battalions, national intelligence agencies, CENTCOM, CENTAF, MARCENT, SOCCENT, and coalition forces. To facilitate the exchange of information and intelligence, we established formal liaison elements (often one officer or warrant officer and one enlisted soldier) with both US corps headquarters, MARCENT, AFCENT, and the coalition forces.[10]

As the deployment progressed, our product became so lengthy that it started to delay production of the twice-daily intelligence summary (INTSUM). We collectively decided that the Rear Operations Team would produce its own product and disseminate it separately to its own consumers, some of whom overlapped with those receiving the INTSUM. During my first encounter with BG Leide, the CENTCOM J2, I asked him if I could talk to my counterpart on his staff. He asked again what I did; I explained my mission and he replied: ‘We don’t have anyone here who does that, but we’re glad you’re doing it!’ As a result, I coordinated with a number of sections in the CENTCOM J2 that each

analyzed a piece of the puzzle I was trying to complete. Without doctrinal guidance and with no counterpart at my higher headquarters, I created the RATSUM (the rear area threat summary). In it we detailed the significant activity on each of the threats and then attempted to anticipate future activity over the next few days for planning purposes. Some of my soldiers did such great work that when national-level agencies arrived in country, they would ask my specialists for their databases as their point-of-departure for planning purposes.

Information technology grew by leaps and bounds during the deployment, and we had access to unprecedented capability to communicate and transfer data and images. The subordinate units' thirst for detailed information was insatiable. Although we could produce the intelligence information, we could not always deliver it in as timely a manner as subordinate commanders would have liked. We diverted personnel, assets, and resources to disseminate information outside the doctrinally accepted method. As an echelon-above-corps unit, we would normally disseminate to the corps, which would then disseminate to the divisions. Because this was time-consuming, especially over such great distances, we began delivering information, specifically imagery, directly to the divisions to reduce the lag time between collection, analysis, and the commanders' need to make decisions. For critical events, such as SCUD launches, we created redundant notification channels and systems to make sure everyone who needed to know got the information as soon as possible.

One interesting cultural note was the advantage of Islam to facilitate early warning of incoming SCUD attacks. Muslims pray five times a day, and to facilitate the call to prayer, neighborhoods such as Eskan Village in Riyadh were wired with a loudspeaker system. This system doubled as an air raid/nuclear/biological/chemical warning system for the civilian population – and us. We quickly knew when to don our protective gear and when the area was all clear.

Many of us worried about the chemicals and vaccines running through our systems, wondering if we'd be the second generation of 'Agent Orange' victims. After experiencing the oil fires in Kuwait, we began to refer to the possibility of a medical/health condition as 'Agent Oil.'

At one point I went to visit the ARCENT Chemical Officer, LTC Vicki Merryman, to ask her if my husband and I had to worry about having children since we both had received our shots/vaccines and were both deployed in the Gulf. She calmly and seriously looked at me and said, 'Have you ever considered adoption?' I stood there dumbfounded. I asked, 'Are you serious?' Her reply did not reassure me and did not set my mind at ease. She said the Army, understandably, had never done any tests to determine the effect on fertility of all of the shots and tablets we took, let alone for married military couples both of whom served in a combat zone.[11]

By 18 September, I had more immediate concerns. The 513th MI Brigade moved from the basement of the RSLF building in downtown Riyadh to join the

other CENTCOM elements living in Eskan Village on the outskirts of the city. The Saudis had built Eskan Village for the Bedouins who chose not to move in and occupy either the garden villas or multi-story apartment complexes. We still had to take a shuttle bus to work each day back to the RSLF building where our operations remained until late December. Other than the obvious concern over taking the same route, at almost the same time each day, the shuttle worked well.[12] The only incident in four months was one bus breakdown about 2 kilometers from the worksite.

We had no communication equipment and no city maps with us at the time. As the senior officer on the bus that day, I had to make sure everyone made it to the compound safely with all of their gear. Talk about contingency planning! We were totally unprepared for this scenario. I divided the group into two- and three-man teams – each individual armed with his personal weapon and protective gear – and staggered their departure times to prevent them from becoming a large target. Fortunately we had driven the route often enough for everyone to be somewhat familiar with how to navigate back to the RSLF building. It was more like orienteering on a general azimuth, but everyone made it safely within two hours. Some would have recommended staying together as a group. I decided against this option because of the threats I had monitored. Troop transport was our number one vulnerable target because of the large concentration of personnel. I frequently look back on my decision and analyze whether that was the best tactical decision. Then I recall that the only confirmed 'terrorist' attack the US experienced during DESERT STORM was the attack on the Air Force troop shuttle in Jiddah on 3 February.[13] Although the decision to disperse was risky, I still think it was the correct one.

At this point in the deployment, none of us had any reason to complain about our physical creature comforts. I shared a garden villa apartment with 9–14 other women depending on the date of the deployment. It had five bedrooms (two of which were really the living and dining rooms used as bedrooms), two-and-a-half baths, a kitchen, a common area, a marble staircase to the sunroof, a bottled water cooler, and air conditioning. Certainly not the image I had of going to war. The only reason we did not feel guilty is the fact that mentally, analytically, and emotionally we *had been fighting* the war – working seven days a week 18–20 hours a day, for the last three months, providing enemy updates to our commanders and major subordinate units – most of whom were yet to deploy to the desert. We received so many new computer hardware and software systems that the pace never eased. We constantly had to integrate new intelligence and communication systems and make them inter-operable.[14]

A significant morale booster began in late September. The mail flow began to trickle. By the middle of October, the faucet was on and we received so much mail, and not just from our friends and families. We received countless packages and letters addressed to 'Any Service Member.' Children made cards, sent pictures of themselves, prayer groups and ladies' auxiliary groups baked cookies,

sent sunglasses, sunscreen, and bug repellent. The outpouring of love and support was heartwarming and gave us strength. Everyone I knew told me they had tied a yellow ribbon around a tree, an antenna, or a candle. My family and friends called all of their friends. At one point my Mom told me that she and Father Scott (the priest who married Will and me) had the Protestants in Indio, California, the Catholics in San Diego, the Baptists and Catholics in Toms River, New Jersey (my home town), and everyone they knew who attended any denomination Bible Study group praying for us.

Some of my pen-pals were Daniella Minervini and Girl Scout Troop 435; Frankie Richett; Shannon Saks from Staten Island, NY; Danielle Wolf; Amanda Puch; my friends from Rutgers – Tony Soriano, Marty and Susan Grogan, Lisa and Bob Abbatomarco; Dana Kunkel; Waldorf, MD, Elks Ladies Auxiliary; Jacelyn Carrillo; Joe Sutton from Lakewood, NJ; Rebecca Malley from Rahway, NJ; Carol Schemelter's class from East Dover Elementary School in Toms River, NJ; my Aunts Santina, Patricia, Ann, and Virginia; Karen Korbul, my matron of honor; CPT John Auciello from my former reserve unit – the 404th Civil Affairs; my parents Barbara and Ralph, and my brothers Jim, Steve, and Tom; and of course, daily letters from my husband until he was alerted for deployment on 9 November. Toms River High School North (TRHSN) even sent all of its deployed alumni a newsletter. It included news from home and all of our addresses. But more importantly, it gave us an opportunity to find one another 'over there.' We all seek comfort in the familiar, and combat is no exception. To be able to find someone not only from your home town, but from your own school was a thrill. All of the support it provided earned TRHSN the local citizen of the year award following DESERT STORM.

The support on the home front helped us weather the daily operations that made for extremely long days that had become routine. But, a new dimension started on 13 October; I received my first invitation to attend the weekly meetings held by the Embassy Regional Security Team. These meetings added to my awareness of the threat situation in theater and certainly helped with my analysis of it. I traveled once a week with the ARCENT Provost Marshall to discuss inter-agency coordination with regard to force protection. The meetings were always at the unclassified level because American contractors operating in Saudi Arabia (for reasons related and unrelated to DESERT STORM) attended the sessions. Members from each of CENTCOM's major subordinate commands attended, as did representatives from other US corporations and agencies operating in Saudi Arabia. More often than not, the meetings served to quell rumors running rampant among the Americans living in compounds throughout the country. What resulted many times was the need to hold additional meetings with military personnel to address operationally sensitive issues – for instance, the vulnerability of ammunition sitting offshore or in a port waiting to unload.

We were all aware of Iraq's capabilities and limitations, and because of this, on 14 and 15 October, over 400 of us living in Eskan Village began to panic. We

were sure we had been victims of a biological attack. One minute we'd be briefing the G2 or the commanding general on the enemy update, the next, we'd turn green and run for a latrine; the culprit was shigellosis, a form of bacillary dysentery. There was no enemy involvement, to our knowledge. The medical community traced the outbreak to the water used to wash the utensils and trays in the mess hall. While we drank bottled water, it seems our place settings had only rated non-potable water. Another lesson learned, with no permanent casualties, but it did interrupt the flow of work on the headquarters staff for about two weeks until everyone recovered.

While the rest of the US military had been gearing up and deploying throughout the fall, we received the bulk of our augmentation in the Intelligence Center in late November and December. Many colonels found themselves working for the new general; many lieutenant colonels were now second in command to colonels, and lieutenant colonels arrived to replace captains as team chiefs. This did not do much for the morale of the unit. We felt that we had performed well and that the new arrivals added advice, direction, and guidance creating a bureaucracy, but did little to add to the productivity. Here is where command information was critical to explain to soldiers and junior officers the commander's intent. The increase in staff and senior leadership helped filter some of the distractions so that we could devote our entire effort to the production of intelligence and answering the commander's information needs. As it was, we barely kept pace with the surge in planning and production of intelligence products. One of my team's major contributions to the campaign effort took place at this time. The ARCENT Deception planning began in earnest. Because the Rear Operations Team monitored what the enemy intelligence collection capability could gather, our assistance was critical to evaluate whether the Iraqis would believe the story we wanted to tell them. The now famous left hook was in fact a surprise thanks to the efforts of many soldiers. Our contribution was to evaluate whether Iraq could and did observe and collect the message we were sending. The Iraqi sand table at the headquarters they had established in Prince Mubarak's house in Kuwait City clearly indicated that the deception plan worked. They had depicted their 'enemy courses of action' from the east complete with the amphibious landings we practised.

In early February, my husband drove down from 1st Infantry Division's positions in northern Saudi Arabia (TAA Roosevelt) to spend 48 hours gathering information and imagery for the Division G2. SGT Mark Domenic, one of our premier all-source analysts assigned specifically to assist VII Corps units, helped Will collect the data his unit needed.[15] At one point, I told SGT Domenic, 'Will is spending more time with you than me!' He responded, 'Ma'am, that's because I have something he wants.' Before my bruises healed, I told him, 'You keep him alive, and I'll give him something to live for.'

On Sunday, 24 February, we kicked off the ground campaign. The pace was fast and furious, hectic and frustrating. But for us in the Intelligence Center, the

main effort had been the last seven months leading up to the start of the offensive. Our mission had been to paint as clear a picture as possible of the Iraqi forces, strengths, capabilities, locations, and intentions. Once we attacked, our focus was battle damage assessment to report how effective our operations had been.

Task Force Freedom

On 26 February, I received orders to take one NCO from my team to join Task Force Freedom; we were to leave for Kuwait the next day. SSG Walter and I were to represent the Intelligence Center as part of the ARCENT Forward G2 element. Our mission was to provide the same analytical support from Kuwait City that we had provided in Riyadh. Any guilt I felt about my living conditions quickly subsided once we hit Log Base Echo in the Saudi desert, tried to link-up with our Special Forces and Marine escorts, and headed into Iraq before the ceasefire. Driving through the desert and oil fires, the noon sky black as midnight, resurrected those worrying thoughts of 'Agent Oil.'

In the brigade slice of twenty-five vehicles, I was the only female to head north. This did not even dawn on me until our new Brigade Commander, COL William Robeson, asked me, 'How does it feel to be Queen Bee?' I looked at him, not understanding the question. Throughout my entire career in the Army, I have been lucky; in very few instances have I felt my gender has made a difference in the treatment I received. When it did occur, it was usually the result of poor communication rather than some malicious plot or sexual harassment. I seldom realize I am the only woman in the room or on the mission until someone brings it to my attention – usually when someone makes an off-color comment and all heads turn in my direction to see my reaction – hoping I did not take offense. Fortunately, in my previous units, we were all green, we worked as a team; there was no gender and no race distinction – just performance of our designated tasks that set us apart from one another.

We departed at 2015 on 27 February, and arrived mid-afternoon in Kuwait City on the 28th. As we approached the airport, we started to see civilians, waving flags at us; smiles and cheers greeted us; it made us feel as though our efforts were worthwhile. ARCENT set up operations in the Ministry of Education compound where SSG Walter and I worked for the next three weeks.

During that time, we provided briefings and support to units in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations. We provided primarily terrorism threat assessments and tried to identify what hostile elements remained in the city. Every Kuwaiti remaining in the city claimed to be a member of the Kuwaiti resistance and provided information on the atrocities they had observed and experienced. Additionally, we monitored the return of critical basic infrastructure support, water and electric service, and sent updates to the G2 in Riyadh.

During the cease-fire negotiations, WO1 Ferguson (a British counterpart) and I drove to the airfield in Safwan, Iraq, north on the Highway of Death. The

destruction was unlike any I had ever observed. Charred vehicles and equipment littered both sides of the route – obviously cleared by coalition forces. Will's unit, 2nd Bde, 1ID, secured the airfield. Once we arrived, we observed the 1st Infantry Division's site security and preparations for the cease-fire negotiations, and forwarded any threat updates we obtained. We took the opportunity to spend our four-hour honeymoon, eating an MRE on the top of his Bradley, overlooking the site.

But by mid-March, SSG Walter and I headed back to Riyadh to begin the wrap-up, history writing, and redeployment planning and packing for our team. The Intelligence Center was one of the last units scheduled to redeploy; we actually arrived home in May. The last seven weeks of our deployment gave us the opportunity to reflect on our operations and how well we had done. We captured the lessons we had learned and wrote recommendations for use by the 513th Military Brigade as well as the Army. I have outlined in the sections that follow some of the important 'take-aways' from my experience during these operations.

Challenges

1 Plan simultaneously – not fragmented, not consecutive, but concurrent – for all parts of the battlefield. The rear area (as then defined) was often ignored or overlooked. As a First Lieutenant, I had little collar weight to convince Lieutenant Colonels of its importance until they were ready to focus on it. This usually meant after they finished the close and deep battle plans. Doctrine has since changed to correct much of this, and we now approach any operation in a more integrated and synchronized manner. In fact, the concept of a linear battlefield is considered antiquated and seldom appropriate in today's doctrine.

2 The friendly force picture of the battlefield is just as critical for campaign sustainment vulnerability analyses as is the enemy situation. We still need to improve our ability to monitor and share friendly status information. Some difficulties have arisen due to hardware and software incompatibilities. This seemingly easy fix has been a work in progress for more than the 22 years I have been in the service. The Department of Defense has made some improvement with the fielded upgrades of equipment and capabilities, and continues to research ways to improve every soldier's situational awareness and common operational picture (COP) of the battlefield.

3 When no doctrine exists to provide guidance, look to the commander's intent and improvise. In my case, it was a combination of (a) the need to supplement existing symbology, and (b) the need for a specific, tailored product to supplement a complicated intelligence production cycle. My response was to create the RATSUM. In any case, always strive to inform and ask everyone who needs to know to avoid confusion and gaps.

Lessons learned

There are many lessons I took away from my experience during Operations DESERT SHIELD, DESERT STORM, and DESERT CALM (the period after the cessation of hostilities). None of them are new, but six bear repeating and emphasizing. One thing I have learned as I have moved from unit to unit in my career is that individuals learn, but units must constantly re-learn. Personnel changes are such that the competency and performance of a unit peaks and plunges; it is cyclical and correlated with the training cycle. That is why the first accomplishment I list is the success of 'training as you fight.'

1 *Train as you fight.* The 513th did this very well. I have performed similar military intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination tasks in other units, but the 513th was one of only two units that actually exercised the operations plans it expected to execute; 2nd Infantry Division was the other. While in garrison, our daily mission (which we called training) was very similar to our wartime mission. We monitored and evaluated the same threats in our area of responsibility, identified significant indicators if hostile activity, and provided early warning of enemy intentions. The exercise of real operations plans makes training all that more realistic, productive, and worthwhile. In fact during our exercise, Internal Look, we often had to ask ourselves, 'Is it real, or is it Memorex?'

What is distressing to some of us in the intelligence community is the substitution of a 'world-class opposing force' instead of an actual portrayal of the anticipated threat. Granted there are often other training goals and objectives such as training the staff to function collectively, effectively, and efficiently and restrictions on the classification of the data necessary. However, what normally ensues is an additional 'ramp-up' to tailor the training for the impending deployment. The skills evaluated in training are the same skills needed for deployments, crisis-response, and operations other than war, but their application differs considerably with the enemy and the terrain. Make it as realistic as possible, and this the 513th did, as did ARCENT and CENTCOM prior to operations in the Gulf. The threats we exercised mirrored those that we would encounter – not some fabricated threat with unrealistic capabilities. What this demonstrated was the post-conflict difficulties that always ensue: the civil affairs missions, the nation-building, and the peace-keeping. The US Army is very good at its core mission of fighting and winning the nation's wars; it is the postwar period requiring integration of non-governmental organizations and civil authorities that still needs refinement.

2 *Emphasize a balance between technical and tactical training.* Here again the 513th had the good fortune to have commanders who emphasized different skill sets in training. Although it seemed personality-driven more than planned, the brigade commander's focus was tactical proficiency while the battalion commander's emphasis was on the technical intelligence skills. These, in

combination with our higher headquarters' training cycle, prepared us very well. We were at peak operating efficiency, mission-ready, and extremely effective at our tasks on the eve of our deployment. A well-integrated, multi-echelon training plan and cycle can ensure similar readiness.

3 *Keep soldiers focused and everyone informed*. Many 513th soldiers, particularly those in the Intelligence Center, felt bored yet anxious, useless, and frightened during the initial weeks of the deployment. Because the infrastructure and available workspace could not accommodate all of us immediately, many soldiers had to wait until the unit was operational to perform their individual tasks. Attitudes and discipline suffered. Engaging even the most junior soldiers in situation updates, providing language, area, and cultural familiarization, taking them to meetings at echelons above their own focus, and simply including them was critical to keeping their morale high and focusing on the mission. Many of the senior leaders in battalion and brigade did not realize the extent to which soldiers hungered to be included and to perform their mission. Once the junior leaders (company grade officers, warrant officers, and NCOs) brought this to their attention, they granted permission for the junior soldiers to coordinate with their counterparts at higher and adjacent units. They also began providing mission status updates to the entire unit rather than holding their own planning meetings. A simple fix.

4 *Support from home is critical to total success.* History, like the American public, did not provide a warm reception to returning Vietnam veterans, although their contributions and sacrifices have slowly gained the recognition they are due. We, on the other hand, had no doubts during our entire deployment that we had the support of the home front. It built confidence and was reassuring. We knew we had the blessings of those we swore to defend. They reminded us each day. They not only wrote letters, but sang songs, made movies, and galvanized whole communities to take an active role.

When the 513th redeployed, the soldiers landed at McGuire Air Force Base, a 45-minute drive from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. Many family members came to meet us at the airport, but all of us had to either ride the bus or drive in the convoy back to Fort Monmouth before going home; we could not ride with our families. We *were* the parade, and the entire route was lined with a display of patriotism I had never seen Americans express – hand-held and raised American flags waving, yellow ribbons tied on each tree, every fire truck in the counties through which we traveled lined the roads, sirens blared, colorful banners and welcome home signs posted on homes and businesses, people literally shoulder to shoulder – reminiscent of Hands Across America. It made the difference to know the country was of one mind, since as soldiers, we do what we do for them.

5 *Faith in combat is critical for many.* While every deployed service member had the opportunity to take a few days of R&R to Bahrain, I waited to request my time during the religious retreat our brigade chaplain had organized. How's this

for a strange combination? Our Chaplain designed a retreat for the brigade's Christians and Jews who wanted to celebrate the Seder during Passover, in a Muslim country (Bahrain) where part of the service included bringing the Torah to Manama (all within Iranian silkworm missile range). As I mentioned earlier, my faith did much to sustain me, and I wanted very much to wait until this opportunity to take my R&R.

Moral courage. We do not discuss it frequently as we sit in garrison and train, but when crises arise, particularly life-threatening ones, the realization that we are mortal all but slaps us in the face. Combat is a wake-up call. Those with a strong sense of faith find comfort and strength. Those who rarely thought of something greater than themselves seem to crave a source of inspiration. I know I would not have endured the stress without prayer. I read *Joshua* by Joseph Girzone and *This Present Darkness* by Frank Peretti during the air campaign because on some nights sleep eluded me. Both books taught me a lot about the power of prayer and gave me strength. The opportunity to fellowship at mass and with my close friends Andy Lombardo and Tracy Richardson also helped us feel as though we had divine protection.

6 *Keep a journal*. As a First Lieutenant, I was fortunate to have served in a unit that became an extended part of the Army component staff. That vantage point provided me with access to discussions, planning, and intelligence information not found routinely at tactical levels – at that time – and certainly not what most of my lieutenant counter-parts experienced. Although much of the intelligence the 513th MI Bde produced provided tactical fox-hole resolution, much of it focused on future threats. This experienced confirmed for me, the need – for even the most junior leaders – to understand the strategic vision as much as the need to understand the tactical and operational goals and objectives. However, over time, details fade, names are forgotten, and sequencing of events becomes blurred. Encouraging leaders (and soldiers) to keep a journal provides an outlet for stress, an opportunity for reflection, and the possibility that the details will survive for the next generation of those who study and fight wars.

Notes

1 NBC Chamber is the Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Chamber designed to test the effectiveness and efficiency of protective masks ensuring that they worked properly when exposed to noxious agents. Almost as important, it is designed to build confidence in each soldier that his mask will work in the event of a real attack by a chemical or biological agent.

2 I have taken these figures depicting the unit's strength over time from the 513th MI Bde Tier Deployment Concept briefing. This briefing was a compilation of the major lessons learned from DESERT STORM and applied to a tactically tailored approach to ready the brigade for future deployments. Original source of the figures was the brigade personnel strength reports compiled by the S1s and commanders of the brigade and subordinate battalions during the deployment.

3 The individuals I credit most with making this happen are the S3 and the Executive Officer (XO) of TF 174/297th Opns Bn, CPT Diana Flett and CPT Christopher Von Jacobi respectively, and the S3 and XO of the 201st MI Bn, CPT Alicia Pence and CPT Kennedy respectively. It was their hard efforts, persistence, and willingness to overcome the boundaries and limitations of doctrine and culture that ensured the 513th had the disposition and resources to perform its mission successfully. Numerous other members of the brigade, the commanders of TF 174/297th Opns Bn and the 201st MI Bn, LTCs Bob Butto and Tom Woosley, respectively, and their staffs, contributed to make the 513th MI Bde soldiers successful at their wartime mission; but these four officers were the most visible from my vantage point.

4 As the A Co 202nd MI Bn Company Commander, CPT Oneta Fioravanti was responsible for the soldiers manning the Corps EPW cages and had to interface with both VII Corps and XVIII ABC to establish them. In January, they established the cage to support VII Corps 30 km west of Hafr al Batin, Saudi Arabia, the cage to support XVIII ABC in Raffa, Saudi Arabia, and the theater camps in Hafr al Batin and in Al Sahra (which did not open until February). Subsequently, her unit assisted in establishing the Joint Debriefing Center for the interrogation of senior, high-value EPWs. Telephonic interview with LTC Oneta Fioravanti, Fort Gordon, GA, 15 January 2004.

5 J. M. Cowan, ed., *The Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic* (Spoken Language Services, Ithaca, NY: 1976): 901–902. Hans Wehr defines the word muruwa as 'the idea of manhood, comprising all knightly virtues, especially manliness, valor, chivalry, generosity, sense of honor.' Sometimes it is translated as 'Chivalry, magnanimity, generosity, sense of honor, virility, and manhood … coming from the verb which means to be healthful or to be manly.'

6 I speak from my own experience and observations with those I have served. No one I know ever really wants to go to war; but all of us have made the commitment to protect the nation and to serve when called upon to fight for our nation's well-being and to preserve the values we hold dear.

7 This order came to us via formal automated electronic message traffic from CENTCOM Headquarters – 13 September 1990 at 1507 Zulu time – to ensure that all units received the same guidance at the same point in time.

8 Hip-pocket training is a term applied to that training not originally planned but conducted nonetheless. This is usually the case when an unexpected opportunity presents itself or because of an unexpected delay in the training already underway. Rather than waste the time, junior leaders fill the time productively, supplementing with mission, combat, or life skills training of value to the soldiers present.

9 WO1 Terri Metzger was the first person from the 513th MI Bde to brief GEN Schwarzkopf; her analysis of the terrain in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations was vital to the successful planning conducted by the CENTCOM staff. In the eyes of the coalition leadership – and as a female soldier – she made quite an impression. The Arab Coalition Officers commented as she left the briefing room, 'Who was that woman!' In this case, unlike the cultural bias we had encountered earlier, it was delivered in quite a complimentary way.

10 CPT Andy Petretti joined the 513th MI Bde during DESERT SHIELD; he represented the Intelligence Center with the coalition forces that included Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Kuwait.

11 That night I prayed a few extra prayers. My husband and I now have two beautiful children who are healthy and happy – born in 1998 and 2002 – and we continue to count our blessings, knowing that many veterans of DESERT STORM have experienced health difficulties and tragedies. Numerous women in our brigade suffered miscarriages shortly after their redeployments, and many studies have been under way

to determine the nature and extent of Gulf War Syndrome. Our family continues to pray for all veterans, their families, and the medical community's on-going work.

12 Any analysis of operational security measures will identify the vulnerability of not having a varied routine. Predictability equates to vulnerability.

13 Taken from notes, briefings, and summaries produced during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

14 The key to successful planning is to have the most thorough information about the enemy's capabilities, disposition, and intentions. Intelligence analysts must determine this to the best of their ability, with incomplete information prior to operations commencing. In the last few years, with the pace of combat operations, our job is almost easier once hostilities have started. Of course, battle damage assessments and continued updates on the threats are necessary, but the intensity of the effort – the weight on analysts' shoulders – feels lighter even though the critical information needs for force protection and operations remain.

Another constant when the US deploys forces on operations is the tendency for decision-makers to want the latest and greatest technology. In the intelligence discipline, these systems often are not fully tested, and certainly not already in the Army inventory. The training and learning curve associated with these systems, especially for an intelligence center, is comparable to fielding a new tank at the start of combat operations and telling soldiers and crews of this equipment 'Figure it out! Make it work!' And they do! The caliber of the Army soldier never ceases to amaze me. Young intelligence specialists and privates have the know-how and curiosity to make electrons sing, and they do so in ways that developers have sometimes never thought to consider.

15 WO1 Bob Cuddeback provided oversight to both the VII Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps LNOs as the technical experts for order of battle analysis and coordination of other intelligence related products from the Intelligence Center.

Part 3

JUNIOR COMBAT COMMANDERS

7

THE BATTLE OF 73 EASTING

Colonel H. R. McMaster

For even casual followers of the history of the Gulf War, Colonel H. R. McMaster needs little introduction.[1] *His unit – Eagle Troop of the 2nd Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment – was the dominant force at the Second Cavalry Regiment's Battle of 73 Easting. This battle characterized not only the Gulf War, but the state of American forces in 1991. Highly trained, well led, and with the world's best combat equipment, US armored forces had not been tested on the battlefield for decades. But the actions of Colonel McMaster and Eagle Troop left little doubt in anyone's mind as to the supremacy of the United States Army on the armored battlefield.*

Colonel McMaster's unit was a VII Corps asset, based in Nuremburg, Germany, and had trained for years to lead the defense against the threat of a Soviet invasion of Germany. In November 1990, the unit deployed to Saudi Arabia to provide part of the second corps called for by General Schwarzkopf's revised offensive plan. There, the Second Armored Cavalry Regiment would lead VII Corps again, into 100 hours of ground combat. The regiment's mission was initially to locate and fix the Republican Guard, and to pass the heavy armored divisions through to engage and destroy the enemy.

When the 2nd ACR and Colonel McMaster's Eagle Troop approached a longitudinal reading of 73 Easting, however, a bloody engagement with two Iraqi Divisions created an opportunity to defeat the enemy before handing the battle over to the follow-on divisions. Eagle Troop initiated the battle with a violent assault against a brigade of the Tawakalna Division of the Republican Guard. After Eagle Troop's assault, other elements in the Regiment used their thermal sights, long weapons range, and the effects of tactical surprise to annihilate the enemy.

The revolution of US military might that took place in the 1980s came to fruition on a barren desert battlefield in Iraq. Colonel McMaster's story depicts the ground war at its grittiest and cavalrymen at their finest. His account details the courage of American soldiers, the excellence of their training, the superiority of US equipment, and, most importantly, what it was like leading combat forces through one of the most intense tank battles of the twentieth century.

Lieutenants are combat leaders. All soldiers will look to you when things get tough, so you must be leaders in all things. There is a tendency in our Army to view lieutenants as apprentices or novices. Nothing could be further from the truth. Upon commissioning you will have the most important job in our Army. As Major General Ernest Harmon, commander of the Second Armored Division in World War II observed, 'the division will succeed only as the platoon succeeds.'[2] Platoons win battles. Platoon leaders build combat ready teams and lead their soldiers into action.

Our unit's action was one of many fights in DESERT STORM and every one of those battles was different. The Battle of 73 Easting may not be at all relevant to the way you will fight a platoon in combat or to decisions you will make under fire. What Carl von Clausewitz said about military theory is also instructive concerning our use of military history to prepare for future combat. It 'will have fulfilled its main task when it is used to analyze the constituent elements of war, to distinguish precisely what at first sight seems fused, to explain in full the properties of the means employed and to show their probable effects … It is meant to educate the mind of the future commander, … not to accompany him to the battlefield.'[3] The aspect of military history that transfers most directly to the challenges you will face as officers is what has proven an enduring element of continuity in warfare, the human and psychological dimension of battle. In the book, *The Face of Battle*, historian John Keegan analyzed three battles that occurred in the same general vicinity, but were widely separated in time: the battles of Agincourt in 1415, Waterloo in 1815, and the Somme in 1916. His analysis highlighted many changes in technology and organization. For example, the space of the battle area expanded as destructive power and tempo increased. Relationships and relative strengths between combat arms or fires and maneuver shifted over time. What struck Keegan, however, was something that did not change: 'What battles have in common is human: the behaviour of men struggling to reconcile their instinct for self-preservation, their sense of honour and the achievement of some aim over which other men are ready to kill them.'[4] Preparing your soldiers for the struggle Keegan described should be the focus of your efforts as an officer. It is up to you to develop tough, cohesive teams that possess the confidence to overcome fear and accomplish the mission in battle. Confidence serves as a barrier against fear. Fear is dangerous because it leads to a preoccupation with self-preservation. Preoccupation with self-preservation leads to inaction. Inaction creates opportunities for the enemy that the enemy would not have enjoyed otherwise. Fear can lead to the disintegration of an organization. It will fall upon you to prepare your soldiers for the psychological and emotional strain of an activity that involves killing and the prospect of death. What will allow your soldiers to suppress fear and focus on the mission despite the chaotic nature of war is confidence. Confidence was, I believe, the factor that best explains our troop's overwhelming victory over a Republican Guard brigade during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

On 23 February, the Second Armored Cavalry Regiment moved into Iraq and initiated its offensive covering force mission forward of General Frederick Franks' VII Corps. The VII Corps' mission was to envelop and defeat the Republican Guard from the west. The Iraqi defense was mainly oriented to the south. The Republican Guard was positioned in depth to the north to preserve its freedom to maneuver. Some Republican Guard units were in defensive positions; others were in reserve. To the east of VII Corps, the Marines reinforced with the Second Armored Division's Tiger Brigade attacked to defeat the enemy and advance on Kuwait City. To the west of VII Corps, the XVIII Airborne Corps attacked deep to cut enemy egress routes and trap the enemy. Once the Iraqis detected our effort to envelop and destroy their Army in Kuwait with the VII and XVIII Airborne Corps, elements of the Republican Guard, including the Tawakalna Division, reoriented to the west.

As an offensive covering force, the Second Armored Cavalry Regiment led the attack to ease the forward movement of the Corps, prevent its premature deployment into fighting, defeat enemy units within its capability, and develop the enemy situation. Once the Regiment located the Republican Guard defensive positions, we would determine where the enemy was strong and isolate that strength, find or create weakness, and pull the divisions into the fight under advantageous conditions. Our troop was only one small part of that regimental operation, an operation that ultimately located the boundary between the Republican Guard and the mechanized divisions of the Iraqi Army. Our troop's fight and other engagements gave the Corps commander, General Frederick Franks, the information he wanted before he committed a 'fist' of heavy divisions that were moving behind the cavalry.

On the first day, we traveled only about 20 kilometers into Iraq and then waited for the divisions to close behind us. F Troop, commanded by Captain Tom Sprowls, who led the squadron almost the entire time in Iraq, rapidly defeated several enemy infantry units. The emphasis was on getting to the Republican Guard and we passed many of our prisoners on to units traveling behind us. Our troop had our first combat action on the evening of 24 February after moving further to the north. It was dusk and an enemy position fired on us as we halted. We engaged them with direct fire from Bradleys and my tank as well as indirect fire from our mortars, killed some of them, and then many surrendered to F Troop, which was on our right flank. As we continued our attack the next day, leaders emphasized to their soldiers not to become complacent about our early actions because we would soon meet more capable Republican Guard units that could present us with greater challenges. Just before sunset during the evening of 25 February, G Troop, commanded by my classmate Captain Joe Sartiano, engaged and destroyed an enemy reconnaissance unit of about twelve MTLBs – small armored personnel carriers. They were Republican Guard vehicles. G Troop took captured vehicles to the squadron command post so that we could examine maps and the condition of the weapons and equipment, much of which

was brand new. After entertaining ourselves by racing the vehicles around for a while, we returned to our troops to await the next day's orders. We anticipated a fight. It was clear that we had hit the Republican Guard screen line, or security zone.

It rained very hard during the night of the 25th, and as a result there was heavy fog on the morning of 26 February. We could barely see 200 meters, sometimes less. The fog eventually lifted, but it was replaced by a sandstorm, and the blowing sand also limited visibility to very short distances. It was under those conditions that the Regiment ordered us to continue our attack to the east to identify the defensive positions of the Republican Guard. We had a feeling in our guts that we would soon be in a fight. The divisions of VII Corps were still far off, but were closing the gap. Our troop and G Troop destroyed several enemy BMP and MTLB reconnaissance vehicles that morning.

After moving into the lead along Second Squadron's southern boundary with Third Squadron, our troop received orders to move out. It was about 1607 on the afternoon of 26 February. We were given a limit of advance of the 67 Easting, a north–south grid line on the map. We moved in a formation called a modified column security right. One scout platoon, Lieutenant Mike Petschek's First Platoon, led with three scout sections of two cavalry fighting vehicles each in a 'vee' formation. The other scout platoon, 1LT Tim Gauthier's Third Platoon, moved along our southern flank, with guns oriented south to cover the gap between us and Third Squadron moving behind us to our south. Our mortar section followed First Platoon. Our tanks moved behind the mortars in a nine-tank wedge with my tank in the center. 1LT Mike Hamilton's Second Platoon was to my tank's left in an echelon left formation and 1LT Jeff Destefano's Fourth Platoon was to my tank's right in an echelon right.

Because we had no maps of the area, we were unaware that we were paralleling a road that ran west to east along our boundary with Third Squadron. The road ran through a small village and then into Kuwait. We also did not know that we were entering an Iraqi training ground recently reoccupied by a brigade of the Tawakalna Division, which had received the mission of halting our advance into Kuwait.

The enemy commander, Major Mohammed, and his soldiers knew the ground well.[5] The unit had used the village for billets as they conducted live fire training. Major Mohammed, who had attended the Infantry Officer Advanced Course at Fort Benning, Georgia, thought it was the ideal ground from which to defend. He assumed that we would have to move along roads to avoid becoming lost in the featureless desert. He was unaware of our Global Positioning System capabilities. He organized his defense along the road by fortifying the village with anti-aircraft guns to be used in the ground mode, machineguns, and infantry. Mohammed's defense was fundamentally sound. He took advantage of an imperceptible rise in the terrain that ran perpendicular to the road and directly through the village to organize a 'reverse slope' defense on the east side of that ridge. He anticipated

that upon encountering his strong point at the village, we would bypass it either to the north or the south. He built two engagement areas or 'kill sacks' on the eastern side of the ridge to the north and the south of the village, emplaced minefields to disrupt our forward movement, and dug in approximately forty tanks and sixteen BMPs about 1,000 meters from the ridge. His plan was to engage and destroy us piecemeal as we moved across the crest. Hundreds of infantry occupied bunkers and trenches between his armored vehicles. He positioned his reserve of eighteen T-72s and his command post along another subtle ridgeline approximately 3,000 meters further east.

The first contact came at 1607, when Staff Sergeant John McReynolds' Bradley drove right on top of an Iraqi bunker that contained an observation element positioned to provide early warning to the forces in the village. Two enemy soldiers emerged and surrendered. SSG McReynolds took them prisoner and transported them to our trains.

McReynolds' wingman, Sergeant Maurice Harris, remained at the limit of advance and scanned into the village through the blowing sand. Evidently the Iraqis warned the force in the village and Sergeant Harris' Bradley came under 23mm and machinegun fire. The first thing he did was to report to his platoon leader, who responded, 'Well, kill them.' As SGT Harris began to engage with his 25mm chain gun, LT Gauthier moved forward and continued to report the situation.

As a platoon leader or company commander, you must be forward to have a clear picture of the situation. I asked LT Gauthier to fire a TOW missile into the center of the village so that the explosion would orient our tanks. After my gunner, Staff Sergeant Craig Koch, fired a round to mark center, all nine tanks fired high explosive rounds into the village simultaneously to suppress the enemy position. Everyone in the troop was doing the right thing. There were big explosions in the village and it would have been easy for crews to become distracted. The troop's training paid off, however, as First Platoon maintained its primary orientation to the east.

If you know where friendly forces are and there is not a danger of civilian casualties, do not hesitate to shoot or conduct reconnaissance by fire. Staff Sergeant David Lawrence was the commander of First Platoon's northernmost Bradley. When his gunner, Sergeant Bradley Feltman, said, 'Hey, I've got a hot spot out there; I'm not sure what it is,' Lawrence responded, 'Put a TOW in it; see what it is.' Lawrence identified the hot spot as a T-72 as the turret was ripped from its hull in the ensuing explosion.

Be prepared for confusion and concurrent activity. As we fired into the village and while Lawrence was launching a missile, the troop received permission to advance to the 70 Easting. I instructed First Platoon to resume movement east. LT Petchek did not respond immediately because Lawrence was reporting, 'Contact! Contact, east, tank!' Although I had not yet received that report, I felt it was best for us to go to a 'tanks lead' formation and instructed Green and White, the tank

platoons, to 'follow my move.' First Platoon pulled in behind the tank wedge to cover our rear. Third Platoon retained responsibility for flank security. As we began moving forward, First Platoon, responding to the contact report on their platoon radio net, started firing 25mm high explosive munitions across the front. It was a little unnerving for the tanks as we moved forward. I gave First Platoon a cease-fire order – 'Red 1, this is Black 6, cease fire.' The two tank platoons were separated slightly from our tank. When our tank came over the crest of the imperceptible rise north of the village, SGT Craig Koch, the gunner, and I identified the enemy simultaneously. As SGT Koch said 'tanks direct front,' I could see eight T-72 tanks in prepared positions to our front.

Standard unit fire and battle drills at the crew, platoon, and company levels are essential to achieving speed of action and, in armored combat, the side that shoots first usually wins. I gave the fire command, 'Fire, Fire SABOT.' We had a HEAT (High Explosive Anti-Tank) round loaded, so the order alerted the crew to index SABOT and the next round would be a kinetic energy round. As Sergeant Koch fired the first round, I sent a contact report to the troop, 'This is Black 6. Contact east. Eight armored vehicles. Green and White, are you with me?' SGT Koch destroyed two more tanks as the tank platoons accelerated movement. Then, all nine tanks began engaging together as we advanced. In approximately one minute, everything in the range of our guns was in flames. Eagle Troop demonstrated great fire distribution and control, which allowed us to take out a lot of the enemy at once. Soldiers took aggressive action against a numerically superior force without hesitation.

If your soldiers know how the platoon and troop maneuvers, they will take initiative. Our tank driver, SPC Christopher Hedenskog, knew that he had to steer a path that permitted both tank platoons to get their guns into the fight. He turned 45 degrees to the right and kept our frontal armor toward the first enemy tanks we engaged. He also drove through a minefield, avoided the anti-tank mines, and told me on the intercom, 'Sir, I think you need to know, we just went through a minefield.' He knew that it would be dangerous to stop right in the middle of their kill sack; we would have been stationary targets. He saw that we had a window of opportunity to shock the enemy and take advantage of the first blows SGT Koch had delivered.

In another example of soldier initiative, SSG Digbie ordered PFC Bertubin to reload TOW missiles. Bertubin could not get the cargo hatch open, however. When he kicked the hatch release, he sheared it off. Rather than telling his Bradley commander that he could not get the TOWs reloaded, he jumped out of the back door while the vehicle was under small arms and machinegun fire. He climbed onto the back of the Bradley, loaded both missiles, then tapped his Bradley commander on the shoulder while yelling, 'TOWs are up.' SSG Digbie nearly jumped out of his skin because he thought that an Iraqi had climbed onto the Bradley. There are countless other stories of Eagle Troop soldiers taking initiative and making significant contributions to the fight.

If you are commanding tanks, use them to take the brunt of the battle and advance aggressively. Tanks drove around the anti-tank mines and Bradleys and other vehicles followed in the tracks of the tanks. We ran over a lot of anti-personnel mines, but they had no effect on armored vehicles. Our Squadron S-3, then-Major Douglas MacGregor, fought forward with us in his tank as did the squadron tactical command post Bradley commanded by SSG William Burns and LT John Hillen. MacGregor's tank hit an anti-tank mine, but the blast disabled the tank only slightly and it was able to continue, and then make a rapid repair when we stopped.

Crew drill including engagements and misfire procedures are vitally important. In one engagement, LT Jeff DeStefano's tank crew came around the village, destroyed an enemy tank, and acquired a second tank that was traversing on them. A round got stuck in the chamber. The loader grabbed hold of the loader's hatch, kicked the round in, the breech came up, and the gunner fired a round and destroyed a T-72 at very close range.

Coordination between platoons to ensure mutual support also proved critical. The burning tanks and personnel carriers of the enemy's first defensive line formed a curtain of smoke that concealed enemy further to the east. As our tanks assaulted through the smoke, we saw other enemy armored vehicles and large numbers of infantry running to get back to subsequent trench lines and positions. We destroyed the enemy armored vehicles quickly and shot the infantry with machineguns as we closed the distance with them. Pockets of enemy soldiers threw their arms up. Our soldiers were disciplined; turrets turned away from any enemy soldier with his hands raised. Tank platoon leaders asked scout platoons to pick up observation of the enemy infantry as their Bradleys came through the smoke. The scouts saw that the enemy had used false surrender to gain a better position. Enemy soldiers were re-shouldering their rifles and RPGs (rocket-propelled grenades). Our Bradleys surprised the enemy, however, and destroyed them before they could engage our tanks effectively. Because we pressed the assault, the enemy could not respond effectively. Just as we cleared the western defensive positions, our executive officer, LT John Gifford, broke in on the radio, 'I know you don't want to know this right now, but you're at the limit of advance; you're at the 70 Easting.' I responded, 'Tell them we can't stop. Tell them we're in contact and we have to continue this attack. Tell them I'm sorry.' We had surprised and shocked the enemy; stopping would have allowed them to recover. I was free to make that decision because of a command climate that not only encouraged initiative, but demanded it. Our Regimental Commander, Colonel L.D. Holder, told us during training in Germany that, 'Because of the pace of the action and the size of the cavalry battlefield, important decisions have to be made quickly by junior leaders in contact … Because tight centralized control of operations isn't possible or desirable … all Regimental leaders must train their juniors to do the right things and then trust them to act independently … Leaders

must teach and practice mission orders.' It was a message all junior leaders in the Regiment internalized.

We continued to attack toward another very subtle ridgeline on which the enemy positioned his reserve, a coil of eighteen T-72 tanks. We destroyed the first of the reserve from long range. We could not see the others, however, until we crested the rise and entered the assembly area. The enemy reserve were attempting to move out to react to our attack, but we destroyed them at close range before they could deploy against us. We encountered an observation post and an elaborate bunker for the brigade commander, Major Mohammed. After we captured him, Major Mohammed told one of our troopers that he had not known he was under attack until a soldier ran into his command post yelling, 'tanks, tanks!' By the time he got to his observation post, all the vehicles in his forward defensive positions were in flames. He ordered the reserve to establish a second defensive line, but it was too late. The troop stopped when we had nothing left to shoot. The main fight took 23 minutes. We consolidated on the ridgeline that the enemy reserve had occupied.

There was a lot of concurrent activity as we consolidated. We had sporadic contact ranging from nuisance machinegun fire to one company-sized counterattack of T-72s and BMPs. We coordinated our fight with G Troop to our north and I Troop, led by Captain Dan Miller (another classmate and roommate from West Point) I Troop to our south as they came into contact. We destroyed enemy vehicles at long range from the dominating position on the ridge. Three Bradleys from Mike Petschek's First Platoon encountered and destroyed four T-72s as they moved north to reestablish physical contact with G Troop. Our medics treated and evacuated eighteen enemy wounded. Our mortar section was very effective at suppressing enemy infantry further to the east and our fire support officer called in two devastating artillery strikes on enemy logistical bases. Scouts and a team under the control of First Sergeant Bill Virrill cleared bunkers using grenades and satchel charges. A psychological operations team broadcast surrender appeals forward of the troop and we took the first of hundreds of prisoners including the brigade commander. Soldiers organized into Enemy Prisoner of War teams segregated, searched, and secured prisoners through the night. Many of the prisoners cried because they had not expected such humane treatment; their officers had told them that we would execute them. We conducted logistical resupply of fuel and ammunition. Just after 2200, the First Infantry Division conducted a forward passage of lines in Third Squadron's sector to our south.

Our fight was a lopsided victory. From the initiation of our assault until battle hand-over with First Infantry Division, we destroyed approximately fifty T-72s, twenty-five armored personnel carriers, forty trucks, and numerous other vehicles such as SA-9 air defense systems. Our troop took no casualties. There were many reasons for those results.

One of the principal reasons is American air supremacy and technological superiority. While the physical destruction that the air campaign inflicted on Major Mohammed's brigade was light, the effect of the air attacks desensitized the enemy to battlefield noise and lessened their degree of vigilance. The effect that air supremacy has on friendly troops is often neglected. Air supremacy serves to embolden ground units. Soldiers can focus their attention almost exclusively on the ground domain and they know that the tremendous capabilities of American air power magnify their own strength. Even though the sandstorm prevented us from using air assets, they had already made an enormous contribution to the outcome.

Overmatch on the ground also stemmed, in large measure, from technological superiority. The M1A1 tank completely outclassed the T-72. It is impossible for a well-trained M1A1 crew to miss with service ammunition. The round goes right in the aiming dot at the most extended ranges. Everything hit is catastrophically destroyed. The Bradley also has tremendous capabilities. Twenty-five of twenty-six TOW missiles that we fired hit their mark; many shots were near maximum range. The 25mm chain gun and the munitions it fires represent a tremendous capability against a range of enemy from dismounted infantry to T-72 tanks. Our stabilized weapons systems that permit us to fire on-the-move with absolute accuracy allowed us to close with the enemy and achieve shock effect as we destroyed large numbers of enemy vehicles and positions. Our armor protection permitted us to assault without hesitation undaunted by enemy RPG and heavy machinegun fire. Our optics and especially our thermal sights gave us an advantage in locating and engaging the enemy, especially in limited visibility conditions. Finally, the Global Positioning System permitted us to navigate in a featureless desert under tough conditions, including sandstorms.

Enemy technological disadvantages exacerbated our advantages. The T-72 proved inaccurate for several reasons. Every tank round fired at us, of which there were at least four, fell short. Contributing factors likely included worn gun tubes and wet or damp propellant in the T-72's exposed ammunition compartment. It is likely that psychological and training factors caused greater difficulties. Every T-72 or personnel carrier that the troop shot exploded in a fireball. There were no survivors. Seeing adjacent vehicles destroyed likely disturbed Iraqi crewmembers such that they were unable to concentrate on their engagements. The vehicles might not have been boresighted properly and we knew that gunnery training in the Iraqi Army was infrequent and of poor quality. Because of the slow speed of the T-72 autoloader, an M1A1 crew could fire three rounds to every one of a T-72 crew.

Other explanations for overwhelming victory are Iraqi tactical ineptitude and low skill level. At first glance, Major Mohammed developed a good defensive plan. He set up a reverse slope defense, developed good kill sacks with minefields, and dug in positions with good fields of fire. He established a reserve. It was, however, a defense suited for an Iranian infantry-heavy attack during the

Iran–Iraq War and not a defense capable of challenging an American armored cavalry troop. Major Mohammed's conception of time and space was skewed. His vehicle positions and infantry bunkers were too close together. Once we detected the first tanks, we could orient on nearly the entire force; there were no positions designed to hit us from an unexpected angle. Anti-personnel minefields were ineffective as the mines detonated harmlessly under our tank tracks. Mohammed's reserve was too shallow such that it lost its freedom to maneuver as soon as our troop penetrated the forward defensive positions. The defense would have been effective against a dismounted infantry assault or against lightly armored vehicles, but it was ineffective against an armored cavalry attack. Despite Iraqi tactical ineptitude, however, Republican Guard soldiers fought in a determined manner; the majority of the enemy fought until they were killed or wounded.

Surprise, shock, and the initiative gave us tremendous advantage. We did not surprise the enemy in a classical sense; it was our capabilities that achieved surprise. The enemy was unaware of the destructive firepower of a cavalry troop. The initial encounter action gave us the initiative. Destructive direct fires combined with a rapid advance created a shock effect that rendered the enemy incapable of mounting an organized effort against us. The enemy rapidly became preoccupied with self-preservation and his teams at platoon level and above disintegrated due to physical destruction and psychological strain. That is the effect you want to achieve in combat.

I believe that the most critical factors were the offensive spirit of our soldiers and the aggressive actions of crews, platoons, and the unit as a whole. All of our soldiers attacked without hesitation a numerically superior enemy force that possessed all the advantages of the defense. How to develop that offensive spirit in units is a subject worthy of your consideration as you prepare yourself to lead soldiers.

First, a word of warning – offensive spirit does not come from slogans or false bravado. All of that evaporates quickly as combat approaches. Offensive spirit derives from genuine confidence based in tough realistic training, bonds of mutual respect and trust, and faith in leaders at all levels. Here are some suggestions on how you might build genuine confidence.

First set clear goals and priorities. Readiness for combat is the only sensible measure for success. Forge agreement and understanding about your unit's goals and objectives – explain them to your men and women. Ask your team what kind of an organization they want to have, and then summarize *their* points. You might suggest that attaining those goals is as easy as making a collective commitment to achieve excellence. How much effort does it really take to make up the difference between simply accomplishing tasks and accomplishing those same tasks to the highest standard? If you inspire your team to make excellence routine, that level of performance will become self-sustaining. Excellence in training and

operations in peacetime generates confidence in wartime.

Make high quality training your top priority. Establish clear outcome-oriented training objectives at all levels. Ensure that training starts on time with all soldiers and equipment present. Conduct training under conditions that replicate combat as closely as possible. Ensure that the training is evaluated, includes a performance test, and allows for retraining as necessary. Recognize the damage that is done to your credibility and the credibility of leaders when you preside over screw-ups in training. You ought to be forgiving and tolerant of mistakes in many areas because good units push the limits of their capabilities. You should not, however, tolerate training that is conducted poorly. Review all of your training based on your objectives and with the goal of improving the next exercise.

How do you decide what to do? As soon as you take responsibility for your unit, make a comprehensive assessment of your combat readiness. Your non-commissioned officers will tell you what needs to be done. Ask your sergeants a simple question: If we were to go to war tomorrow, what would you consider our greatest weakness? Categorize tasks into individual, platoon, and leader categories. Group together tasks for which it makes sense to train concurrently. Plan to do first things first. Have with you short and long range calendars so you can schedule training on those skills and tasks that your leaders identify. Plan to conduct that training under conditions that replicate combat conditions as closely as possible. Seek the advice of your non-commissioned officers, talk to other officers, and read military history to develop a vision of combat on which to base your training. Remember that soldiers have an abundance of talent and ambition. They want to be challenged. Watch out for two common problems: over-scheduling and lack of preparation time.

Tough realistic training builds the confidence that suppresses fear in combat. Shared experience in training develops confidence in one's own ability, confidence in the team, and faith in leaders. SPC Rodrigo Martinez, a tank gunner, wrote after the battle that he never really experienced fear because, 'we had trained so hard and often that it just seemed like another field problem.' There will be no time to learn new techniques under fire. Battle drills prepare soldiers and units to respond immediately and together to any situation. After our cavalry troop's encounter with a Republican Guard unit, our loader, PFC Jeffrey Taylor, told me, 'I'm not going to lie, I was about to panic, but I said "don't panic, do your job."' The sensory experience of battle, involving deafening noise, multiple fireballs, and thick smoke, can be overwhelming. As our troop attacked, however, our soldiers executed battle drills flawlessly. SSG John McReynolds, scout section sergeant in Third Platoon, recalled that, 'the crew didn't have to be told what to do. It just kinda came natural.' Third Platoon leader LT Timothy Gauthier observed that his platoon's actions were 'almost businesslike.'

Faith in officer leadership is critical. Junior officers earn respect and trust, over time, through demonstrated competence, treating others with respect, and

demonstrating that you care genuinely for those in your charge. In your early sensing sessions with your team, hand out cards and ask them to write down the things that are going well in the organization and things that need improvement. You will be surprised at how easy many of the improvements are, and making those changes will help establish your credibility as a leader. No one expects you to be the expert on all aspects of your unit's operations upon arrival. Learn from your team. Your soldiers will be happy to teach you and you will learn the strengths and weaknesses of each soldier. It is unnecessary for officers or your non-commissioned officers to shout, threaten, or intimidate. Your words, or at least your orders, are literally the law. Get to know every member of your team. Ask them about their concerns. If they have a specific problem, write the problem down and follow through on it until it is solved. Word will get around that you care and that you make a difference. All four of our platoon leaders had earned the respect of their soldiers and their leadership was an important source of confidence.

Make sure that leaders are in positions of leadership at all levels. Develop leaders and give them candid feedback about their performance. Recognize, however, that some will not have an aptitude for leadership. You must replace them. You soldiers must have confidence in leaders at all levels. Soldier confidence is grounded at the squad or crew level. The driver of Bradley Eagle 12, SPC Matt Lee, explained what allowed him to suppress fear and drive directly toward a large enemy defensive position, 'I was confident in my crew. I knew we were a good team.'

As a leader you are also a teacher. Make it a goal to teach even the most junior member of your team everything you know about the way your unit fights and about the current operation. That knowledge frees people to take the initiative – to act without orders. As General Ernest Harmon observed during World War II, 'The American soldier is fundamentally intelligent and does a lot of thinking for himself. If he understands the general plan and what you are trying to do, he will very often contribute greatly to the success of that plan … If I had time, I would tell all privates practically everything about the plans and would get much better results thereby.'[6] Knowing the details of the operation and all the elements of force that the United States military is bringing to bear will embolden your soldiers.

Do not be overly concerned with your own emotional reaction to combat. Leaders are, in large measure, insulated from fear. You will be preoccupied with your concern and responsibility for your soldiers. It is likely that you will simply not have time for fear. Keep a clear head and remain calm. As a platoon leader or company commander, think an hour ahead. Combat is characterized by long periods of movement or inactivity followed by brief periods of furious action. Ensure that your unit is prepared to gain an early advantage in the first encounter with the enemy. Think about what might go wrong as a means of anticipating

problems. Remember, however, not to take counsel of your fears; once you have considered the possibilities, take aggressive action.

Some today argue that changes in communications and information technologies have fundamentally changed the nature of leadership and command in battle. While you will have access to more information, you will also have less time to assimilate that information and make decisions. Moreover, enemy countermeasures such as dispersion, concealment, intermingling with civilian populations, and deception will foil even the most penetrating sensor technologies. At the tactical level, you must, therefore, be in a position to sense what is happening and make decisions based on an intuitive feel for the situation. In battle and in peacetime your unit will look to you and follow your example. You must share your soldiers' hardships and take the same risks you ask them to take. In short, lead from the front.

Our nation is at war. It is likely that we will continue to fight against those who hate us not for anything we have done, but for who we are. Our nation, and especially the men and women who will depend on your leadership, need you. You are likely to face combat situations far more challenging than those that Eagle Troop, Second Armored Cavalry Regiment faced at the Battle of 73 Easting. The keys to success under those tough conditions, however, are likely to be the same.

Notes

1 This chapter was initially prepared as a lecture to cadets at the US Military Academy.
2 See E. N. Harmon, 'Notes on Combat Actions in Tunisia and North Africa,' unpublished manuscript.
3 See Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 141.
4 See John Keegan, *The Face of Battle*, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1976), p. 297.
5 The author's remarks and observations concerning the Iraqi commander, Major Mohammed, are based on the author's personal conversations with Mohammed after the battle and when Mohammed was an EPW.
6 See Harmon, 'Notes.'

8

FRATRICIDE AT AR RUMAYLAH

Major Jonathan J. Negin

The 3rd Squadron, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) began to rail-load its combat equipment on 22 August 1990 in Fort Bliss, Texas. Five days later, all the equipment was loaded and moving toward the port for sea transport. The regiment delivered its aircraft to Beaumont, Texas, where they were prepared for transportation. The regiment deployed to Saudi Arabia in September. Initially, the regiment's mission was to serve as a counterattack force in the defense of Saudi Arabia.

As the theater developed, however, and as CENTCOM began planning offensive operations, LTG Gary Luck placed the 3rd ACR on the XVIII Airborne Corps' right flank – side by side with the VII Corps' 2nd ACR and 1st Armored Division. This required close coordination from the beginning to prevent the friendly units from crossing into each other's paths. On 22 January 1991, the 3rd ACR made the first combat contact with Iraqi forces near this boundary with VII Corps.[1] *The unit was the Third Platoon of I Troop, 3rd ACR. The platoon leader was Lieutenant Jonathan Negin.*

When the ground war began, the 3rd ACR attacked north in sector, maintaining coordination with the 1st Armored Division on its right. Maintaining the right distance between two large, fast-moving armored forces is difficult anywhere, and the vast featureless desert made this task even more so. But the units managed to coordinate well enough to maintain safe distances throughout the attack north. The 'left hook' maneuver, furthermore, although strategically brilliant, was cause for tactical complexities.

On 26 February, LTG Luck realized that the VII Corps' turn toward northern Kuwait had opened a 50 kilometer gap between the two Corps. In order to close the gap, Luck ordered the execution of Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) Ridgeway. This plan called for the 3rd ACR to be reassigned to VII Corps' 24th Infantry Division.[2] *After this reassignment became effective, MG McCaffrey, the 24th Infantry Division commander, ordered the 3rd ACR to attack an airfield along the east–west boundary between the two Corps. The attack was a deadly one, but not for Iraqis. The 3rd ACR mistakenly attacked friendly forces – engineers from the 54th Engineer Battalion, 1st Armored Division.*

Major Negin describes well the fog of war, the fatigue, the expected enemy situation, command and control challenges, and the shock of discovering that the 'enemy' was actually a friendly force. Fratricide has been the bane of armies since wars began, and the technology of today's battlefield has not yet eliminated it. As Major Negin's story shows, perhaps it is impossible to attack enemy forces on the battlefield without the risk of mistakes.

Preparing for combat

In early August 1990, after hearing about it on the news, on the chalkboard behind our Charge of Quarters (CQ) desk I wrote 'Iraq is massing on the Kuwaiti border – are you ready to go?' Later that day someone had written – 'we'll never go.' We went about business as usual and deployed to the field on a training exercise on 3 August. Along with most of the world, many troopers in the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) were surprised to hear of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. There was a lot of speculation in the squadron about the events in the Middle East and whether we would go or not – many rumors one way or the other. Finally, we were abruptly called out of the field around 17 August and told to return to garrison to prepare to deploy. Over the next month we tried to get our maintenance and supply up to speed and went through the process of trying to figure out how to deploy and at the same time learn as much as possible about the Middle East and the Iraqi army. The squadron was used to deploying to the National Training Center (NTC) and for REFORGERs (Return of Forces to Germany), but this was quite different. We knew how to rail-load some of our equipment to NTC and draw from pre-positioned sites in Europe, but this time we would be sending all our own equipment by rail to the port at Beaumont and then ship to the Middle East. Several soldiers were selected to accompany the equipment on the transports while it was shipped across the Atlantic and through the Suez Canal to the ports in the Persian Gulf.

As we began to prepare for movement, we also faced the pleasant task of integrating several new soldiers to bring us up to 100 percent of our authorizations. We got all the new Privates we needed and several Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) from the training base at Fort Knox, Kentucky, to fill up our ranks. We were accustomed to training without personnel in every MTOE (Modified Table of Organization and Equipment) position, and in some ways this affected how we trained. For example, we had very few dismounts, so rarely worked on dismounted scout skills except when dismounting the gunner or Bradley Commander (BC) from the turret. Obviously it was great to have all the personnel we were authorized, but it also was a challenge to quickly integrate and train the new NCOs and soldiers as part of the platoon as we prepared to go to war, especially some of the NCOs from Fort Knox who did not necessarily have any experience on Bradleys or had not been in an MTOE unit lately.

I loaded the last of my Bradleys on the train on 24 August and we focused on individual training (small arms training, Nuclear-Biological-Chemical training, etc.) until we staged to deploy on 30 September on a Hawaiian Airlines charter. While we were waiting to board the aircraft, Private First Class (PFC) Derek Larson received a call from his family – his first child had just been born, and we had no idea when he would get to see his baby girl. We had not traveled far when our plane was hit by lightning, so we had to make an unscheduled stop in Kansas City before heading to Gander, Newfoundland; Shannon, Ireland; and Athens, Greece. It was an ominous reminder that this wasn't just another deployment when we picked up an Air Force fighter escort as we approached the Middle East and landed in Bahrain on 2 October. Initially, we stayed in a warehouse at the port of Jubail waiting to offload our equipment from the transports. Once our vehicles arrived on 3 October, we prepared to depart, and put our vehicles on Heavy Equipment Transports (HETs) to move out on 9 October. We moved westward into the searing desert heat to an initial staging area, trying to get organized and waiting for further orders. Our initial mission was to serve as a counter-attack force for the 24th ID and 82nd ABN (Airborne). The 101st was supposed to protect our left flank as we attacked forward of the 24th and 82nd.

We were fairly ready for a prolonged desert deployment because we were used to going to the field for extended periods at Fort Bliss. However, our primary mission had been REFORGER, so all our planning, training, equipment, and vehicles were focused on the Soviet threat on the northern European plain, not fighting in this desert against a relatively unknown enemy. Furthermore, as we were soon to learn, not all deserts are the same. Our familiar terrain at Fort Bliss was nothing like the desert we would find in Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Fort Bliss is bounded by mountain ranges which provide handy reference points for navigation, and the relatively flat valley is covered with mounds of brush that disrupt formations, can provide lots of cover and concealment, and affect direct fire gunnery. The Saudi and Iraqi desert has very few terrain features (not much cover) and has almost no vegetation (almost no concealment) which allows for dispersed formations and almost unlimited observation and gunnery engagements. It is similar to Fort Irwin in some aspects, but has far fewer terrain features than the NTC.

I expected the war to take at least two years (the Iran–Iraq war lasted eight years) and for us to have to seize or subdue Baghdad for the war to end. Given the size of Iraq's army, I thought we would be there for a while and be involved in some major engagements. I expected we would fight wide-open, fast-moving battles like those we fought at Fort Bliss or Fort Irwin. I also thought we would have to face chemical weapons at some point. I believed the final siege of Baghdad might be a static war that would take a long time to resolve. A couple of my ROTC instructors were Vietnam veterans – I thought that desert operations would be much different, but that we would face some very harrowing experiences similar to those of my instructors. As it turned out, most of these

expectations would have to wait over ten years to come true, fought by a new generation of American soldiers, led by many who fought in the first Gulf War. I suppose you could say we had been fighting the siege of Iraq for over ten years, before launching the assault to defeat its corrupt government and begin stability and support operations to rebuild the nation and give the country back to its people.

In the beginning, we were very concerned that we might have to defend Saudi Arabia with very little time to adjust to our new surroundings. Eventually, I could see that we were going to have time to do more training, and set about reviewing our Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) in the platoon and training on them as much as possible. An effective SOP captures how a unit naturally does its mission in accordance with the commander's intent, and ensures the key tasks are completed to get the job done. It is not really an SOP unless everyone knows and understands it and we had time to train to achieve this standard. Everyone knew what we were supposed to do and how we were going to do it. I came to treasure this time to work with my NCOs and soldiers to the level where we became a very tightly knit combat unit. After we were in the desert for a few months, taking care of the soldiers also became an even higher priority, and we tried to give them as much to do and as many comforts as possible. Mail was critical! Improving food, and giving the soldiers a chance to take field showers and call home was also important. Having a radio really helped (to listen to music or sports), and we also played quite a bit of sports (football, volleyball, baseball) and cards (spades, hearts, whist, euchre). Maintenance was also a very big concern, because our vehicles were old and rather worn out.

We were not able to do as much mounted training as we wanted to because of the age of our equipment and spare parts problems. This was not a big issue for scouts, because I focused on all of our dismounted missions which helped us develop trust in each other and teamwork. There was some tension in the platoon between soldiers and NCOs, and everyone seemed to adjust to the stress of being away in different ways and at a different pace. I had a few sensing sessions with my soldiers, and tried to keep up with counseling, rewards, and discipline to keep us together. All in all, we did some great training while we were there, and were much more prepared for the war than when we first arrived. Being fairly new to the platoon, this is where I really learned how to be their platoon leader – how to train them and take care of them in the field as we prepared for combat. I was also blessed with excellent NCOs who knew their business and cared for their soldiers. Moving to different assembly areas was good training, as was rehearsing our counter-attack mission as part of the defense of Saudi Arabia, guarding the corps Ammunition Supply Point (ASP), and just going out in the desert and training on whatever we wanted. This was also a great chance to work with other units and learn to work together better.

We thought that Iraq might continue to attack into Saudi Arabia, so our initial mission was to serve as a counter-attack force for the 24th ID and the 82nd ABN

Division. We did a full mounted rehearsal of this mission on the actual terrain we thought we might have to defend. As the months passed, and Iraq did not attack, and more units and supplies came into the theater, we started to think about going on the offensive to free Kuwait. On 16 October 1SG Kenneth Sayles predicted, 'He will not attack, we will attack.' As part of the 'left hook,' on 18 January the Regiment loaded up on HETs and moved west to a new location in preparation for our attack. Moving a Regiment on HETs driven by Saudi foreign nationals from many different countries was quite an experience. Most did a great job moving us, but some got lost, broke down, or just plain refused to transport us. Several NCOs had to take charge and drive a HET themselves or road march their vehicle to link up with their unit – a tribute to the flexibility and initiative of our NCO corps. Of particular note, Staff Sergeant (SSG) William Crutcher noticed his driver had decided to take an alternate route away from the rest of the HET column and climbed forward from his Bradley up to the cab of the moving HET. He then used his 9mm pistol to persuade the driver to go in the right direction, before taking over the wheel of the HET himself. Sergeant First Class (SFC) Pete Schoomaker's HET broke down, but he was able to negotiate his way across the desert and link up with his platoon two days later.

Once we completed the HET movement, we sent out patrols even farther west of the squadron area. On 22 January, my platoon engaged in a brief firefight with the Iraqis along the Saudi border – as far as I know, the first mounted firefight during the war.

The first firefight

Third Platoon, I Troop, Third Squadron, Third Armored Cavalry Regiment made the first ground contact of Operation DESERT STORM on 22 January 1991. It has been many years since then, and this was just a prelude to larger and more significant battles in the first Gulf War, and is far less significant than the recent actions in Iraq, but it was the first mounted firefight of the first Gulf War and is an interesting example of small scale mounted warfare during its time.

We received the mission to conduct a moving flank screen westward to an overnight observation post, and screen back the following day. We were clearing the sector to our west for the 24th Infantry Division to occupy on the regiment's left flank. First platoon was following us four to six hours later with a similar mission, but a different Observation Post (OP) 50 – 60 kilometers closer to the squadron main body.

Our final destination was over 100 kilometers from the squadron assembly area, so logistics and communications were a major concern. Accordingly, we brought long range antennas and formulated contingencies for resupply. Unfortunately, because of the distances involved, we left our habitually associated M106 4.2 inch mortar carrier and crew behind. Later, we would wish that 'Blue 7' and SSG James Kennedy's indirect firepower would have been

available. We did have an unexpected 'attachment' when Colonel (COL) Douglas Starr, the Regimental Commander, and his Bradley crew took this opportunity to conduct a leader's reconnaissance with our platoon. We also had a ground surveillance radar track from the 66th Military Intelligence Company, with Sergeant (SGT) Todd Morgan as the squad leader.

The morning was clear and cool as we departed to the northwest over varying rocky, sandy, flat, and sloping desert terrain. Observation was outstanding everywhere as we paralleled the berm between Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Along the way, we encountered a military police squad securing a main road northward to a town that recently had been under Iraqi mortar attack. This was a reminder that we were operating in unsecured terrain. COL Starr informed me that Allied aircraft were scheduled to attack that evening to destroy the enemy mortars.

We continued our mission westward without further contact. As we neared our objective, Corporal (CPL) Alvin Gage, gunner for I-32 (I-32 stands for I Troop, 3rd Platoon, Vehicle #2) detected something on the horizon about 5 kilometers to the west. I maneuvered the platoon from a staggered column to a scout platoon wedge. We developed our wedge for maneuvering toward targets of opportunity in a hasty attack, platoon-sized raids or moving independently as a scout platoon, including the situation such as we now faced. The wedge enhanced our 360-degree security and flexibility, in addition to providing good command and control. It also allowed scout sections freedom to maneuver with overwatch from the rest of the platoon, of which I now took advantage.

I notified COL Starr on higher radio net that I was sending a section forward to investigate. The Colonel also went forward. As Bravo Section (I-35 and I-36) maneuvered forward, they reported the vehicle as an abandoned 'low boy' trailer. However, from here they identified some Saudi border guard vehicles on a ridge about 3 kilometers to the north, near the first vegetation we had seen all day.

We returned to our wedge formation and moved forward to the next ridge line. COL Starr was now in front and dismounted to talk to a Saudi Captain. On the next ridge line, on the enemy side of the berm, we saw the faint outline of some unidentifiable equipment in the hazy distance. Remarkably, there was also a large, two-story structure in the valley below. It was the first building we had seen in days.

COL Starr quickly briefed us that there was a Saudi border patrol engaged in a firefight in and around the building to our front. The Saudi Captain requested our assistance. How could we refuse? As we headed down the gradual slope, we could see the shallow valley was densely covered by scrub and scattered bushes, affording decent concealment and some cover. The far side of the valley rose to the limit of our observation about 10 kilometers distant in the desert haze.

The sky was overcast and dim as COL Starr prepared us for what was about to unfold. He calmly ordered us to close our vehicle hatches, move on line, and prepare for contact as we steadily descended to the berm on the Iraqi border. Faced with the sudden prospect of combat, we readied our weapons and our

minds as we intently scanned the valley below and the ridge as it rose to the north. I glanced about at our formation and spacing. We pulled into hull-down positions along the berm with about 150–200 meters between vehicles. The berm was 5–6 feet tall, consisting of bulldozed dirt and rocks at a formidably steep angle on both sides. I discharged my dismounted observers forward on to the berm for local security and scanned for enemy on the Iraqi side of the berm.

Scattered Saudi soldiers moved in and around the lone structure to my right. Border guard trucks hastily pulled out to the west as we arrived. We caught glimpses of the enemy as they randomly ducked in and out of the vegetation to our front. The relatively tame firefight that had been going on took on a frightening new dimension with the arrival of the remarkable firepower of a Bradley scout platoon. Soon, we all would have evidence of exactly how effective the 25mm chain gun can be. The enemy could not have been ready for what was about to happen. I'm sure they were as surprised to see us as we were to be facing them.

COL Starr coolly directed us to scan for targets, but to let him know before we engaged. After a few moments of scanning, I heard the distinctive report and fire control rhythm of a 25mm canon from a Bradley to my right. COL Starr was conducting reconnaissance by fire in the vegetation 1000 meters to our front. I took this as an endorsement to follow suit and commanded my platoon to engage any targets that presented themselves. COL Starr continued to engage at intervals and I began receiving reports from Alpha Section (I-32 and I-33). They were engaging troops and a bunker 1,800–3,000 meters distant with High Explosive (HE) rounds.

COL Starr told me to control my fires because he saw the rounds lofting high into the air, but I explained to him that this was just the trajectory of our HE rounds at extended ranges. SSG Terry Buchanan, the Alpha Section Sergeant, said he actually saw enemy soldiers attempting to dodge incoming round they observed in flight.

Alpha section thoroughly covered the bunker with suppressive fire. 'It just lit up,' SGT Morgan later told me. The only enemy we saw now were fleeing out of our range into other bunkers. These targets would have been within 4.2 inch mortar range if we would have had them with us.

After he had saturated the area to his front with 25 mm, COL Starr aggressively maneuvered his Bradley forward. He advanced to flush out enemy soldiers we identified trying to hide in the vegetation to our front. A frenzy of tracers sprayed all around him as he attacked. But soon he reported that he had pinned down some enemy soldiers and requested that I dispatch a section to assist him. As yet, Bravo Section on my left had no enemy in their sector so I relayed their mission to the Section Sergeant, SSG Steve Ruch.

The situation had developed into a hasty attack. We had suppressed the enemy activity and it was time to assault. If we'd had mortars, we could have suppressed the entire area, including the dead space and hazy targets on the horizon, and

perhaps used some smoke to cover our assault. SSG Ruch initiated the assault by quickly crossing the berm and dashing to the enemy's flank. The berm was more difficult in his area, so his wingman, SSG Pete Baez, had trouble crossing as quickly and assaulted about 500 meters behind, but still effectively covered his exposed flank. It was not a flawlessly initiated assault, but it was taking shape.

After Bravo section deployed from my left flank, I was concerned about security on that side so directed my dismounts to focus on that area. Bravo section searched for targets in the scattered brush as they closed on the enemy. Alpha section continued to engage and report on the right. I cautioned the entire platoon to ensure they could positively identify both Rifles Six (COL Starr's Bradley) and Bravo Section before they engaged. Strangely, safety was foremost in my mind at this point in the firefight. If they could not identify all the friendly elements, they were not to fire at all. The entire situation felt almost like a live-fire range at Fort Bliss – a tactical problem and concerns about safety – but with the unanticipated addition of a live-fire enemy.

COL Starr later said we were under small caliber enemy mortar fire, but I didn't realize what it was at the time, and it was primarily concentrated on the buttoned up Bradleys in overwatch and had limited effect on our assault. The assault developed somewhat slowly because of the difficulty in negotiating the berm. Since we appeared to have suppressed the enemy in center sector, I began to search for a spot for my Bradley (I-31) to cross the berm and directed Alpha Section to do the same since the enemy had stopped moving in their sector as well. Alpha Section began to cross the berm just as Bravo Section reached the objective. I told Alpha Section to hold in place, scan, engage the enemy, and continue to report.

Suddenly, SSG Ruch came under intense small arms fire. I saw tracers flash and the smoke of projectiles impacting on his Bradley as it assaulted through the enemy position. SSG Ruch's excited voice came over the radio, 'I've got casualties in the back! My track's full of holes!'

Welcome to war, lieutenant. The word 'casualties' has an abrupt and powerful impact on the situation. *What do you do now LT?* Casualties? God, let them be alive – let them live. My gunner and I stared at each other momentarily in disbelief. I guess this was more than just another live fire range.

I thought for a brief moment, and then told SSG Ruch to return to the berm near my position, treat his casualties, and keep me updated. I directed SSG Baez to continue the assault. I informed COL Starr of the situation and he concurred with my decisions.

Once he cleared the immediate fire zone, SSG Ruch reported that his vehicle was full of smoke and that both his dismounts had been shot in the leg. One wound was minor, but the second was more serious. PFC Kelly Ocon skillfully maneuvered his Bradley back through a hail of continuing enemy fire while the rest of the crew returned fire and tended to the wounded – a determined effort and

a tribute to the teamwork and training of the crew of NightHawk 35 (I Troop, 3/3 ACR was the NightHawks in those days).

Once back on our side of the berm, the slightly wounded soldier, CPL Mark Valentine (a combat lifesaver trained to administer more than basic first aid) finally stabilized and controlled the bleeding of the other casualty, Specialist (SPC) Trey Garrison. Later, we counted 15 holes of various sizes in I-35, the first Bradley Cavalry Fighting Vehicle (CFV) tested under fire in combat. Most of the holes were from medium to heavy machine guns, but a couple appeared to be from older model antitank weapons. We were fortunate that most of these rounds either didn't fully penetrate or passed harmlessly through the less vital areas of the Bradley.

Meanwhile, SSG Baez and crew closed on the objective. The enemy was disorganized and disheartened after subjecting a Bradley to such intense fire and watching it drive away, evidently unharmed. Those few still left standing on the objective raised their arms in surrender. SSG Baez stopped his Bradley on the near side of the objective and dismounted with his two scouts to collect prisoners. Dismounts from Rifles Six assisted. SGT Bryan Hunt, the gunner of I-36, identified an enemy heavy machine gun crew preparing to engage SSG Baez and his dismounts. Acting independently, he swiftly and accurately destroyed them with 25 mm fire. The enemy had seen enough, and didn't care to provoke further deadly response to any of their attacks. The assault was complete, and since we didn't intend to hold our small piece of Iraq, it was time to withdraw and reconsolidate. We had helped the Saudis, captured some Iraqis, and given the enemy something to contemplate before confronting us again.

SSG Baez loaded the prisoners on the trim vane (plank used as part of the swim apparatus on old Bradleys) on the front of Rifles Six and moved them back across the berm into Saudi Arabia, where my platoon sergeant, SFC Emilio Rios in I-34, took charge of them. We then all moved back about 3000 meters from the berm to evacuate our casualties and process the prisoners. We occupied a platoon tactical assembly area and moved the casualties and prisoners to the center around Rifles Six.

COL Starr contacted Blackhawk helicopters from the regiment to evacuate the wounded and prisoners. We systematically searched the prisoners. They were between the ages of 18 and 45, well armed, but otherwise poorly equipped. Some were frightened and others seemed to accept their fate. The war was over for them.

Later, our Squadron Intelligence Officer (S2), CPT Paul Hovey, told me that this had been a good drill for all allied echelons of Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) processing. It validated the systems that the allies already had established. Once the Blackhawks departed, we displaced one ridge line south where we had first made contact with the Saudi Captain. Night fell as we secured our perimeter and COL Starr arranged for aerial resupply. I quickly assembled my Bradley commanders to issue orders and conduct a short after-action review.

After night settled in, the ground surveillance radar reported activity in the valley below. Being only a platoon (plus) over 100 kilometers from our troop and squadron, we remained vigilant for a possible counter-attack. COL Starr had called two OH-58D (observation) helicopters and an A-10 (Air Force close support aircraft) into the area. They verified that the enemy was evacuating bodies from the battlefield and probably terminated any enemy thought of moving that night. We saw tracers rocket into the night as the enemy unsuccessfully tried to shoot down the A-10 on its passes, and a stream of fire from the A-10 as it responded to the enemy's futile efforts. This was not a game that the enemy could win. COL Starr finally called off the air support and left to brief the Corps Commander, Lieutenant General (LTG) Luck. We girded in for a tense, yet uneventful night.

It was crisp and cool the next morning as we made the 100 kilometer journey back to the squadron assembly area. Everyone was excited about our return and immediately inundated us with questions. The squadron commander, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) John Daly, snatched me away to the TOC to debrief the troop commanders and staff. Below are a few of the lessons learned that I related to them and have reflected on since. Many confirmed what I had already been told in my Army experiences and schooling.

1 *The Army trained us well!* The soldiers responded as they should have. The Army should continue to emphasize leadership development programs such as Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC), Basic Non-Commissioned Officers Course (BNCOC) and Advanced Non-Commissioned Officers Course (ANCOC). Cohesion, teamwork, and leadership at all levels allowed us to be a flexible and responsive unit, and rapidly and effectively prepare for and react to any situation that presented itself.
2 *Combat experience is exceptionally valuable*. COL Starr set the tone for success with his calm, poised, and confident bearing. We should ensure that combat lessons learned are perpetuated and internalized through officer and enlisted professional development programs. Tough, realistic training also helps build understanding of the kind of mental and emotional control leaders need to develop to prepare for and react to combat situations.
3 *Cover your wingman*. This is a basic combat concept that should never be violated. Everyone must have a wingman and they must know how to work together. Emphasize fundamental fire and maneuver as a team during dismounted training, section-level gunnery, and all tactical exercises.
4 *Always retain some form of indirect fire support*. Our effectiveness would have been much improved if we had responsive indirect fires available. We could have inflicted much more shock at longer ranges, and perhaps assaulted deeper into enemy territory under the cover of indirect fires. There is always dead space (areas not affected by direct fire) to cover. The 25 mm

cannon HE round has some indirect qualities at longer ranges, but even a 60 mm mortar organic to the platoon would have been valuable. Indirect fires are most critical to scouts, not necessarily to kill, but to suppress the enemy and buy time to perform security and reconnaissance missions. Reconnaissance by fire is a useful technique when firing into a concealed area, if the ammunition is available. I would have preferred to conduct reconnaissance by fire using indirect fires. Fire, maneuver, and fire support – three keys to tactical success. Combined arms wins.

5 *In a strange way, even in combat, safety is paramount*. Controlling fires and maneuvering elements are critical to mission accomplishment and preserving the force. At every level, fire plans, sound SOPs for engaging targets, and identifying friendly and enemy forces are essential for success. We should continue to emphasize the importance of situational awareness and understanding, fire commands, fire plans, and vehicle identification. Live fire training teaches a healthy respect for the lethality of our weapons systems, and this same attitude must translate into combat situations.

CPL Valentine and SPC Garrison received overwhelming medical attention as the first combat casualties in our sector. Valentine returned to us four days later and Garrison several weeks after that. On 27 January, LTG Luck, the XVIII Airborne Corps Commander, flew to our location to award Valentine his Purple Heart in front of the troop. 'This award sucks,' he said on a bleak, miserable Saudi winter afternoon. I agreed. Fortunately, despite other combat operations, this was the last Purple Heart any of my troopers received.

After the excitement, Third Platoon, I Troop was famous in the regiment. I let my soldiers enjoy the attention, but thought ahead to the day when the real offensive would begin and reminded myself that glory is fleeting. I prayed we would fare as well in the battles to come and wished the same for all those wanting to know, 'What was it like?'

Waiting for the ground war to start

After we made contact on our 22 January patrol, the platoon was very confident in our equipment and abilities. On a small scale, we had successfully done a lot of things that we expected to do in the months ahead. After an Iraqi attack jammed a Marine unit's radios, we practiced a mission with no radio communication at all. We also gained a lot more confidence in our equipment when we turned in our M3A1 Bradleys and received M3A2s. We were glad to have the extra armor of the M3A2s above and beyond our M3A1 models. The tankers also got new tanks, so everyone was very confident in our vehicles (only the mortars and M113s still had significant maintenance issues). We also knew of the success of the air war, and heard the Iraqi army wasn't holding up very well – this also helped our confidence, especially when we would see friendly aircraft

heading north. I was glad that we were not on the receiving end of a similar aerial assault.

So the platoon enjoyed its notoriety for a while, but we suspected the day when all of us would go across the berm was soon in coming. The air war could not end the war all alone – could it? We continued to train to get ready for the attack and even got a chance to go back to the rear and turn in laundry and get a real shower for the first time since we had been here. Too bad it was also the night of the worst sand storm we experienced so that everyone was dirty again as soon as they came out of the shower. Rumor circulated that Iraq had had enough and would withdraw, but eventually we got our orders for the assault into Iraq and began to prepare for the mission ahead.

During the initial stages of the attack into Iraq, my platoon got the mission to recon the route up to the border and screen on the border until the rest of the squadron moved up. When we got this mission, we knew we could do the job and didn't expect any trouble. We crossed into Iraq with the whole squadron. It was nice to have all that support with us – an armored cavalry squadron with helicopter support from the air squadron looks very formidable in the open desert. We moved forward cautiously the first day not knowing what to expect, but were comforted by the air support overhead. We did not make any contact the first day and halted just south of a major escarpment to our north as the first night set in. The squadron Operations Officer (S3), MAJ Bill Martin, summoned me to his Bradley to discuss the route ahead the next morning and gave me the mission to conduct a route/zone reconnaissance to find the best routes through the escarpment for the squadron trains, and assess the terrain and possible enemy locations north of the escarpment.

Once again, I was proud to have the mission to recon ahead of the squadron and find the route deeper into enemy territory. We set out on our recon early the next morning, found a path up through the hills that made it much easier for the squadron's wheeled vehicles to traverse, and scouted ahead for any sign of the enemy. Once we had established security north of the escarpment, we returned to report to the squadron and guide the trains up through the path we had found. Some think it odd, but I was most proud of this mission – we did an excellent route/zone recon mission, and I knew we had helped the squadron and were ready to face the enemy in front of us. An understanding and ability to fire and manuever on the terrain is probably the most important skill that soldiers need to understand, and after many months training in this desert, studying the maps, and actually engaging the enemy, I was confident that we knew how to fight the enemy on this terrain.

Fratricide at Ar Rumaylah airfield

We had no contact the next day either and were now deep into Iraq when we stopped to fuel that night. The Troop Commander, Captain (CPT) Bo Friesen,

went to the squadron headquarters for a briefing and radioed our mission back to the Troop Executive Officer (XO), First Lieutenant (1LT) Aaron McLane. I helped the XO organize the troop as we moved out to attack our next objective. I wrote down all the information I had about our mission on a 5 x 8 card. We were to assault an enemy airfield and were expecting a dug-in enemy battalion with obstacles and anti-tank weapons. After an artillery prep, 1st and 2nd squadrons would support by fire before 3rd squadron assaults in a diamond formation – Tank company in the lead, I Troop on the right, K Troop on the left, L Troop scouts screen for our trains, L Troop tanks in squadron reserve. The tank company would lead us using Global Positioning System (GPS) waypoints and our limit of advance was the 50 Easting (50 north–south Grid line). As I looked back later, there was no mention of other friendly forces in the area.

It was a black night as a tempest raged across the desert – there was lightning, hail, rain, and the terrain was rough. During the 50+ kilometer attack to our objective one of my Bradleys and my mortar track got mixed in with other units. The darkness, fatigue, and terrain disrupted our formation. Just as I retrieved them and we got the platoon back together, one of our tank platoons reported contact with a chain link fence and what looked like an airfield tower. Second platoon tanks received permission to bust through the fence, and the troop followed. As the troop broke through, CPT Friesen identified hot spots on the far end of the airfield. SSG Ruch in I-35 indicated he saw them too, so I told him to take his section and link up with the commander to check it out. Our troop formation was in disarray, so it took him some time to link up with the commander, and for the rest of the troop to get in position.

Once I had a scout section in position, they reported that it looked like there was a building and some dismounts in front of us. There was some discussion about what we should do next, and it was not obvious who they were or what equipment they had – we were all still concerned about a dug-in enemy battalion with obstacles and anti-tank weapons. CPT Friesen told me to fire warning shots above the enemy's heads, so I relayed the order to SSG Ruch in Bravo section. At some point, the Troop Commander's tank gunner reported that the enemy was firing at us with small arms, but I never saw them, and none of my scouts reported any firing. As a result of our warning shots, what looked like a building caught on fire. Along with the extreme darkness, the fire was disrupting our thermal sites. Unknown to us, one of the enemy soldiers caught 25 mm fragments in his ankle from our warning shots. We didn't seem to get much reaction from the warning shots, so my scouts carefully dismounted to check the situation out further. The Troop Commander ordered a cease fire after our initial warning shots.

The building, which actually turned out to be a covered trailer, continued to burn, and since it was loaded with demolitions it eventually exploded. The shock and concussion knocked all of my scouts to the ground and rained scattered debris down on me and the commander where we sat in overwatch. I felt sick and feared

that all my scouts were dead, but was overjoyed and amazed to hear the report that they were all battered to the ground, but alive and well. Now there were dancing hot spots scattered all across the ground to our front, further complicating the effectiveness of our thermal sites.

The Troop XO was relaying information to squadron and passing orders down from higher, but eventually the squadron command group caravan moved forward to my left front. They sent a psyops (psychological operations) vehicle forward, loudly broadcasting something in Arabic. At some point, I heard the unexpected firing of a machine gun to my left front. The CO demanded to know who had fired, and I quickly reported that I thought it came from the command group. This worried me, because I also had soldiers on the ground at this time and wondered what the command group knew that I didn't.

After the unexpected shots, the tense situation began to unravel into something much more revolting. Someone reported back that there were no enemy soldiers whatsoever – only a friendly unit that had been left behind on this airfield! What? This was incomprehensible! We had just conducted a regimental attack – didn't they see the artillery prep? Hadn't 1st and 2nd squadrons chased them off? What were they doing here? Why didn't we know they were here? Where was the enemy? I was mindless and enraged, and ranted for quite a while before I regained any composure.

Gradually the full effect of our actions was reported. The machine gun fire that I heard from the command group had killed one of the friendly engineers, CPL Lance Fielder, as he tried to evacuate the friendly soldier we wounded with our warning shots. The Squadron Commander had mistakenly thought that CPL Fielder was an enemy soldier trying to escape and opened up with coax machine gun from his Bradley. How could this happen? We didn't come here to kill Americans! What do we do now? Why did this happen? Didn't LTC Daly know that there might be friendlies here? What the hell is going on?

Meanwhile, the rest of the regiment was moving forward, and as the tragic dawn crept up on us, a regimental legal team flew in, and the squadron moved out and formed up as the regimental reserve for our next mission. Our emotions were spent and confused. No one knew quite what to do except drive on with the next mission and let the regimental legal section investigate the previous night's events.

I had lost my composure during the confusion of the airfield and subsequent report of fratricide and was determined to show my platoon that I hadn't lost it altogether and was ready to drive on with the next mission. I focused on the task ahead and on maintaining my poise as we followed the lead squadrons eastward across phase lines that closed the gate on the bludgeoned and retreating Iraqi army. In some way I think it helped my platoon to see the LT vent the frustration and anger that all of them were feeling, especially since I seemed to get it back together then next day when we were back to business. Soldiers turn to their leaders for the appropriate emotional response to situations and even though I lost

control for a while, perhaps that is the best response to fratricide as long as it doesn't jeopardize the troops who need to keep fighting. A leader's poise, and ability to think and function despite the circumstances, is one of his or her most important attributes and functions in combat, and the incomprehensibility and disgust of fratricide is one of the most difficult tests for soldiers and leaders.

Despite our anger and frustration at the previous night's events, the platoon had not lost confidence in our ability to complete our mission. All told, we sensed that we performed as we should have, but still wondered what else we might have done to prevent such a horrible and needless loss. We continued to move forward slowly in squadron reserve and cleared a few empty bunkers while moving phase line to phase line as the war drew to a close. We got the cease fire news later that day, and very soon thereafter retraced our attack route back through the overcast of burning oil wells to Saudi Arabia. Before long, we were back in the port getting our vehicles ready to return to the US. The war ended very quickly for us, but the tragic events of the airfield would play out over the next several years as CPL Fielder's family, those of us involved, the Army, and ultimately the US Senate tried to sort out what happened and who should be held responsible.

After we returned to Fort Bliss all involved were called upon to testify several times to several levels of investigations, and initially no major actions were taken against anyone involved. However, as the investigation progressed and several media programs covered the incident, CPT Friesen was given a letter of reprimand and was held over to work on the Fort Bliss staff while waiting for the results of further investigations. One of the worst parts to the situation is that CPL Fielder's family was informed that he was killed due to combat action, and only learned that it was due to fratricide as the investigations unfolded at higher levels. Eventually, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) from the US Senate got involved on the behest of the Fielder family and action was taken against LTC Daly as well. In the end, CPT Friesen was not promoted to Major, so in effect was forced out of the Army; and LTC Daly was also held responsible, reduced in rank and forced to retire as a Major.

Personally, I think LTC Daly may have been somewhat negligent for not getting more information from CPT Friesen before firing, but commanders are taught to lead from the front, and perhaps he was trying to help us fight the expected dug-in enemy battalion, and had no idea that there might be any friendly units in the area. Perhaps CPT Friesen should have done a better job keeping LTC Daly informed, but the Troop XO was also talking to the Squadron Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and CPT Friesen was trying to focus down on the action of his platoons. It seems to me that someone should have known that there was no enemy on this airfield and that a friendly unit was left behind there. I have often asked myself what else I could have done, but felt very confident that SSG Ruch and SSG Baez were on the ground with their scouts and could handle the situation while I kept the Troop Commander informed and overwatched with the rest of my platoon ready to fight any other enemy that might appear.

In a very simplistic and naïve way I blame Saddam Hussein for the horrible events of that night. Ultimately, he is the reason that we were all on that airfield and such tragic events unfolded. On the contrary, I thank President Bush and our senior military leaders for establishing the coalition, setting the conditions for victory, and giving Saddam Hussein every chance in the world to back down before launching the coalition's fury and justice against him. War is, after all, the extreme end of political action and Saddam Hussein forced us to deploy there, and President Bush and his military enabled us to complete a crushing victory and for most of us to come home. Decisions made by world leaders can severely impact the personal lives of individuals in their nation – thank God we have a system that allows us to elect our leaders instead of enduring the senseless evil of tyrants like Saddam Hussein. Keeping Saddam Hussein's continuing treachery in check and Operation Iraqi Freedom were the next steps in this ongoing battle against injustice and an attempt to free the people of Iraq from a tyrant. It is unfortunate that more of the world was not willing to participate in the final destruction of a dictator, securing the freedom of the Iraqi people and rebuilding of the nation of Iraq as a free and peaceful member of the world community.

Here are a few of my lasting impressions on the entire incident:

1 *Fratricide is a part of war*. Unfortunately, the US Army learned this lesson all too well after the first Gulf War. The number of incidents during the war made us look back at the history of fratricide and try to account for why we had such a high rate of fratricide in this war. We learned the importance of 'situational awareness' and the dangers of being able to engage targets farther than you can actually identify them, but there will be fratricide challenges in any large scale action involving men with exceptionally lethal weapons aggressively maneuvering on the chaos of the battlefield. Leaders at all levels must be held responsible to train their soldiers and do everything they can to eliminate fratricide, but I am not sure we will ever be able to completely remove it from the chaos of war, and we should understand this as part of a committing to battle. The battlefield is a dangerous place and we must recognize this as we approach war.
2 *Steps to reduce fratricide*. The danger in reducing fratricide is to do it to the point where it significantly reduces the effectiveness of combat operations. However, situational awareness and 'battle command' of the fight should naturally lead to reduced fratricide and should be emphasized as part of the planning, coordination, and rehearsals prior to the battle. Commanders must recognize that it is difficult to control a unit once it is in contact with the enemy and put the emphasis on commanding their units and allowing subordinate commanders to do the same. This means that leaders at all echelons must understand how their mission fits into the big picture, their commander's intent, and how to aggressively accomplish their mission and still protect their soldiers from the enemy and from fratricide. It also implies

continued emphasis on effective communications and battle tracking, vehicle and personnel identification systems, fire control training, and combined arms and joint planning and coordination during the battle. If we had better combat information, if we had been better able to identify friendly forces, if the squadron commander had better information on our actions prior to firing the deadly shots, we might have avoided disaster on that miserable night on the airfield.

3 *Casualty reporting system*. One of the worst parts of this situation is that CPL Fielder's family was not told he died as a result of fratricide right from the beginning. Our Troop XO, 1LT McLane, and First Sergeant (1SG) Kenneth Sayles took care of CPL Fielder's body on site, but something must have gone terribly wrong from there. Units must be ready to conduct this extremely difficult function and coordinate with mortuary affairs units to ensure the soldier is taken care of and his family is notified properly. The chaos of the battlefield can make this exceptionally difficult, so this must be planned, coordinated, and rehearsed like any other effective combat operation. If someone reported CPL Fielder as killed by enemy action to save his family pain, then it only caused more grief in the end.

4 *Leadership after fratricide*. Leaders must accomplish their mission and take care of their soldiers. Depending on the enemy situation and ongoing mission, there may not be time in combat to fully address a fratricide incident. Leaders must first ensure they drive on with their mission and take care of their soldiers as best they can. The myriad emotions associated with fratricide – anger, rage, disgust, resentment, sorrow, and frustration – must be put aside, at least temporarily, in order to accomplish the mission at hand and care for the soldiers still fighting. As in most things in combat, the soldiers' responses to fratricide will be primarily determined by their training, leadership, and the cohesion of the unit – the reaction of junior leaders and the reactions of their fellow soldiers on their right and left. We do not train much on the exceptionally disturbing effects of fratricide in combat, so leaders must step up and model the appropriate response and rely on the cohesion they have built in the unit to keep the unit together while they grieve for a fallen comrade. When there is time, leaders must express their feelings on the tragedy and allow their soldiers to do the same, but also highlight the importance of continuing their mission and get the job done. The Army has many ways to honor our fallen comrades and we must always ensure we do so when the situation allows.

We returned to Fort Bliss via the Netherlands and Bangor, Maine, to a rousing celebration at our stops in Maine and Texas. It was an outpouring from America that felt over-deserved, but I hoped that some of our Vietnam and Korean veterans could also enjoy some of this overdue appreciation for our armed

services from a grateful nation. Many stayed behind for the years leading up to the dreadful events of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent launching of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), but the first Gulf War was an important step in its time for many reasons. It demonstrated that a western ally would come to the assistance of a Middle Eastern nation and free Kuwait from a harsh tyrant; established an increasing US presence in the region not completely focused on the Arab–Israeli conflict; won a major combat victory that helped sweep away some of the disappointments of the bitter conclusion of Vietnam; heralded a shift to a more deployable US force; and ushered in the heightening of terrorism as the main means to fight the US since major combat action proved ineffective. Despite all of this, the first Gulf War seems less memorable than OIF, because it was over so quickly and didn't have the same lingering presence that the current action has, but was important in its time and for the future implications of US foreign and military planning and policies.

The first Gulf War provided some new lessons, but also validated the importance of many tried and true military axioms that have withstood the test of time. Most of what I have said is not new – told by leaders throughout history, but always good to hear again and somehow internalize and make your own. Perhaps something I said has revealed something new about the war or leadership that is particularly relevant to someone or at least given some insight as to what this particular war was like. Our experiences shape our lives, but it is also important to put them into perspective and adjust what we learn from them as the situation changes.

Whenever I change jobs and set up my office, two of the first things I put up are a picture of my platoon from the desert and a picture of SGT (posthumously promoted) D. Lance Fielder's gravestone (Apr. 9, 1968–Feb. 26, 1991). They are reminders of the teamwork and close bond that you can develop with a highly trained group of professionals in time of war, and the tragic consequences and extreme danger of putting the young men and women of our armed forces in harm's way. I imagine most people think of the first Gulf War as a tremendous success, and I do as well, but always temper my thoughts with the reminder of the loss of SGT Lance Fielder, and the grief and loss of his family. War is too often a necessary evil, especially when we lose such fine young men at so young an age, but the sacrifice of Lance Fielder and his family is appreciated, even to such a needless event. Although fratricide can be reduced, it will probably always be part of any large combat action even in such a magnificent victory as the first Gulf War.

Notes

1 See Richard M. Swain, *'Lucky War': Third Army in Desert Storm*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Command and General Staff College Press, 1997), p. 180.

2 See Robert H. Scales, Jr., *Certain Victory* (Washington, DC: Office of Chief of Staff, 1993), p. 260.

Part 4

COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL

9

TACTICAL LOGISTICS SUPPORT

Major Sandra L. Vann-Olejasz

Major Vann-Olejasz's unit – the 493rd Supply and Service Company, 87th Maintenance Battalion – was executing its post-Cold War mission in Grafenwoehr, Germany, when it received the order to deploy to the Persian Gulf. Its mission on deployment, though, did not change from Cold War times: provide a full range of service and supply to VII Corps, from fuel to food, and from clothing to construction material. This time, however, the unit would provide that support in a desert environment instead of the wooded hills of Germany. The manner in which the unit would accomplish its mission, moreover, was often unusual. Major Vann-Olejasz shows well how the demands of combat sometimes overrule the unit SOP and how the challenges of wartime logistics require soldier and leader flexibility and ingenuity to meet the mission.

In Saudi Arabia, the unit remained a VII Corps asset, but fell under the 159th Support Group, a Reserve unit from Montana. Though providing support to the Corps and sometimes theater-wide, the 87th Maintenance Battalion still focused heavily on those units it habitually supported in Germany, such as VII Corps' engineer and artillery units. In country, one of the company's more demanding missions was that of operating a modified Refuel on the Move (ROM) site to support the VII Corps' movement into forward positions. But, as with many units in the Persian Gulf War, their missions were not always doctrinal or textbook. Leaders and soldiers constantly adapted to meet the demands of their missions and to find ways to support combat units moving forward very rapidly.

The burden of leadership in the Persian Gulf War grew heavier, and decisions more critical, as the ground war approached. Leaders like Major Vann-Olejasz had to use their judgment, sometimes against what was prescribed in the textbook. She relates incidents in which she had to work with conflicting orders from her higher headquarters. The leaders on the ground, she shows, must make decisions that make sense to them, but they must also be able to accept the risks and consequences of a bad decision. Major Vann-Olejasz aptly describes the ethical and moral challenges of war and preparations for war. She also provides an honest look at moral and leader failure and its effect on a unit.

In reflecting upon my unit's deployment to Southwest Asia, there are a couple of main points that stand out in my mind. They are not unique thoughts; in fact I had probably heard them more than once before I was even commissioned. My experience in the Persian Gulf just helped me solidify these notions. First, in dealing so closely with people in the profession of arms, there are never 'cookie cutter' solutions to the complex personnel challenges that leaders face. Second, given a mission, guidance, and resources – do not underestimate the power of soldier ingenuity. Soldiers are our most precious assets and the things that they can accomplish never cease to amaze me. Finally, prepare for what you know, but expect that things will not necessarily go as planned. Keep an open mind, because surprises are around every corner. All of these realizations fall under the general notion: leaders must expect the unexpected.

I began to learn the importance of flexibility straight out of the Quartermaster Officer Basic Course (QMOBC). My first assignment was to the 493rd Supply and Service Company, Wurzburg, Germany, a non-divisional unit that primarily supported VII Corps artillery and engineer units. We were at Grafenwoehr training area in November 1990 with other elements from our parent unit, 87th Maintenance Battalion, supporting gunnery exercises. Our only news source was the *Stars and Stripes* newspaper, which had reported that units from Germany were going to be deployed to support Operation DESERT SHIELD. I distinctly remember discussing with one of my squad leaders whether or not our unit would go to Southwest Asia. As a higher echelon logistics unit, our missions in Germany included running a petroleum, oils and lubricants (POL) tank farm and my platoon had recently been assigned the mission of running the Self Service Supply Centers (SSSC) for the Wurzburg, Kitzingen, and Aschaffensburg military communities. We both believed that our unit would not deploy due to the nature of our current missions. We were proved wrong when, about eight hours later, the CO, our company commander, called a meeting and began by saying, 'I have good news and I have bad news.' The good news was that we were leaving 'Graf' early. The bad news was that we were leaving early to prepare to deploy to Southwest Asia.

The deployment order seemed to conflict with our traditional 'real world' mission. When I first arrived at the unit, our wartime mission was to occupy our general defense plan (GDP) site and support NATO forces in the mission to prevent Communist aggression from Warsaw Pact countries. Although the Berlin Wall had been recently dismantled, and it seemed the Cold War was over, I had not contemplated the possibility of deploying outside of the European theater. We were able to quickly react to this unexpected development because the nature of our support missions did not change. We did not view this deployment as a change of mission, but merely a change in our area of operations.

Fortunately, my platoon was prepared for the first phase of this operation, moving our equipment. Having recently returned from Graf, the equipment was at a fairly high state of readiness. In addition, we had recently conducted training on rail-load operations so we were able to get our vehicles to the northern port of

Bremerhaven with relative ease. The rest of the pre-deployment activities, however, would prove to be much more challenging.

The most significant challenges concerned personnel issues. Our first concern was to prepare all of the soldiers for overseas movement. We ensured that wills and powers of attorney were updated, immunizations and dental exams were current, and checked for things such as identification cards and tags. Although we efficiently moved through the administrative actions necessary to deploy everyone, the eye-opening experience came with the personal situations that developed. A platoon sergeant's wife purposely dropped a large electric transformer on her husband, breaking his foot, to keep him from deploying. A similar event took place in the battalion headquarters, where another soldier purposely injured himself to avoid deployment. Two of the battalion's primary staff officers became 'non-deployable' for health reasons soon after the news of deployment. I do not doubt the legitimacy of their health issues, but, in retrospect, I now wonder how we had been reporting them on the unit status report (USR) up to that point.

The number of pregnant female soldiers in our unit – a number that was high to begin with – continued to grow. I realized how naïve I was when I learned how many unwed mothers that we had in the unit. I did not understand the full impact of that situation until we were deployed. In garrison, pregnant soldiers can fill administrative positions so that they can continue to support the unit. But they cannot deploy, leaving authorized positions filled, but for all intents and purposes vacant. Some single parents were afforded a quick leave to take their children back to the United States to be with other family members. Many soldiers came to the sobering realization for the first time that being in the military was more than just a job. It is a much larger commitment that often forces families to make sacrifices. I remembered hearing the saying that 'the truth is stranger than fiction,' when it comes to dealing with personnel situations. This was no more evident than when I realized the great lengths that some people would go to in order to avoid doing their duty. The vast majority of soldiers were committed to mission accomplishment and did the right thing, but I am also convinced that leaders will always have to be prepared to deal with unexpected personnel situations.

In a sense, it was a relief to complete pre-deployment activities and get on the plane headed for Saudi Arabia. The personnel issues were left behind, allowing us to focus fully on the upcoming mission. Although the anticipation of what lay ahead was exciting, we were uncertain about what to expect. Soon after we hit ground I learned that unexpected events happen at all levels. When we arrived in the theater of operations, we were chopped out of our higher headquarters, 7th Support Group (SG), and reassigned to fall under a reserve headquarters, 159th SG, US Army Reserve, out of Montana. This caused our battalion to reestablish policies and relationships with a different higher headquarters after we had already begun operations, because the 159th SG did not arrive in country until

over a month after we did. Although this change ended up being fairly transparent at my level, there was an unsettling feeling about losing the comfort of knowing and understanding established procedures and expectations from the higher headquarters. This was alleviated by the fact that the 159th incorporated most of our previous policies and procedures and by the elimination of many of our routine garrison reporting requirements.

Until our equipment arrived, there was little to do at the port. We conducted a lot of physical training; our commander even had us running in gas masks to get acclimatized. My company commander was a former Navy Seal, and began his Army career as an infantry officer until re-branching into quartermaster for medical reasons. His background made us extremely confident in his tactical knowledge. He was also able to provide a unique perspective, one from a combat arms soldier, which gave us an even better appreciation for the role of combat service support units. It was an appreciation that was already part of my instinct, one that I would act on in situations in the Gulf and that continues to steer me as a logistician today. We did not want to be the type of logistics unit that supports only when it is convenient; we strove to be the type of unit that our supported units could count on to make things happen. This sentiment was not necessarily shared throughout the battalion, but my company's priority was to do whatever it took to support the combat effort.

Our unit directly supported VII Corps engineer and artillery units in Germany. We continued this relationship in the Gulf and we also became backup support for the 1st ID and the 2nd ACR. Our company's doctrinal missions were to provide Class III bulk, run a field ration break point (FRBP), water purification and distribution, and to maintain a Class II (clothing and individual equipment), III P (packaged petroleum), and IV (construction and barrier material) warehouse. I expected that we would continue to perform these missions in Southwest Asia as well.

Our company's biggest mission in support of DESERT STORM was to set up and run a refuel on the move (ROM) site to support VII Corps' movement to forward assembly areas west of Hafir al Batin in preparation for the ground attack. It was not technically a true 'ROM,' but more of a convoy support center. A doctrinal ROM is more mobile. It refuels a unit and moves. The ROM that we provided became a fixed location for nearly all of the VII Corps units to move through. Our POL platoon did not have enough personnel to man the extensive ROM site 24 hours a day, so we quickly trained other members of the company to help accomplish the mission. Cooks, mechanics, supply clerks, water purification specialists, and infantrymen quickly adapted to operating pumps, fuel lines, and nozzles to support the international convoy as it moved west. Initial cross training was necessary for mission accomplishment, and it eventually brought the company closer together as soldiers gained an appreciation for what the other military occupational specialties (MOSs) did. Initially, the soldiers from outside of the POL platoon were a bit resentful because they felt that their own missions

were not as important. But the thrill and satisfaction of seeing and supporting all types of units at the ROM, from combat units to coalition forces, helped them realize their roles in the greater mission. Often times support soldiers issue parts and supplies without seeing the results of their labor or interfacing with the end users. Although they all wanted to support the overall mission, I am sure that none of them would have guessed that their contribution would be in handling fuel. This goes to the nature of soldiers in general. They want to do well; they just need to be told what needs to be done.

I sent 27 soldiers from my platoon to support the ROM mission, leaving 23 of us behind to run the Class II, III (P), IV, and VII yard. We had a computer van to manage our requisitions. The process of ordering parts at that time took a mainframe computer van and the back and forth hand-carrying of tapes to higher echelon supply units. That process today can be done on a personal computer and sent by wireless communication. We learned that the reliability of automation systems in a desert environment, throughout the supply chain, posed challenges that made manual practices the most predictable. The downside was that we lost a lot of the efficiency that technology, such as automation, was supposed to bring us. The measures that my platoon took to keep our petroleum yard stocked in order to support our units reminded me of old Vietnam movies that portrayed 'beg, borrow, and steal' logistics. I did not condone any illegal practises, but we could not always wait for resupply to come to us. In fact, no one else seemed to wait around either. I met many Battalion S-4s from all over the theater whose sole function was to drive around looking for needed supplies – from repair parts to desert camouflage BDUs. They were always on the go, and many times they would not know where their units had moved. We kept track of what they were asking for, whether we had it or not. Chances were that if they needed it, someone else would too. Then, we did our best to try to find what they were looking for. We often sent a team of senior NCOs back to rear area supply bases to get items that were in demand. We had learned by experience what was in demand and used this knowledge to anticipate units' needs. This enabled us to be more proactive instead of reactive in our support. Our methods did not follow the schoolhouse version of supply operations and they were nothing like what I had expected, but we quickly analyzed the problem, developed a solution, and it worked.

As previously mentioned, I took my CO's (commanding officer's) vision to heart. Although he was often not in the company area – he spent the majority of his time with our most forward elements – I always felt that I understood his intent. We had to do what it took to support our units; that was our mission. I did not expect that his vision would conflict with any battalion level policies. For example, one item that was particularly scarce was gas cylinders. Our petroleum yard included some gas cylinders, but due to the scarcity, our battalion support operations section retained issue authority. In other words, my platoon could not issue out any gas cylinders without their approval. As an exchange item, the requesting unit was supposed to have an empty cylinder to exchange for the full ones that we issued. We would then take the empties back to rear area supply

bases to get refilled or swapped. Less than 24 hours before the ground campaign was supposed to start, a captain from an artillery battalion came to my petroleum yard desperately seeking gas cylinders. He did not have empties to exchange, so our battalion headquarters, contrary to my recommendation, denied his request for issue. This presented an ethical dilemma. I was told not to issue the gas, but I did not feel that that was the right thing to do. I was torn between mission accomplishment and following orders. I went back to the platoon and I told my soldiers to issue him the cylinders. I also immediately launched a team to find more gas cylinders. That team was successful; we were able to resupply those cylinders that I had released for issue. I struggled with that decision, never thinking that I would disobey an order, but something happened two years later that solidified my instinct and gives me even greater cause to conclude that I would do the same thing again today.

I was in a new unit (47th FSB, 3rd ID) in Germany, at a Grafenwoehr rotation when I ran into that same captain again. He was now in the 3rd ID DIVARTY and to my surprise he immediately remembered both me and the gas cylinder issue in the desert two years earlier. I could not believe that he remembered that incident, but he went on to tell me how critical that support was to their mission. He explained that his unit fired in support of the initial artillery prep at the start of the ground campaign. Their mission would have been hindered had they not received the gas cylinders. I never would have known that; again because support units, especially non-divisional support units, rarely see the end result of their efforts. That was probably one of my proudest moments as a quartermaster, knowing that our supported units felt that they could count on us to meet their needs and expectations.

I strove to make sure that my soldiers trusted that I would provide them the necessary resources and guidance to accomplish their missions. I think that I really proved that when I was faced with another ethical dilemma. I was surprised when the battalion told me to have my platoon give up our last remaining mission oriented protective posture (MOPP) suit, or 'ICE (individual chemical equipment) pack,' to the POL platoon. The reason I was given was that the POL platoon was more likely to ruin MOPP suits during fuel handling and that the POL sites were more 'forward' than our current company area. The timing of this directive could not have been worse. Part of my platoon had just returned from a convoy through Hafir al Batin when a SCUD missile attack occurred. Although we stopped, masked, and kept moving out of the area without sustaining any damage, it highlighted our vulnerability – no matter where we were. Therefore, telling my soldiers to give up their remaining ICE pack was not something that I was prepared to do. I discussed the situation with my platoon sergeant. Although we understood the concerns of the directive, we wanted to make sure that we had exhausted all other possibilities before we had to comply. We did not give them up, but instead ventured out to solve the problem. I went to the 1st ID DISCOM,

the next closest support unit, to see if they had an issue point for MOPP suits. I was bounced around the DISCOM area trying to find the 'Lieutenant (LT) Griffin' who was in charge of the uniform items. I found out that unexpected events are not necessarily negative in nature and that the Army is a very small world. The 'LT Griffin' that I was looking for was 2LT Griffin, my roommate during my last year at West Point. It was good to quickly compare notes with a classmate and someone with whom I had just completed QMOBC. 1st ID was able to fill our request for MOPP suits and the problem was solved. Sometimes the initiative of junior officers and NCOs leads to solutions that may never have been considered.

As a platoon, we continued to figure out how to accomplish many different missions. These additional missions included processing captured enemy equipment, preparing to start a clothing issue facility (this never materialized – it was retained as a rear log base mission), and moving Milvans, Conexes, and SeaLand vans all over the desert. The Army was very successful in getting a large quantity of supplies into Saudi Arabia by shipping equipment, supplies, and parts in these containers. However, we were not initially prepared to move them throughout the desert. As part of the solution, my platoon received two rough terrain container handlers (RTCHs). They are 50,000-pound forklifts that can hold spreader bars capable of lifting and moving 20-foot and 40-foot containers. These pieces of equipment were not part of our unit's authorized organic assets and no one in my platoon had ever seen one before. Moving containers on and off flatbed trailers for many different units spread throughout the area became a huge mission. This required coordination for transportation assets to carry the RTCHs to those units' upload and download points. The soldiers who went on these missions were gone for days at a time. We assigned a dynamic NCO who had previously displayed tremendous initiative, and some of my best forklift operators as the RTCH section. Not only did they figure out how to operate the RTCHs, they worked with the mechanics to figure out how to keep them running for the entire deployment. Once again, the ingenuity and determination of the soldiers in our unit led to successful accomplishment of unanticipated missions.

We continued to develop unique solutions in order to navigate through logistics missions. As a junior LT, I was ordered, on several occasions, to lead large supply convoys for the support group from rear area log bases in Saudi Arabia to 1st ID support units in Iraq and Kuwait. One-way travel time was usually 12 hours, but loading up and delivering (especially to units who had jumped) made these convoys several-day events. The convoys consisted of soldiers and equipment from several different units in the support group, very few of whom I knew. They came from active units in my battalion as well as National Guard and Reserve component soldiers from Tennessee and Montana. We carried food, fuel, ammunition, water, and repair parts to 1st ID DISCOM units. Major challenges in conducting these missions were the lack of communication and navigational equipment. We had a few PRC-127s – hand held short-range 'walkie-talkie' type radios – but I had the only vehicular mounted radio in the

entire convoy. Our navigational equipment consisted of a compass and an aerial map. We had to rely on the basic low technology techniques that at the initial point in all of our careers helped us successfully navigate through our first land navigation course. Most of us were used to navigating based on a map and identifiable terrain features. Unfortunately, the desert has no terrain features. Even the sand dunes shifted during shamals, or sandstorms, leaving little trace of where you thought you had been. We overcame this by passing directions in terms of distances and azimuths. We also turned large stacks of soda cans, 55-gallon fuel drums, and chem-lights into our own major landmarks. We always arrived at our destinations, but getting there was never easy.

Many other unanticipated events come to mind when I revisit my experience in the Gulf War, from being air-evac'ed after a vehicle accident on the infamous Tapline Road to watching a tractor trailer filled with ammunition completely vanish after exploding just outside my platoon's perimeter. The most surprising and disturbing event, however, was witnessing the downfall of one of my classmates due to personal indiscretions and lack of integrity. I would never have thought that I would describe a fellow officer, particularly a US Military Academy (USMA) classmate, in that way.

Unbeknownst to me and the other officers in the company, one of my fellow platoon leaders was dating a female soldier in his platoon. Apparently the relationship had started back in Germany and continued during the deployment. I do not know if or when they had any private personal contact once we left for Saudi Arabia. I do know, however, that they attempted to discreetly communicate by trading small audiocassette tapes. Although the tapes were meant to be proof of their devotion to each other, they became the proof that would lead to my classmate's downfall. One tape in particular highlighted his intent to protect her by purposely preventing her from going on the least favorable and most dangerous missions. At this point the ROM mission had not started, but we were sending POL convoys to forward deployed units. The convoys were usually gone for several days and once they were launched, we did not have much communication with them. I suppose that the fear of her being sent to any forward area coupled with his personal desire to keep her as close to him as possible led him to adamantly profess his plan to keep her safe. As far as I knew, none of the other members of his platoon, NCOs or soldiers, knew about their relationship. I was not very surprised that none of the soldiers in his platoon had made claims that he had been treating her with favoritism. He was a personable and likable officer, who was very dedicated to each of his soldiers. An example that makes this apparent is his actions when a group of our soldiers were involved in a serious car accident in Germany before we deployed. One of his soldiers was in a coma at a German hospital about an hour from our kaserne (military base). She remained there for months, until she could be transferred back to the United States. During that time he visited her nearly every day. He read to her, played

her favorite music, and talked to her, desperately trying to elicit some response. Unfortunately, that same passion for his soldiers would be taken too far and his personal feelings would eventually cloud his professional judgment.

One night, one of his soldiers on guard duty asked to borrow some music tapes. As anyone would expect, he agreed and told the soldier that they were on his cot. The soldier grabbed a couple of tapes off the LT's bunk and went to his post. One of the tapes was not a music tape or audio book as the soldier expected; it was one that the LT had been making for his girlfriend. After hearing the evidence of the LT's affair, the soldier went to the commander with his discovery. That night, soon after he finished watch on guard duty, that same soldier reported his weapon missing. Two days later, CID investigators began pulling soldiers in for questioning. When I had been pulled in for questioning, I had not talked to the LT and knew very few details of the situation. After being questioned, the company XO and I tried to talk to the LT to get him to tell us where to look for the weapon. He denied knowing anything about a missing weapon, so the XO and I searched the POL platoon's area with mine detectors, but to no avail. The LT was relieved of his platoon leader position and was reassigned to the support group headquarters where he sorted mail in the S-1 shop, pending investigation. Following confessions from the LT, CID later found the weapon buried underneath a 10,000-gallon collapsible fuel tank. I never learned the exact terms of his discharge from the Army, but I do remember my disbelief that this actually happened. I was thoroughly embarrassed as a USMA graduate because I thought I had shared unquestionable values with those who had graduated from the institution before, with, and after me. I was even more ashamed as a commissioned officer. Soldiers must be able to unquestionably trust and to look to us as an example. This platoon leader violated that trust and let his soldiers down in a combat zone. The cynicism that developed and spread among enlisted members of the platoon was disheartening. Up until that point morale in the whole unit had been good. The soldiers were busy exceeding all mission expectations, but the remainder of the deployment became an unneeded, unexpected battle to regain the trust of many soldiers in the unit. Although some soldiers felt that it was no big deal and that he should not have been relieved, the vast majority of them were disgusted with his behavior. Looking back, this incident was the most significant situation that I encountered in the Gulf. It has forged even deeper my belief that adherence to the West Point honor code is a non-negotiable part of earning a commission from USMA. All officers must be held to the highest standards of conduct, so that we can carry out the responsibility and authority given to us.

My unit's success in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM came from a combination of planning and executing missions that we were trained to do and our confidence that we could conquer the unexpected. I learned that human nature dictates that personnel issues will always exist. Leaders must anticipate and take measures to prevent potential problems that could degrade unit effectiveness. My

experience also reinforced my admiration of NCOs and soldiers. They love challenges. They thrive on successful completion of a tough mission. Most of the great ideas that helped our unit to be successful did not come from me or the company commander, they came from our talented NCOs and soldiers. Soldiers deserve good leaders. As a leader, knowing what to expect is impossible, but knowing to expect the unexpected is vital. Whether it is pre-commissioning training, local field training exercises, garrison activities, or a major deployment, confidence gained through experience, coupled with dedication to duty and soldiers, will always be the best preparation for unanticipated situations.

10

PLATOON LEADER CHALLENGES

Major Chris Kubik

T*he 19th Engineer Battalion has a long and illustrious history, dating back to World War II campaigns in Morocco, Sicily, and Anzio, and extensive service in Vietnam. Since then, however, the Battalion served primarily as a Cold War force, training with little anticipation of any war. Its primary mission was to support the US Armor Center at Fort Knox, Kentucky, under the 194th Armored Brigade (Separate). In 1990, the 19th was a 'wheeled' engineer battalion. Squads rolled in the back of 5-ton dump trucks, much like infantrymen in the back of a Bradley. The truck pulled a bolster trailer, designed to haul concertina wire, mines, and demolitions.*

But a 5-ton dump truck provides little protection; thus, the Battalion's role in combat was predominately that of a follow-on force. However, these rare wheeled battalions possessed an array of heavy equipment, to include bulldozers, road graders, cranes, and scoop loaders, making the unit a valued multi-purpose engineer asset. In the fall of 1990, the Army recognized that value and ordered the 19th to deploy to Southwest Asia in support of Operation DESERT STORM. *The Battalion arrived in theater on January 16 as a separate battalion, ready for action. There, the unit was assigned to the 7th Engineer Brigade in support of VII Corps.*

In early February, having off-loaded from ships and prepared all vehicles and equipment, the 19th Engineer Battalion, under the command of LTC Robert Shields, convoyed north via Tapline Road to a location in the desert near Logistics Base Echo. Here, the unit provided general engineering support to the 1st Armored Division. One of the Battalion's major missions prior to the ground war was to provide mobility support for the VII Corps' rehearsal of the great wheel maneuver. As the 1st AD curved north across the desert toward the Iraqi border, the 19th marked passages and created earthen bridges over the oil pipeline that stretched across the desert floor.

On G-day, the battalion punched more than 200 6-meter lanes in the berm separating Saudi Arabia from Iraq, passing through the heavy divisions.[1] *Following the 1st Armored Division into Iraq, the 19th Engineer Battalion provided lines of communication clearing and improvement, and constructed*

enemy prisoner of war holding areas with concertina wire enclosures. Four soldiers from the Battalion died in combat.[2]

Major Kubik's story is one of leadership at the ground level – interacting with soldiers and NCOs in some of the most challenging situations. Personal fears can overcome a soldier's discipline and a unit's ability to successfully accomplish a mission, and leadership must find ways to counter those fears. Major Kubik tells of two situations in which fear began to threaten the mission, and how he was able to subdue that very valid human emotion. Yet another story tells of the difficulties and rewards of a platoon leader's challenge in dealing with a platoon sergeant who is considerably more experienced than he is.

Ranger leadership

Operation DESERT SHIELD became Operation DESERT STORM the day before we arrived in theater – 15 January – so we were diverted south to Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. Once there, our chartered 747 dumped us into a warehouse and lumbered back into the blue sky to begin its 18-hour flight back to the States. On the second day at Abu Dhabi, and still disoriented from the seven-hour difference in time, we got the go-ahead to move to the port city of Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. There we would meet up with our trucks, dozers, graders, CONEXs, and the rest of the Battalion's equipment, arriving by sea. The sun dissolved into the horizon as we filed into the belly of the bare C-130 Hercules cargo plane. The air crew ratchet-strapped us to the plane's floor, side by side, feet to backs. Our collective nerves hummed like high-tension wires; a couple of soldiers had to be un-strapped at the last minute to relieve attacks of diarrhea.

The last time I had felt this almost sickening tension was a year prior, when I drove down the backroads of Fort Benning to report for Ranger training. The pitch-black, cold January morning matched my fear-filled expectations of the course. Ranger training was to me then as combat was to me now: the great unknown, a danger and failure-filled rite of passage into a mysterious and exclusive fraternity. But though both Ranger training and combat were supposed to be the ultimate physical challenges, I would soon learn that the psychological demands were even more rigorous. The greatest challenges would not come from without – they would come from within.

The rumbling, rolling flight from Abu Dhabi to Dhahran ended in a rough landing and a rush of sights, sounds, and smells. The cargo doors roared open to a ripping wail that enveloped us. There was no mistaking that sound – that of air raid sirens from World War II. Only this time it wasn't a black and white documentary on TV. It was real. Two dark, bulky forms rushed into the plane, shouting, 'GO TO MOPP 4 NOW' which meant to put on our chemical suits and masks. The aircrew's distorted faces signaled the gravity of the situation as they gestured frantically for us to get off the plane. Outside, chaos reigned supreme. Soldiers and airmen scattered across the tarmac in a ragged line, dragging bags

while trying to shove chemical masks over their heads. Some tripped and fell, mixing with the lumpy duffel bags and rucksacks strewn from the plane to the edge of the runway. I wondered how I was ever to regain control of my platoon.

My platoon sergeant, Sergeant First Class Charles 'Chuck' Kestel, through force and pure will, assembled the platoon on the edge of the tarmac. F-15E Strike Eagles bolted down the runway and roared into the inky sky. Bomb crews loaded waiting jets at a machine-gun pace. Jet exhaust fumes permeated the air, seeping into our nostrils and brains. Floodlights lit the area into a weird, seemingly chemical-type day. A soldier appeared at my side to tell me where the busses were. They became visible only after he pointed them out. We were to move out once I had everyone accounted for.

Rangers drilled accountability into me. Ranger training was the first real application of the maxim I had learned in OCS (Officer Candidate School): leaders were accountable for everything that occurred or failed to occur in their unit. You were accountable for every piece of equipment, every soldier, and every action of every soldier. If your soldiers failed in their mission or lost equipment, it was your responsibility. Doesn't matter who did what. It was your responsibility. So we learned to preclude disaster in Ranger School through detailed planning, close supervision, and – most important of all – being in the middle of the dirtiest, toughest part of the fight. Some might call it micro-management, but in Ranger training it meant leading from the front, being more alert than anyone else, and feeling more responsibility for the mission and your troops than anyone else. For some Ranger candidates, this heavy burden of responsibility proved too much.

We left the din and chaos of the airfield and drove into a greater darkness. Soldiers and subordinate leaders began asking me questions for which I had no answers. After a short ride, we found ourselves at a guarded compound with military police at the gate. Razor wire stretched far left and right into the night. Our XO (executive officer) met us there and gave us the 'all clear,' which meant we could take off our chemical gear. He pointed out the building where we were to stay and told me to be at an operations meeting in an hour. The compound looked like a scene from war-torn Beirut – all the streetlights were out. Tall, black apartment buildings jutted up into the moon-lit air, and HMMWVs (Humvees) with mounted machine guns rolled through the streets. Bunkers squatted here and there, doorways were sandbagged, and even within the compound, razor-sharp concertina wire circled several buildings.

I split my platoon into the three rooms of our stripped apartment; my platoon sergeant tasked the squad leaders with settling the soldiers and gear until we got back from the ops meeting. There, we learned that our equipment had arrived in the port, and that we would be off-loading and preparing the equipment for movement over the next two weeks. After briefing the squad leaders, we arranged our sleeping bags on the hard floor and slept.

We found the chow hall for breakfast, and then began branching out to explore our compound. A hamburger stand and phone tents had already been established.

A few small parks, devoid of children, were scattered throughout the apartment building complex. It seemed like there were 50,000 soldiers in that compound, and there probably were. We kept our soldiers busy checking their gear and training on basic soldier skills throughout the day.

At midnight that night, terror struck. The now-familiar wailing sound of air raid sirens tore us from dreams of home and happiness and jerked us back into this foreign land, with our very existence threatened. I ran to the window and looked down. A HMMWV crept through the streets with a megaphone stuck out the passenger side window. Clearly and loudly, and so slowly that it seemed recorded, the megaphone mechanically cranked out the soon-to-be familiar words:

> SCUD … ALERT …. SCUD … ALERT ….SCUD… ALERT .....GO… TO MOPP 4 .... GO ... TO MOPP 4 .... MOVE … INSIDE .... MOVE… INSIDE .... SCUD ... ALERT.

We put on our masks, buttoned, tied, tucked, and buddy-checked our chemical suits. Then we waited as the sirens continued to sound. Anxiously; nervously; questions with no answers. As with Ranger training, there were no guarantees, no assurances. In fact, the odds in Ranger training were against survival, against success. But I had learned the power of thinking positively and the importance of leadership in such times. Both confidence and courage are contagious, I knew, so I told everyone that there was nothing to be worried about. We had been through the same thing last night at the airfield. I tried to find out what was going on, but a venture into the hallway of our apartment building only revealed anonymous soldiers in MOPP Level Four scrambling up and down the stairs, trying to get back to their 'homes.' I sent my driver to company headquarters – two floors down – to see what they knew. He returned and told me, 'They don't know what the hell's going on. It's a fuckin' circus over there!' The driver seemed somehow empowered by the chaos – some thrive in it – in that he suddenly felt the courage to swear when communicating to an officer.

Then the megaphone began again, but more urgent this time, the cadence of the words quicker. Instead of 'SCUD ALERT,' we heard:

> SCUD ... LAUNCH! .... SCUD ... LAUNCH! .... SCUD ... LAUNCH! …. STAY IN MOPP 4 .... TAKE COVER ... IMMEDIATELY .... TAKE COVER *IMMEDIATELY*!

The squad leaders began to hound me; they wanted to get into the basement instead of remaining on the sixth floor. I bowed to their pressure and common sense and decided to conduct a leader's reconnaissance with one of the squad leaders. The platoon sergeant remained in charge of the platoon. We checked our rifles (we had no ammunition yet), grabbed a radio, and moved out. One floor

down, in the weak hall light, we found a man in MOPP 4 waving a portable radio around his head in slow circles. I stopped and asked him what unit he was in. He was my battalion commander, trying to get an English-speaking radio station.

We ran down to the bottom of the stairwell, but there was no basement. We exited out the side door into a street, where the air raid siren was noticeably louder. It was pitch dark, with only some windows and the moon providing light. We crossed the street and opened the door into the chow hall, which was actually an underground parking lot. It seemed like a good place to go. We turned around and went back out the door and into the street. A military policeman stopped us and asked us what we were doing. I explained our plans. He said that all units were under orders to remain inside and not to move. We could not move to the chow hall. No way.

As he spoke to us, the mechanical megaphone rose up through the siren again. Instead of 'SCUD LAUNCH,' we now heard, to our distress:

> SCUD ... ATTACK! .... SCUD ... ATTACK! .... SCUD ... ATTACK .... TAKE COVER ... *IMMEDIATELY*! .... TAKE COVER ... *IMMEDIATELY*! .... SCUD ... ATTACK!

We scrambled up the stairwell and back into our crowded apartment. I started to explain our situation to the other squad leaders and my platoon sergeant, but was cut short by a deafening explosion that sent shock waves through the apartment. A vague yet powerful roar moved upward and away as everyone fell to the floor. Squad leaders crawled to their squad rooms, shouting through their protective masks. I got up and ran to the balcony, pushing open the glass door. A second explosion shook the air, knocking me backwards. I immediately thought of chemical fallout and lunged back into the apartment.

Inside, screams mingled into the horrid hierarchy of sound. I ran to the source – third squad's room – and found two soldiers holding down a third soldier, with another green form kneeling close by. I pushed my way over to the group. Flashlights illuminated the conglomeration of human bodies. I realized that it was a young Private First Class. He was screaming 'Shoot me up! Shoot me up! I've been gassed! Shoot me up!' I quickly learned from his squad leader that he had already tried to inject himself with an atropine injector, which contained the antidote for nerve agent poisoning.

I helped the squad leader calm him down. We all had breaking points, I knew; it was just a matter of when, not if. Rangers have long realized what I was witnessing on that dark apartment floor: the psychological pressures of combat heed no rules, no rank. All were equally susceptible. This is why the course is so mentally demanding. Rain, snow, cold, lack of food, danger, extreme fatigue, and imminent failure become a way of life for the Ranger, and he is judged by how well he can accept life as such. If the Ranger is able to whittle down the long list of human comforts to 'life,' and 'life' only, then he may succeed in his quest for recognition as a partially civilized, but highly efficient, killing animal. The rigors

of Ranger training and of combat were similar in that both bend humans to the breaking point. 'Battle fatigue' knew no social status – it was simply a human condition, a survival response that clicked on when required by that particular human body. It could strike any one of us, as we were all equals in the face of psychological duress. Perhaps because of this fact, all Ranger students are treated as equals. None wore rank. Captains and Privates mixed with little thought. Rangers know that any Ranger could be the force that accomplishes the mission and attains victory. Thus, Privates are trained as platoon leaders and vice versa. This trust in the individual Ranger is reflected in the phrase 'though I be the lone survivor' of the Ranger Creed and is, I think, directly related to the warning found on a large sign in front of the 4th Ranger Training Battalion's compound, which reads, 'NOT FOR THE FAINT OF HEART.'

So I pulled the young soldier off to the side and talked to him as a human being and as a fellow soldier whose breaking point had suddenly found him, and not vice versa. The platoon watched out of the corner of their collective eye. They waited. Each knew, consciously or subconsciously, that their own breaking points had been creeping up on them. They also knew that harsher conditions lay ahead. Any one of them might be in that soldier's place in the weeks, months, or years (who knew?) ahead. My tone, I think, set the tone for his eventual reintegration into the platoon, and reassured all, perhaps, that their fears were shared and valid and were not signs of weakness, but rather of reality and the human condition.

After regaining control, I made my way back out to the central room of our platoon's apartment and found the platoon sergeant. He told me that a Patriot missile had struck and knocked down a SCUD missile overhead, and that they had sent a chemical detection team to test the shrapnel and fragments that rained down into the streets just north of our apartment. He had learned this from someone in a HMMWV that had passed by while I was talking to the soldier.

I called the platoon together for a meeting. I told them what we knew and that we needed to stay in MOPP 4 (full chemical gear with masks on). One of the squad leaders suggested that we test the air for chemicals with one of our disposable chemical detectors. I gave the go-ahead, and he and two others went out on the balcony to perform the test. My driver asked if I wanted him to check again with the company headquarters. I wrote down our situation report and sent him off with it.

Most of my soldiers were sitting along the edges of the main room, what was once the living room. Nobody spoke. They seemed to be waiting for something, but I couldn't quite sense what it was they were waiting for. The bodies inside the grayish-green chemical protective suits and bug-eyed black masks seemed all the same, yet so different. I thought about the faces behind those masks. They were so damn young. They were too young for this. I guess that cliché really strikes true when death stands beside young men. A few HMMWVs drove past. My soldiers looked at me expectantly.

I realized then that they were watching me closely for clues as to their future existence. They were isolated – removed from their families, their homes, their land and country. They were isolated from the battalion and from the rest of the company. They were, in these impermeable suits and masks, isolated even from each other. They looked to me, I realized, to break down these barriers, to reconnect them to life and hope, to each other. As a brand new Second Lieutenant, I was made the brunt of many a leader joke by these very soldiers. But now they needed hope and inspiration; they needed a real leader to lead, to break through the psychological morass into some sense of hope and optimism. In Ranger training, I all too often found myself in similar situations. Of course, that is the purpose of Ranger training. When a patrol moves through bone-chilling, ball-gripping swamp water, everyone shrinks into their own little shell, isolated by darkness, the rain and cold, the water, silence, hunger, and fear. In order to succeed, the Ranger leader must exert all his will and his very being, in order to chip into the individuals and to reform the individuals back into a group. He must exchange his last remnants of life and optimism for an energy that will sustain a number of other men. I had done it in Ranger school – sometimes successfully, sometimes not – but I knew I would have to succeed here, or I would have a rough go of it in the combat to come.

I had to bring them back to a prewar world, a world of collective safety and of normal life, if only in their minds. These were not hungry or wet or tired soldiers, but they were soldiers who were hungry for hope and tired mentally – they had each faced their own very personal deaths in the previous minutes, and the strain on their sanity was clear. It didn't take me long to figure out the best technique. The first joke that I told was one about Ranger training – a Ranger had sunk into the quicksand in the swamps and needed help getting out. After I hit the punch line – which was only halfway funny – muffled laughter spread slowly, hesitantly around the room.

I told another joke – a farmer's daughter joke that probably everyone had already heard. This time the laughter was real. I think they were mostly happy that they were alive, and that life had returned, at least psychologically and if only temporarily, to normal. Surely if their leader was not worrying, they were OK. The relief from strain manifested itself in more laughter and elbowing; friendly punches landed here and there. The tension – draped over us like wet canvas – slowly lifted, allowing us to breathe, to live, to gain some perspective.

As Rangers come to learn, the most important person in the world in a combat environment is your Ranger buddy, your combat brethren. They provide your anchor to reality. As a platoon, we were all alive, and we were all together. And as we learned over the next few months of unknowing, of combat and cease-fires, of mines and death, that was all that mattered and all we needed.

A matter of trust

At the end of my officer basic course, I found myself in a competitive 'leadership board' trying to answer this last question from the president of the board:

> 'You are a platoon leader in a combat situation. Your M8 chemical detection system has sounded. You report the alarm to higher headquarters and have your platoon go to MOPP Level Four. After your company headquarters confirms that there have been no adjacent unit alerts, the company commander orders you to conduct unmasking procedures. However, the soldier you select to perform the unmasking procedure refuses to unmask. Since he is the lowest ranking soldier, you know he is young, scared, and confused, but the fact remains that he refuses to be the soldier to unmask.'

The Colonel stopped and smiled at me. 'What do you do?' he asked.

And now I was living the question. We had arrived on the border of Iraq about a week ago. The chemical threat was real, and our M8 alarm had gone off. I glanced at the faintly luminous hands on my watch – 0230 hours. After getting the order from company headquarters, I had my first squad leader run two separate M256 chemical detection kits, both with negative results. There appeared to be no chemical agents present.

But it was my duty to select and tell Private Conkle that he was to be the human guinea pig. I led him outside the tent. Through my chemical protective mask, I explained his duties, taking the time to speak kindly, yet firmly. Throughout my monologue, Private Conkle did not move or speak. I could not see his face through his mask. His chemical suit was tucked, buttoned, and tied tight. His rubber-gloved hands hung straight down by his side, pointing to his black rubber boots. When I finished, I asked him if he understood what he had to do. He did not respond. I asked again. No answer. I clicked on my GI angle-head flashlight and searched his mask-clad face. The red beam caught the wet tears streaking down a dusty, dirty face. Private Conkle turned his face away. A muffled 'I can't do it, sir, I just can't do it' was followed by what appeared to be the dark outline of his body convulsing slightly with sobs.[3]

My platoon sergeant stepped up behind me. In a low voice, he asked, 'Sir, do you want me to take over here?' I didn't know how he would handle the situation, but I did know that it was my problem. 'No, I got it.' I took PVT Conkle by the shoulder and walked him into the darkness. Our conversation went something like this:

'Conkle.'
'Yes, sir?'
'You can do this, Conkle.'
'No, I can't, sir.'

'Yes, you can.'

'I don't want to die, sir.'

'Conkle, you're not going to die. We've already tested the air with two M256 kits, and there is no chemical present.'

'What if the M256s were wrong? What if you're wrong, sir?'

I thought about my options. I first thought about how I responded to the question from the president of the board in that leadership board. That was option 1, but I knew I couldn't do that. Option 2 was to again order him through the unmasking procedures and when he refused, threaten him with a court martial. But this would mean one less man in the platoon, and I'd still have to get another soldier to go through the unmasking procedure. Option 3 was to try the solution proffered by the president of the board. I decided to try that technique first. The conversation that follows is as I recall:

'Conkle.'

'Yes, sir?'

'Listen. Company headquarters told me that there have been no alerts in any of the other units to our left, right, or rear. No other M8 in the company has gone off except ours. We've run the M256 kits, twice, with negative results. More than likely, the alarm went off from all the dust. We've been told to expect that. Plus, the Iraqis are too far away right now to hit us with gas. Now it's time to conduct unmasking procedures. You can do this. You did it back at Fort Knox, and you can do it here.'

'Yes, sir, but that was Fort Knox. This is an whole different situation here …'

Conkle's head hung down; he wouldn't face me. I thought about just taking off my own mask – hell, I was pretty sure it was a false alarm. Lead by example, I kept telling myself. But as much as I felt inside that I would have been right to do that, my training simply would not allow it. Who would lead the platoon if I got killed? What would my commander say when he found out? That I was too weak to lead? Too weak to enforce the standard, to make soldiers do their jobs?

I thought back to my days and years as a Private. I thought of what had motivated me, personally, then, and I realized that it might work here, too. Plus, in the Engineer Officer Basic Course, I had read the writings of Vietnam historian S. L. A. Marshall. In his book *Men against Fire* Marshall wrote that it was the fear of failing a buddy that was the primary motivator of soldiers in combat.[4] Many of us Cold War leaders accepted that idea. This seemed to make great sense to me, and I knew that in the past I had certainly been motivated by this fear. So I carefully formed my words and asked:

'What are your buddies going to think about you, Conkle, if you don't do this? You know we'll just have to pick someone else to do this. Do you want to be the one to tell this person that he has to do it instead of you because you're afraid?'

Pause. 'I don't know, sir.'

'You know that everyone in the platoon will realize that you refused to do this, don't you?'

Pause. 'Yes, sir, I know.'

'You don't want to let them down, do you?'

'No sir.'

'Well, what do you think? Can you do this?'

'Well, sir, I don't want to let them down, and I'll do just about anything else. It's just that, well, sir, I don't want to die, either.'

His voice was sincere, it was honest, but it quavered.

I told him I understood. I stood and thought for a moment. I realized, slowly, that perhaps Marshall was wrong as well. Do all soldiers fight and die primarily for their buddies? What about those new soldiers who haven't formed strong bonds with their brethren? What about new transfers into units? Although soldiers undoubtedly have performed on the battlefield motivated by buddies, that could only be one of several factors. There was more to motivating soldiers than just that. The Colonel back at that leadership board wasn't quite right, either. Information, in and of itself, will rarely motivate a soldier to risk his personal safety. I realized that only one thing is sure to motivate soldiers to risk their lives in combat.

As that thought developed in my mind, we continued talking, much as new friends would, finding things in common, and learning about each other. The darkness helped ease the distance and made it easier to talk. Private Conkle seemed to relax somewhat, and I listened carefully to him. I asked him what he thought about the unit, how his parents were doing, and what his concerns were about the upcoming weeks. I gave him my full attention and honest answers to his questions. After a good while, and after our conversation had run its natural course, I turned the conversation back to the present situation.

'Let me tell you something, Conkle. I know you're a good soldier. You've worked hard for the platoon, you've listened to your NCOs, and you've kept a good attitude. I know that everyone back home is proud of you. You're a good man. I know that. Everyone knows that. Nobody wants to see you get hurt, least of all me. Now I want you to tell me something. Have I ever asked you to do anything stupid before?'

'No, sir.'

'Think back over the last month or two since you got to the unit. Have I ever done anything that you thought was wrong?'

'No, sir, I guess not. I've always thought that you were a pretty good platoon leader.'

'Well, I'm not asking you to do anything stupid now. And I'm not asking you to do anything that would harm you. I give you my word that we will do this as

safely as possible. You've got to remember that you're only going to break the seal of your mask at first. Eyes closed. You'll hold your breath. If anything feels wrong, anything at all, I've got the medic standing by. If you feel anything out of the ordinary at all, we'll stop until we know it's safe to go on. You can trust me.'

I put my hand on his shoulder. 'Do you understand this, Conkle?' His head lifted up. I felt his eyes meet mine through the darkness of the night and of the situation.

'Yes, sir. I understand.'
'You can do this. I know you can.'
Private Conkle paused for a very long time, then said, 'OK, sir, I'll do it.'
'Alright, Conkle. I knew you could.'

As we walked back around the tent, I thought about the courage it took for Private Conkle to say yes, to agree to test the air for chemicals. I thought back to that leadership board in the Officer Basic Course. I thought about the irony, or the 'unheimlich' (uncanny-ness) as Freud might describe this situation, of being asked a hypothetical question about a soldier refusing to unmask, then later living that question.

I had to think twice about that question before I answered it, back in that peace-time board. As a Noncommissioned officer (NCO), I had always placed the welfare of soldiers first. The mission was less important to me than was my direct responsibility for the lives of soldiers – real people – whom I knew intimately. I knew them like a father knows his sons, and took on risk with the same frame of mind. As a team leader with three soldiers, as a squad leader with nine soldiers, or as a platoon sergeant with 30 soldiers, I knew every one of my soldiers as a person first. I knew that my greatest asset was a willing force of teamwork from genuinely motivated soldiers, those soldiers motivated by solid leadership. If I were to lose a soldier, I would likely lose the confidence of my men. Each soldier was critical to the psychological stability of the team and to the success of the mission. Therefore, care and proper leadership for soldiers must *always* precede mission, because the mission will likely fail without combined, synchronized, and psychologically strong teamwork. But when I became a commissioned officer, I knew that I was first expected to accomplish the mission. In fact, the catch-phrase 'mission first, men always,' was often repeated in this officer course. Perhaps because of this mission-oriented environment, I found myself accepting, or at least believing, ideas about leadership that I would have soundly rejected as an NCO prior to OCS. I was struggling to find the 'right' leader principles, and in doing so, I had swung too far to the right, perhaps.

I had told the board that if necessary, 'I would rip the mask off the soldier's head. I would accomplish the mission.' I felt this would impress the board – this sense of mission first, of perhaps losing the skirmish but winning the battle. This was not the Staff Sergeant Kubik of one year ago speaking; this was Second Lieutenant Kubik. I knew it was not the right answer for the person I was, but

over the last year of academics and training, I thought it was the right answer for the person I was supposed to become. The question and situation were artificially constructed, and I knew that, and it confused me, because I had to create an artificial, constructed answer to match the question. My job at this leadership board was not to tell how things should be accomplished, I felt, but rather how the Army expected missions to be executed.

The president of the board, after listening to my answer, explained how that might not be the best response. Though mission accomplishment was important, he said, there were almost always ways to do that without force. He smiled and told me how if I gave the soldier sufficient information, that soldier would very likely have no problem unmasking. It was all a matter of keeping everyone informed, a matter of 'information dissemination.' This was, as we all knew, the information age, and the challenge was to manage all this information, to get it to the lowest levels. He mentioned the growing role of computers and leaders' roles in sifting and providing information. I felt a little angry with the Colonel's response to me, since I had assumed that all the information had already been given to the soldier, and he still refused. Providing the soldier with all the information was the first step any leader would take, I thought.

I was miffed that I blew the board on more of a misunderstanding of the situation than real leadership awareness. However, in this new 'officer' environment in which I was learning, I thought that the 'information' principle did make sense and would have been adequate to persuade the soldier to unmask. And I certainly didn't like the response I had given – to rip his mask off. That was surely stupid enough, and inside, I had hoped that that wasn't the right answer. So the thought of 'give the soldier enough information, and he will agree to the task' seemed simple and logical enough.

But there in the pitch black darkness of the Arabian desert, on the edge of death and war, I realized a powerful lesson of combat leadership: it wasn't for information that soldiers place themselves in danger. I could have given Private Conkle a full information briefing on the entire Army situation and the history of chemical unmasking procedures, and it wouldn't have made a whit of difference. Even if soldiers are fully informed, they don't sacrifice themselves for information. Nor will they always risk their lives for buddies, particularly if they are new to the unit. In fact, if a soldier feels that his buddies don't appreciate him as a person, as an equal, that soldier is unlikely to do any more than what guarantees his own personal survival. When it comes time for soldiers to risk their lives, there is something much more important than information or peer pressure.

It is, pure and simple, the matter of *trust*.

That trust finds its birth in a leader's genuine concern for the welfare of his or her soldiers. My conversation with Private Conkle, in the middle of the night outside a GP Medium (troop tent), in full chemical gear, wasn't a very long conversation. But it was enough for young Private Conkle to gauge if he could trust me or not. He didn't gain trust through commands, or through buddies who

were not there; he gained it through a belief that I cared for him not as a subordinate, but as a person, as a real person with a life worth learning about. Once he realized that I valued him as a person, and that my interest in him was sincere, he began to realize that I was not there to deceive him, and that I would not 'use' him in achieving some sort of mission success. If he were to die in that inky black land, 7000 miles from home, he would do it only after his leader had gained a real appreciation for the value of his life; that he had a real home, and a real family, and had value as a real person. My previous identity – Staff Sergeant Kubik – had learned this through years of leading soldiers at the ground level. Now that leadership truth had emerged from the blackness of a combat situation and had reaffirmed itself. I never again doubted the deep and true leadership lessons I learned as an NCO.

The platoon sergeant paradox

Going into Iraq, I had what we call a 'good' platoon sergeant. It seems there are two types of platoon sergeants – good, and not so good. The good platoon sergeants are a blessing from God. You cannot fail with a good platoon sergeant. On the other hand, if you have a 'not good' platoon sergeant, it seems that despite your best efforts, your platoon will make absolutely no progress.

When I first got to my new unit as a Second Lieutenant, just ten months prior to deploying to the Gulf War, I didn't even have a platoon sergeant. I did get a platoon immediately; in this post-Cold-War era, the low-priority fill 19th Engineer Battalion did not have enough lieutenants to fill all the platoon leader positions. The Battalion was also short of platoon sergeants, squad leaders, and soldiers. My platoon was no exception, and leading this skeleton platoon was fairly difficult for a new lieutenant. But in the months following Iraq's occupation and annexation of Kuwait, all of that changed. That was when we 'made the tip-fiddle.' Or at least that's what the acronym TPFDL (time-phased force deployment list) sounded like as it echoed around the battalion. All of a sudden, we began getting troops and supplies as if we were, well – going to war!

One of those 'fill troops' was Sergeant First Class Charles 'Chuck' Kestel. SFC Kestel was a relic; a crusty old E-7 with at least 100 years of service under his black issue belt. Nobody had ever heard of him or seen him before, but here he was: a real, old-fashioned, chain-smoking, coffee-by-the-quart platoon sergeant with a voice like a D7 dozer scraping crushed rock. To me, he was manna from heaven; a second lieutenant's dream come true. SFC Kestel's first words to me were, if I recall correctly, 'OK, sir, I wanna know who the duds are in this platoon.' Of course, I let SFC Kestel know – in no uncertain terms – that there were no such individuals in my platoon, that all were soldiers with great potential. Some might have less potential than others, but as far as I was concerned, we didn't have any 'dud' soldiers. My new platoon sergeant just smiled and said, 'OK, sir. I understand.'

The first paradox I faced was the old one: how does a raw 'butter bar' Second Lieutenant – at the very bottom of the officer ranks – gain some sense of authority over a seasoned Sergeant First Class? It's generally understood that it's the education of the officer that gives him or her some authority over the NCO, but I didn't even have that. I had some smattering of actual college classroom time, but I soon learned that SFC Kestel exceeded me in that, as well. Thus, initial counseling was an uneasy challenge for me, as it is with any 2LT counseling his platoon sergeant for the first time. Though I did try to remind myself that I had eight or nine years of service, somehow I still felt like a teenage boy counseling his father on the rules of the road.

But you wouldn't have known this by SFC Kestel's attitude. He listened intently, took notes, answered with lots of 'yes sirs' and 'no, sirs,' and signed his name to the counseling form in a careful, flowing script.

When I finished, the old NCO began his initial counseling. There were no forms, no records – no structure at all – and as a matter of fact, I didn't even realize that he *was* counseling me. He told me very simply that he was here to turn this gaggle of troops and NCOs into a real platoon. It would take a little time, he said, but I could expect to see changes immediately. All he asked of me was my full support. Yes, he understood that I didn't really know him yet, but I should trust him. And I knew that I could. Every word he spoke resounded with truth, honesty, and sincerity.

Overnight, it seemed, I went from being a fireman in a busy city precinct to a volunteer firefighter in a sleepy rural district. All the problems seemed to disappear. SFC Kestel, like super-absorbent floor-dry, kept any soldier problems from spreading past him, allowing me to focus on the upcoming deployment to war. He kept me informed, but it was all FYI – 'It's already taken care of, sir. You don't have to do a thing.'

SFC Kestel also had the old-time, odd custom of addressing me in the third person. Instead of asking me if I would like a cup of coffee, he would instead ask, 'Would The Lieutenant like a cup of coffee?' or say, 'If The Lieutenant prefers, we can head down to the motor pool.' Over the next four months, SFC Kestel made it his primary job to coach 'The Lieutenant' on all aspects of leadership, soldiers, engineering, maintenance, supply, and even administrative tasks. 'Proper paperwork,' he would say, 'results in proper pay and promotions.' Despite his initial words to me, I soon learned that soldiers were his passion. They were all like sons to him. He might be a strict disciplinarian, but he was compassionate and, most importantly, seemed to know exactly what it took to get the platoon ready for combat. As I gained trust in him and his style of leadership, I gave him more authority within the platoon. When SFC Kestel spoke, that was the law. It was the best way to run the platoon, I thought. I would lead the platoon, but SFC Kestel ran the platoon. Sometimes our roles would cause conflict, but I began to defer to his judgment in order to empower him, to 'give him the reins' and to give myself some distance to better lead the platoon.

But now I found myself in a very difficult situation, and SFC Kestel, with his reins, was at the heart of the problem. Our platoon had been detached from the Battalion shortly after crossing the border into Iraq, and we were operating independently in the desert. Our mission was to assist a military police platoon in EPW (enemy prisoner of war) control. So far, things had been going smoothly. We hadn't suffered any casualties from the numerous minefields, though the danger posed was very great. As engineers, we knew that even a change in temperature could set off some of the more unstable mines. And, thankfully, our only direct contact with the enemy so far had been in moving great numbers of ragged, dusty Iraqi soldiers into the large concertina-wire holding areas we were constructing.

Deep in Iraq, we were still in MOPP level two (chemical suit and boots) when we drove up to what appeared to be – at one time – an Iraqi convoy. There wasn't much left of it. Still-smoking hulks of vehicles lay scattered to the horizon. To our immediate front was an Iraqi cargo truck. The truck was black, but it wasn't painted black – it was burned black. Numerous charred objects lay scattered around the vehicle, in stark contrast to the light-colored sand. Inside the vehicle, slumped over the steering wheel, with arms outstretched, was what we euphemistically called a 'crispy critter.' In reality, it was a horribly burned, clearly dead Iraqi soldier.

The problem began when SFC Kestel, via radio, told me he was going to 'check out' the vehicle. My mind clicked and raced. No, no, he couldn't do that! I pressed on the microphone to speak, but then released it. 'Why not?' I thought. What am I going to tell him? How am I going to order this experienced E-7 not to 'check-out' this vehicle? Certainly he is a grown man; he is an experienced soldier and leader, and he can see the risks. My mind raced, trying desperately to gather evidence and reason to support my instinctual initial reaction. As I looked again at the dark objects scattered around the vehicle, I realized that they were mortar rounds. I looked again at the truck and saw that it had apparently suffered a direct hit from artillery or tank fire, and the mortar rounds had been blown out of the back of this cargo truck. The smaller chunks of black indicated that some of the charred, yet unexpended mortar rounds might be partially buried or buried under the shifting desert sands.

I pressed the mike again. 'Negative two-seven (SFC Kestel's call sign), I can't let you do that. Over.' I released the mike and heard SFC Kestel's reply: 'Say again, two six (my call sign)?' I paused, heart pounding, and keyed the mike again, 'I said negative, two seven. It's too dangerous. Over.' SFC Kestel: 'Two six, we need to talk. I'm enroute your location. Stand fast. Out.'

SFC Kestel was not happy, and now I was faced with paradox 2: You empower platoon sergeants by 'giving them the reins,' but at the same time you must somehow subordinate them to you. I knew from my enlisted years that NCOs are at the core of every good unit. The more powerful the platoon sergeant is (within the platoon), generally the more orderly the platoon will be. But if the platoon sergeant becomes more powerful than the platoon leader, the platoon will

sense the upset in order. The disorder in the hierarchy of power causes instability (problems) in the platoon, usually disciplinary in nature.

When SFC Kestel lumbered up in his 5-ton truck, I dismounted my HMMWV. I wondered how I would find the courage out here to face up to the man who was, in effect, my leader, and my mentor. We were in the middle of nowhere, far from the structure of our battalion. We were on the battlefield, where authority derived from action and not symbols. When you are there, rank can seem insignificant on the battlefield. But I gathered my moral strength and approached my platoon sergeant with as much conviction as I could muster. 'Sergeant Kestel,' I said, 'I know you're not happy with my order, but I can't let you go near that truck, or anywhere around here. It's just too dangerous.'

'Sir,' said SFC Kestel, 'all I want to do is walk over there and check out that vehicle, and maybe snap a couple of photos of the crispy critter. Are you going to tell me that I don't know how to take care of myself?' His voice was edgy, raw. He took a long drag from his cigarette, exhaled, and looked directly at me as I spoke.

'I understand that, Sergeant Kestel, but hell, look at all the mortar rounds laying around – how do you know one won't go off, or how do you know you won't step on a buried one? It's simply not worth it, Sergeant.'

Sergeant First Class Kestel looked me straight in the eyes, as he often did. His eyes had a way of piercing into my inner self, where the truth lay, sometimes hidden. But he could always find his way to it through that hard stare of his. He burned into me for a long time. He puffed on his cigarette, and inhaled deeply. Exhaling, he looked off toward the horizon and shook his head. 'OK, sir, you're in charge.' He turned and walked back to his truck.

I realized long after that that the real paradox of the situation manifested itself in that moment. I possessed the courage and the resolve then because Sergeant First Class Charles Kestel had trained me to meet every physical and moral challenge, including this one. He knew the time would come, and it did. His goal was to start with an acorn and end up with strong sapling, in the hopes that someday that Second Lieutenant would become an officer of courage, a solid oak corner-post for his beloved Army. He knew, as he walked away, likely with a slight smile playing on his sun-burned lips, that he had succeeded in his mission. Yes, The Lieutenant was finally in charge.[5]

Notes

1 Sergeant Chester Applegate is credited with the first bulldozed breaches in our sector, turning the huge sand berm obstacle into Swiss cheese in a matter of minutes. Years later, I met up with Sergeant Applegate again. This time, he was again at the tip of the spear for the 1st Armored Division, busting dirt at the banks of the icy Sava River in preparation for the Division's initial thrust into Bosnia.

2 Staff Sergeant Steve Hansen from Ludington, Michigan was killed by a mine in Iraq in the Tawalkana Division sector. Sergeant Thomas Walrath, Specialist John Fowler,

and Private Anthony Patterson were all killed in a vehicle accident during a sand storm.

3 I must mention the remarkable courage of one of the other young Privates in my platoon: PFC Pizarro. When Private Conkle expressed reluctance, PFC Pizarro stepped forward and volunteered to take off his mask. Later, PFC Pizarro asked me if there was any way he could volunteer for service further forward, in the front lines.

4 See S. L. A. Marshall, *Men against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000).

5 Sergeant First Class Chuck Kestel died five years later, on 6 November 1996. He had taken the Army's downsizing offer of an early retirement and enjoyed a few good years with his wife and children before lung cancer took him from this battlefield. He was 38.

11

TACTICAL ENGINEER SUPPORT

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Huber

During the Persian Gulf War, Charlie Company, 37th Engineer Battalion of the 20th Engineer Brigade, provided general support for many units of the XVIII Airborne Corps. Deploying from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in September and October 1990, the unit was first tasked with providing mobility support for the Corps and for the 6th French Light Division. Before the ground war, some of the company's missions included the construction of ammunition storage points, roads, logistics points, fighting positions for the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, and a 5,000-foot flight landing strip with a bypass road.

As with all combat, the psychological strain of war became an issue, one that had potentially serious effects on the capability of Lieutenant Colonel Huber's unit. Two weeks prior to ground combat, one of Colonel Huber's soldiers began to exhibit symptoms of combat stress, making threatening signals toward his leaders and fellow soldiers. Sometimes when soldiers are in situations of grave consequence, such as war, they seem to think that 'the rules have changed,' and that peacetime formalities no longer exist. The general public may not realize, perhaps, just how often this type of incident does occur in military units before, during, and after combat operations, because leaders like Colonel Huber make the right decisions to deal with the issue. Leaders like Colonel Huber know that an effective force is one with strong leadership and a strong moral backbone.

When the ground war began, the unit received the mission to construct a flight landing strip bypass road 70 miles north into Iraq. Transportation assets, even for heavy engineer construction equipment, were insufficient to haul all of the unit's vehicles. This created a fundamental problem and a leadership challenge for the battalion. How could they roll engineer construction equipment fast enough to keep up with M1 Abrams tanks and M2/3 Bradley Fighting Vehicles and still be capable of carrying out their mission at the end of the movement? Colonel Huber's solution reflects an impressive sense of balance and perspective, an understanding that in war, if you don't make it to the fight in the first place, you cannot win.

Colonel Huber also discusses the on-the-ground realities of his post-combat mission to destroy enemy bunkers and abandoned equipment. The bunkers were very large, with large quantities of ordnance. The challenges arose not just of

safety, but of the technical methods of destruction, particularly since the unit had insufficient quantities of conventional demolitions material on hand. Added to the situation was the fact that Saddam Hussein's army was believed to possess chemical and biological weapons.

Part one

During Operation DESERT STORM, coalition leaders wanted to shock the enemy by advancing as fast as possible through his lines of defense. Much of the surprise hinged upon the 'Right Hook' of XVIII Airborne Corps. Assisting the Corps in mobility operations up the Theater left flank was the 37th Engineer Battalion, which provided mobility engineer support to the 6th French Light Division, the 82nd Airborne Division, and the XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery. We had to 'road' (drive) our equipment, as haul assets were not available. A great leadership challenge was to find the optimal mix of speed and rest, so that the engineer equipment would not burn up in the race to support the fight.

The background

Engineer equipment played a significant role in the mobility operations of the campaign. I commanded an airborne engineer company, which consisted of a headquarters section, two combat engineer platoons, and a light equipment platoon. The combat engineer platoons used 5-ton dump trucks as squad vehicles. The light equipment (LE) platoon had several pieces of earth-moving equipment, which was used for constructing roads, flight landing strips, and helipads during Operation DESERT SHIELD, in support of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), the 101st Airborne Division, the 82nd Airborne Division, and XVIII Airborne Corps. This included graders, front-end loaders, bucket loaders, water distributors, scrapers, and bulldozers, as well as a small haul capability which consisted of three 25-ton tractor-trailer combinations and a few 15-ton tilt trailers; certainly not enough to carry all of the assigned equipment. As our equipment was small (D5B bulldozers, for example), our battalion PBO (Property Book Officer) contracted larger equipment (D7B and D8B dozers, as well as civilian graders and dump trucks) to assist us in our construction efforts. We did not get the haul assets with the equipment, however.

As DESERT SHIELD progressed and we were given the mission to transition our planning for an offensive, I became concerned with taking all of my equipment into Iraq. We sent requests up the chain of command for additional haul capabilities, but most were being used to carry the XVIII Airborne Corps mechanized vehicles into western Saudi Arabia (from the 24th Infantry Division, the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 1st Cavalry Division, etc.). On the third day of the air campaign, my battalion was ordered to move from our location supporting the 3rd ACR to a new location several hundred kilometers to the west. This new location was north of the Tapline Road, south of the Hamrat Al Batin,

about 25 kilometers east of the town of Rafha. My executive officer was instrumental in coordinating for limited haul assets to move our LE platoon to this new location. These assets would not stay with us, however. During a battalion operations meeting in February 1991, the company commanders raised the questions about moving north. The answer was clear: we would have to road our LE vehicles.

The challenge

Our primary mission from higher headquarters during the ground offensive was to construct a flight landing strip bypass road at Logistics Base (LB) Romeo (near Objective Brown) not later than G+6, in order to facilitate the quick and efficient resupply of XVIII Airborne Corps. This mission required all of my LE assets, which had to get to the site in fully mission-capable (FMC) status. The technical manuals and maintenance warrant officers recommended driving the equipment no faster than 15 mph, with breaks every few hours to allow the axles and wheels to cool. We knew that the maneuver units of XVIII Airborne Corps would be moving across the desert to our front and on our right flank at high speeds. If we did not get the Logistics Base established quickly, the Corps mission might not be accomplished.

The situation and solution

We crossed the line of departure with 100 percent of our equipment fully mission-capable. Due to the heavy traffic of vehicles trying to get to Main Supply Route (MSR) Texas, we only went 18 miles in the first six hours of the ground campaign, before finding a harbor area off of the MSR. One civilian-rented road grader and a 5-ton tractor broke down during the initial convoy, and we had to leave the crews behind to repair them.

On the second day of the ground campaign, we convoyed north along MSR Texas to MSR Virginia, heading east to OBJ Brown. At 10 mph, travel was extremely slow, but the 82nd Airborne Division, moving north in 5-ton trucks, was intertwined in our convoy, keeping speeds low. It was a very long day going 70 miles from As Salman to OBJ Brown. However, the two non-mission-capable vehicles were recovered and rejoined our convoy. When we arrived at OBJ Brown, we found that the maneuver units had already screamed past this area and would not need a logistics base at Romeo. At 0800 the next morning, we received word from the Brigade Commander that LB Romeo was scratched and that all support assets would move to LB Saturn, which was in the VII Corps sector nearer to Kuwait. We continued on 100 miles eastward to OBJ Purple, arriving at 2300, when we stopped for the night. Restarting the next morning at 0800, we immediately encountered scatterable mines blanketing the area. The route was covered with cluster bombs and mines, so my company started marking a travel

lane and then rigged munitions to blow the mines in place. Fortunately for XVIII Airborne Corps, my company was present to clear the minefield, allowing the Corps Artillery to continue the fight.

Epilogue

By keeping convoy speeds below 15 mph, we were able to keep the tires and bearings cool on the engineer equipment that was driven to war. The heavy traffic offered opportunities for drivers and maintenance personnel to check vehicles often. The convoy was very deliberate, with heavy focus on keeping the vehicles maintained. When we arrived at OBJ Purple, I had every piece of the LE platoon available (and FMC) to clear mines. We used Small Emplacement Excavators to carry 2-pound C4 charges with 30-second time-fuses attached. These charges were placed on the inside of the cluster bombs and mines, so that after the fuse igniter was pulled and the charge detonated, the blast would be outward, creating a traffic lane. We then used our graders to 'proof' the lanes, driving with the blades down to ensure all debris and/or munitions were completely gone from the lanes. I recommended the grader drivers for Bronze Star Medals for their performance of driving through the minefields (the awards were later down-graded by higher headquarters to combat ARCOMs [Army Commendation Medals]).

Had the MSR been wide open for our convoy, it would have been tempting to get the equipment into the sector as fast as possible, neglecting the speed restrictions for the engineer equipment. This could have been disastrous, if the equipment broke down. As a leader, I was responsible for accomplishing the mission, but I also had to weigh the risks of not following my maintenance officer's recommendations. To arrive earlier with less equipment could have been useless. As it turned out, we spent about 5–6 hours clearing mines and making safe traffic lanes for the Corps, and to my knowledge, no vehicle was damaged due to the cluster bombs

As an afterthought, could XVIII Airborne Corps have provided more haul assets to us, perhaps assisting us in reaching the Logistics Base and accomplishing the mission? With the 82nd Airborne Division requiring dump trucks to transport troops and several divisions positioning armored vehicles in the west for the 'Left Hook,' I don't think our corps engineer battalion (non-divisional unit) was high on the list for additional haul assets. The only viable option left to me was to drive each piece of equipment.

Part two

Two weeks before the ground campaign was to start, a PFC from 2nd Platoon decided that he would threaten his platoon. He wrote names of his squad members on his helmet band and started talking about how some platoon members would not make it back from Iraq. The final episode occurred when he tried to put a

7.62-mm round under the helmet band of his helmet and mentioned that that round was for some of his 'buddies.' All of this occurred in a matter of hours. The leadership challenge was critical: How was I to isolate this soldier from the other members of the company and continue to prepare for combat?

The background

When the air campaign of Operation DESERT STORM began in January 1991, the morale in my company was good. My soldiers had been primarily engaged in horizontal construction missions, such as road construction, even though two-thirds of the company consisted of combat engineers, soldiers trained for demolitions missions, not construction missions. The possible missions of conducting breeching operations led the soldiers to a complete focus on their training. We set up dummy minefields in the desert to improve our detection skills. The battalion set up a 2-kilometer demolitions training lane to test our soldiers in clearing mines and wire obstacles, as well as breeching tank ditches and fortifications. We videotaped the squad performances to use as after-action reviews. Troops were focused and morale was high. The 20th Engineer Brigade commander, COL Robert Flowers, visited the battalion area and briefed every soldier on the upcoming offensive operation. Then it happened. A clerk in my supply section told the first sergeant that he was a sole-surviving male and was not sure if he could go into combat. The first sergeant assured him that his training and the conduct of others would ensure he would make it back to Fort Bragg to see his parents. He became an effective part of the company again.

The challenge

I am sure that other soldiers had similar thoughts. At this point, I had over 135 soldiers in my company, and I was responsible for getting them home. We had excellent intelligence about the enemy, but one could not help but wonder how many casualties the US Army, and Charlie Company, 37th Engineers in particular, might take. As mid-February approached, a 12B (combat engineer) from 2nd Platoon went over the edge. He wrote names of his squad members on his helmet band and started talking about how some platoon members (especially NCOs) would not make it back from Iraq. The company was preparing all vehicles for the maneuver into Iraq, painting inverted Vs on the sides and placing VS-17 (high-visibility) panels on top of all vehicles for Allied recognition. At this point, with the offensive imminent, live ammunition had been given to soldiers manning company guard positions, and this PFC was an M60 machine gunner. He must have taken a round while on guard watch and then he tried to put a 7.62-mm round under the helmet band of his helmet and mentioned that that round was for some of his 'buddies.'

The solution

I was at a construction site when the operations sergeant radio-ed me about the incident. I immediately ordered the Platoon Sergeant to take the soldier's weapon and all rounds and confined him to the platoon tent with an NCO guard. The Platoon Sergeant then searched the soldier's belongings and took away all other objects that could inflict harm, including pocket knives.

My gut feeling was that this soldier was scared. Unfortunately, he handled his fear in an unacceptable manner. My First Sergeant and I questioned him at length about his actions, and he immediately expressed regret. I informed him that he was to be separated from the Army, chaptered out. He then really turned on the remorse, but I told him it was too late for that. I could not tolerate threats to my soldiers, even in jest, and I had a tough time believing that all of his actions had been simply whimsical.

This was a terribly stressful time for the company. One of our own had threatened others in his platoon. We still had to prepare for war (the Russian delay of G-day had not occurred yet). I enlisted the assistance of the battalion staff. The adjutant and his folks started separation procedures immediately. The battalion commander met with the soldier and concurred with my recommendation of separation. Under separation procedures, the soldier needed a physical examination and a mental evaluation. These examinations (which could take weeks back at Fort Bragg) were completed within two days. 2nd Platoon had to give up their platoon leader and a few NCOs to shuttle the soldier to all of his separation appointments, but the rest of the platoon kept on preparing. I had a meeting with the company, explaining the situation, trying to put everyone's mind at ease. The soldier was gone within a few days, headed back to Fort Bragg, and out of the Army. My only concern then was that I had released an unstable individual back home where our families were, but no incidents ever occurred. In fact, about a year later, I received a letter from a bakery in the Midwest asking for a character recommendation. This ex-soldier was applying for a job and had listed me as a reference.

Epilogue

This specific type of leadership training is not taught at the Officer Basic or Advanced Courses. I did know, however, that many of my NCOs had a tremendous amount of experience leading soldiers. As long as soldiers are kept informed of the mission, I believe that most fears can be calmed in critical situations. The NCOs in my company kept their soldiers informed, and with the exception of one soldier, the company pulled together as a cohesive unit. Getting a strong working relationship with subordinates that involves trust is key in effective leadership. My NCOs trusted me, and their soldiers trusted them, to get us through this tough time. The swift and deliberate action taken to rid the 'team' of this soldier enabled us to accomplish our mission to prepare for combat.

Part three

After the cease-fire, the 37th was given the mission of destroying almost 100 reinforced underground bunkers near the Iraqi town of Suq as Shuyuhk (also known as Khamisiyah), each filled with hundreds or even thousands of rounds of conventional munitions (tank and artillery rounds, mines, mortars, small arms rounds, etc.). The mission had come from the 82nd Airborne Division commander, who was responsible for that sector. EOD (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) individuals were present to assist with a high-detonation blast, but our training had not prepared us for destroying several hundred thousand pounds of munitions at one demolition. Suppose we came across unmarked chemical or biological munitions? How much explosive was needed to demolish the bunkers without having cook-off of the rounds inside? This became a leadership challenge as the soldiers looked to their commander for support and guidance.

The background

When the cease-fire was called on 28 February 1991, my company had just crossed Phase Line Jet, en route to Objective Gold. We had spent most of 27 February clearing lanes through a minefield in the vicinity of Al Busayyah (Objective Purple), so that the XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery could advance. After clearing the minefield, we continued on to Objective Saturn, stopping about 9 kilometers short of our new objective. We had been given a new mission late on 1 March: the 37th Engineer Battalion would be in Direct Support to the 82nd Airborne Division to destroy ammunition storage sites and abandoned vehicles.

On 2 March, sections of our battalion staff conducted a reconnaissance of the mission location and on 3 March, we convoyed for six hours to Objective Gold, an ammunition storage point consisting of about 100 ammunition bunkers and several warehouses. Each warehouse was underground, covered by reinforced concrete and several feet of earth. Apparently, the Allied air forces had tried to destroy this site with air-dropped munitions, but it was not vulnerable to air attack. Engineers were needed to destroy the bunkers by using demolitions rigged inside the bunkers.

The challenge

There was no power in this part of Iraq. Each bunker was immense, covering a few thousand square feet, and containing several hundred and even (in some cases) several thousand rounds of ammunition. We first had to clear each bunker, to ensure there were no Iraqis or booby-traps inside them, and then we had to destroy them. Using flashlights and one squad per bunker, this was a tedious process. Once we were sure it was safe to enter, we had to determine how to destroy each bunker.

Two NCOs from an EOD Detachment were attached to our battalion as expert advisors. My soldiers had detonated cratering charges, mines, Bangalore torpedoes, etc., but we had never destroyed bunkers full of ammunition. Also, none of us could read Arabic, so we were concerned about the possibility of chemical rounds. Many rounds had no markings. Given a limited amount of time to complete the mission, how could we be sure that every round would be destroyed, given the poor visibility conditions?

This would be a very deliberate operation. On the first day, 3 March, my company was selected to inventory and rig two bunkers for a 'test shot.' With the EOD NCOs advising, we brought in drop lights (maintenance lights on extension cords) from our maintenance contact trucks to provide light inside the bunkers. We conducted a thorough inventory of the two bunkers. I instructed my operations lieutenant to videotape everything in each bunker (we had a company video camera sent to us from the Family Support Group at Fort Bragg). The platoon sergeant and EOD NCOs then discussed a plan for placing our charges to destroy the bunkers. I estimate that we used about 60 pounds of charges on the two test bunkers. The blasting caps had 30-minute time fuses attached, which meant that the fuses would burn for 30 minutes before detonating, allowing soldiers to ignite the fuses and withdraw safely. Once the Battalion was at a cleared safe distance, we pulled the fuse igniters at 1530 and the two bunkers detonated at 1600. They formed a huge pillar of smoke and burned all night.

The next day – 4 March – we went in to inspect the site. MG Johnson, who commanded the 82nd, brought his staff by to see the progress. There was debris all over the place, with a few small fires still burning. This now became a huge challenge. How can we ensure that each bunker is destroyed without rounds being cooked-off? Also, with a few small fires in the area, was it safe to bring in the company to destroy the other bunkers? Would we be able to get to a rally point in time before the charges went off? Finally, how could we be sure that there were no chemical munitions?

The solution

On 4 March my company rigged 14 bunkers for demolition, and on 10 March, we rigged another 16 bunkers. On most demolition ranges I had been on, the explosives limit was 200 pounds. On 4 and 10 March, our battalion set charges off in dozens of bunkers, containing several hundred thousand pounds of explosives. The Engineer Officer Basic and Advanced Courses did not have a page in my FM (Field Manual) 5-34 to cover that. The Battalion S-3 did, however, calculate that the minimum safe distance from a demolition this large was at least 4 miles.

With the help of the EOD NCOs, we determined that each bunker would need a 'high-yield' detonation, creating enough heat to melt every round in the detonation, not allowing individual rounds to cook off. I calculated that each bunker would need about 400 pounds of explosives to start the demolition. We

did not have this much C4 (Composition 4 type plastic explosive), so we improvised, using Bangalore torpedoes, cratering charges, anything we could find. We placed the charges on as many of the rounds as possible, tying them all together with detonating cord, and then we ran the time fuse out of each bunker.

We then conducted a complete rehearsal. Twice. We had NCOs standing outside of each bunker, next to the fuse igniters. Every radio in the battalion was on the command net. At a specified time, the battalion commander said, 'Go!' Each NCO said 'Boom!' and simulated pulling the fuse igniter. He then moved to the roadway where a vehicle picked him up and headed to the rally point. Once each vehicle passed a company check point, the commanders (my counterparts and I) counted bodies and radioed the battalion that all were accounted for. At the rally point, a thorough count was again conducted. Each rehearsal took 15 minutes, which gave another 15 minutes as a buffer (considering the 30-minute time fuse).

Epilogue

The demolitions were completely successful. I made sure that each bunker was inventoried (on paper and with video cameras), and the information was forwarded to the 82nd. At no time did we see markings indicating that the rounds were other than conventional munitions. Years later, however, I did find out that the battalion's S-2 section had detonated some rockets in a pit, which was a few miles from the bunker site, and that those rockets may have contained chemical munitions. Every soldier in my company was safely out of the demolition area before the first bunker detonated.

Again, I think the big issues are trust and communication. As a young lieutenant, I had discussions with mentors on trusting soldiers. I felt that my NCOs were completely professional and had a bit more experience with demolitions than I. The same goes for the EOD NCOs. My soldiers looked to me for steadiness amid this turmoil. I spent every day talking to them about being professional, taking care of each other, and learning from their NCOs. I also reinforced the standards of working with flak vests and helmets at all times. M8 chemical alarms were operating every time we went into the bunker areas. Every squad had several M256 chemical detection kits in case an alarm would sound. All of my soldiers who went north on this mission made it back to Saudi Arabia and to their families in the United States.

What's the key to overcoming leadership challenges? First, gather all of the information available. This usually means talking with subordinates and getting their recommendations. A young leader may not have had all of the experiences that senior NCOs or other officers have had. Second, keep the communications lines open. By constantly informing the soldiers of the mission, a leader keeps his soldiers focused on the mission. He also eliminates the opportunities for rumors to start. COL Flowers, my brigade commander during DESERT STORM, visited each

battalion as often as he could, spreading his view of what was happening. I tried to do the same with my soldiers. Visit them while on guard in the middle of the night, while at a construction site, or even while in line for chow. Finally, a leader must establish trust with his soldiers. They will always look to their leaders for guidance. Provide that guidance. Give them a mission and let them impress you with their ingenuity. After the challenge has been overcome, reward your soldiers for the job well done.

12

TRAINING "INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE" SOLDIERS

Major Chris Tatarka

Major Chris Tatarka provides a unique perspective of military operations during the Persian Gulf War. As an Infantry officer straight out of the Infantry Basic Officer Course (IOBC), Tatarka was assigned to the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii. There, he fell under the 4th Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment as a Rifle Platoon Leader. The 25th Infantry Division did not deploy to the Persian Gulf, and Major Tatarka found himself with a different mission from platoon leaders who did deploy. In times of war, however, there are always people who remain in the rear and never see the fight, but their jobs can be very important in extended combat operations. Leaders who find themselves in the rear in one war will likely find themselves fighting another one and vice versa, making these lessons relevant to all military leaders.

Although Major Tatarka got a coveted rifle platoon, his was no regular platoon. In fact, at first, the only other person in his platoon was his Platoon Sergeant. Their mission was to receive and train thirty Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) soldiers in preparation for combat. The challenges were many. None of the IRR soldiers who arrived were above the rank of Sergeant, which caused problems in forming and maintaining some semblance of a chain of command. Experience levels, leadership abilities, and the soldiers' physical capabilities varied widely. Major Tatarka trained these men for five weeks, but even that amount of time was not enough adequately to prepare the platoon for combat operations. Through the training of this platoon, Major Tatarka learned some of the fundamentals of leadership and of motivating soldiers, which are revealed in his story.

The Gulf War ended, and the IRR platoon was ordered back to Fort Benning, where the soldiers were processed back out of the Army and into civilian lives. But the lessons that Major Tatarka learned during this mobilization effort are valuable. Although the IRR training cycle was brief, he was able to glimpse the true essence of leadership and what really motivates men when counseling statements do not matter. Leaders cannot simply rely on rank in order to get men to accomplish the mission. In fact, Major Tatarka shows, sometimes coercing

simply will not work, and that situation is exactly parallel to combat. Counseling statements do not matter in combat either; only real leadership does.

I entered the Infantry Officer Basic Course (IOBC) at Fort Benning two weeks after Iraq invaded Kuwait. By early November 1990, the rumor at IOBC ('unofficially' confirmed by my IOBC company commander) was that all graduates of my OBC class were going to Saudi Arabia to act as replacements for lieutenants who would become casualties when the ground war began.

To this day I have no idea if that rumor was plausible, but it served to ensure that we lieutenants paid rapt attention to the courses during OBC. In fact, we believed the rumor so much that the standard joke in my OBC class was, 'no need to worry about an Expert Infantry Badge – we'll be getting the Combat Infantry Badge within six months anyway.'

I never earned the CIB, the rumor was false, and I never got any closer to the Persian Gulf than Fort Benning.

Reception of the IRR platoon

After IOBC, and a week after the air war began, I arrived in Hawaii assigned to the 4th Bn, 27th Infantry 'Wolfhounds.' A week after unit in-processing, I was told I was getting the coveted job of Rifle Platoon Leader. Only after telling we three new Lieutenants this good news did the Battalion Commander explain the rest of the news: we were going to be leading a group of soldiers recently called back to active duty. These soldiers were members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

I had absolutely no knowledge of what the IRR was, and I can recall being surprised that no one in the unit seemed to have much more knowledge of the IRR than I. We eventually learned that the IRR is composed of former active duty soldiers who are kept on a list for recall to active duty in the event of an emergency requiring additional soldiers.

I was assigned an active duty Sergeant First Class as my Platoon Sergeant, and the two of us began the task of preparing for the arrival of the IRR soldiers. We had absolutely no knowledge of what background experiences these soldiers would have when they arrived. We were told the date the cohort would arrive from Fort Benning (where they had undergone physicals and in-processing), and we were also given a roster of ranks and names. When the IRR cohort arrived, both the scheduled date and the personnel roster turned out to be completely inaccurate.

The 30 IRR soldiers assigned to my platoon included no (Army) personnel over the rank of SGT / E-5. Four of the 30 were former Ranger Battalion soldiers; many others were former light infantry soldiers in regular Army units; a few were individuals who had been chaptered out of the Army for various reasons but still remained on IRR status (none had been chaptered for serious discipline

problems); and one was a Navy E-6 who somehow had been listed as an Army infantry soldier.

The most significant challenge early in this scenario was explaining to IRR soldiers who had been pulled away from college, jobs, and families that we had no realistic chances of deploying to the Gulf. The IRR soldiers were in Hawaii to act as fills within the 25th Infantry Division for the ninety soldiers of the 25th ID sent to the Gulf. They had believed that the Army had brought them back on active duty to fight the Iraqis. I got the unenviable job of explaining to them that unless there was an incident somewhere in the Pacific Rim, the only war they would see would be on CNN. Some seemed relieved to not be going to war, most were angry. They could not believe that they had to give up college classes, work, and civilian life to come back into the Army and be sent to Hawaii.

One specialist, a former Ranger Battalion soldier, was so outwardly angry that he was completely out of control. It was the first time I had seen a soldier completely lose his military bearing and was not something I had expected, nor did I feel prepared to handle the matter in such an open forum.

The Platoon Sergeant had to literally order him out of the room. They discussed his anger management in private. The Platoon Sergeant (PSG) later told me that he let the young man express his anger for a few minutes, and then simply told him that he was in the Army and his behavior was intolerable. (It was a great leadership example. The PSG removed the person so that his behavior stopped being disruptive, he then let him express his anger in a proper environment and then lastly explained the reality of the situation, and established himself as a leader without ever allowing for debate.)

Training the platoon

The initial training plan for this unit was to move from individual, to squad, then to platoon tasks. Unfortunately, because of the vast differences in skill levels, training this platoon was exceedingly difficult. The squad leaders were leaders only because of rank, but not because of any expert knowledge or leadership ability. For example, the former Navy E-6 knew absolutely nothing about being a squad leader, an infantryman, or about the Army in general. His soldiers were constantly teaching him and he proved to not be especially capable. We relieved him within a week and replaced him with the most competent Specialist (E-4) we had.

This new squad leader had never even been a team leader. He turned out to be a true natural leader and was one of the best squad leaders I have seen. His squad respected him because he was an expert in their eyes and they trusted him. Furthermore, they believed that he was looking out for them. (It was another lesson learned: rank is only as good as the person wearing it. I had always heard those types of clichés in ROTC (Reserve Officer Training Corps) and at IOBC, but when I saw it happen in that IRR platoon, I became a believer.)

During their time in the unit, the biggest focus for the IRR platoons was individual tasks. One of the most basic skills that we spent a massive amount of time on was marksmanship. We expected this to take days. It took almost two weeks to get everyone up to a standard similar to the rest of the battalion. Likewise, the remainder of the basic soldier individual tasks and individual infantry tasks took much longer to train than we had envisioned. Even the more experienced soldiers had difficulty in performing many of these tasks initially, while the less experienced, and those who had been out of the active Army for a year or more, took much longer. Equally varied were physical fitness levels. PT (physical training) was almost always done in ability groups due to the extreme differences in fitness levels.

Despite these problems with individual training, the soldiers were generally very motivated to train. The simple fact that the Army was at war seemed to make training much more relevant. From my perspective, officer training at IOBC, individual training within the IRR platoon, and collective training in the rest of the 'Wolfhounds' took on a much greater sense of urgency and salience than it did before or after the Gulf War. This increased emphasis on training by individual soldiers likewise made training events as a whole more successful.

Although generally motivated to train, a major difference between the IRR platoon and an active duty unit was the IRR unit's attitude about the temporary nature of the job. The soldiers were not at all motivated by professional or career goals. Their primary motivation was to *not* look bad in front of the others, or to not look like a 'slug.' For example, for many IRR soldiers a negative counseling statement was only bad because of one's own pride, and not because it would hurt the chance for a promotion. For the few who didn't care about pride, the star performers within the squad (and there were many) were generally able to provide enough peer pressure to generally keep them in line.

Re-deployment

Almost immediately after the Iraqi surrender in the Gulf, the IRR platoon was ordered back to Fort Benning, where it would later stand down and be sent back home. Interestingly, three of the ninety soldiers who had been recalled attempted to stay in the Army on active duty. Unfortunately, despite our best efforts to maintain these good soldiers on active duty, the Army refused their request and they were sent back home.

Although they underwent approximately five weeks of training, I do not believe this IRR unit was anywhere near combat ready. I believe it would have taken a minimum of ninety days before the platoon would have been able to be proficient in platoon collective tasks.

Conclusions

Although not part of the *combat experience* in the Gulf War, my experiences shows a part of the 'other side of the coin' for the Army that was not deployed.

The vast individual differences in the IRR cohort that arrived in the battalion show on a large scale the difficulty in mobilizing a nation for war. For example, not having a correct roster of incoming soldiers and receiving a former Navy NCO in an Army unit show how confusing this period was for many organizations and agencies.

On a more personal level, since that experience with the IRR and during the Gulf War period, I became much more aware of the importance of making training both realistic and relevant. Whether it is instilling competition in training events (e.g. 'we want to kick the hell out of the OPFOR [Opposing Force]'), or taking the time to convince subordinates of the value of training, the Gulf War, from my perspective, showed the importance of facilitating good training by making it both relevant and important to soldiers and leaders. Although extremely difficult to do in a 'peacetime' Army, when this is done it places training in the correct focus and context within units.

CONCLUSION

The lessons of DESERT STORM

General (Retired) Barry R. McCaffrey

For many Americans, memories from Operation DESERT STORM during the Persian Gulf War call up dramatic CNN images of anti-aircraft tracers lighting up the sky over Baghdad and hi-tech 'smart bombs' slamming into their aim-points on vehicles, bridges, and headquarters. Americans remember the war as a stunning military victory achieved in just a thousand hours over a well-armed, brutal, but ultimately dispirited and ineffective enemy. DESERT STORM is also captured in the American psyche as a just war – garbed in the legitimacy of the United Nations – that confronted a ruthless dictator and restored an independent nation. The political, military, and moral ambiguities perceived by many during the Vietnam War were largely absent from our collective understanding of the Persian Gulf conflict. Compared to Vietnam, Operation DESERT STORM was decisive, short, and strongly supported by the American people as well as the international community. Unfortunately, in the judgment of many senior Army and Marine leaders, the Gulf conflict also profoundly distorted public expectations concerning the costs of ground combat as well as the nature of modern warfare.

Our victory in the Persian Gulf War was not secured in only a few days fighting on land; the outcome was at least fifteen years in the making. The roots of our DESERT STORM victory were based on several crucial lessons from the Vietnam tragedy:

1. We must never again go to war without the full support of the American people.
2. In order to gain that support, we must put troops into combat only when America's national security interests are clear and can be explained convincingly. Our nation's strategic concerns, of course, cannot be limited to narrow, low-risk, short-term concerns.
3. Most importantly, once we commit ourselves to military operations, both the nation and the armed forces must be implacable in achieving our national security purpose.

America's political, industrial, and military leaders took advantage of the fifteen years between the end of our national involvement in Vietnam and the

start of DESERT SHIELD to shape our armed services into the most lethal and disciplined fighting force in the world. The national commitment of resources to create this battle force paid enormous dividends during the Persian Gulf War. Undeniably, the reinvention of our air-land-sea forces was largely driven by the need to deter or fight the huge Soviet ground formations menacing Western Europe. However, these sophisticated US military forces were extraordinarily effective in the desert where they were able to wreck Iraq's massive, well-equipped, but poorly employed forces.

In one hundred hours of ground combat, preceded by the most stunning air campaign in history, our seven US Army and two Marine combat divisions turned the fourth-largest army in the world into the second-largest army inside Iraq. This overwhelming Allied force used maneuver, deception, speed, and carefully targeted violence, which not only achieved its military objectives but also saved American lives and cut short what could have been a protracted struggle inflicting heavy losses on both sides. The US ground elements fought effectively and acted with compassion. Any doubts about the end result of this conflict were quickly dispelled as US combat formations, supported by massive levels of artillery and rocket fires, ripped apart an enemy armor threat that was first paralyzed and then blinded by unrelenting waves of Allied air strikes. Years of creativity and hard work produced the warfare technology, leaders, training systems, and Air-Land Battle Doctrine that insured our DESERT STORM victory. In fifteen years, the US armed forces won this thousand-hour *blitzkrieg* by undergoing a revolution in military affairs that was largely unseen by the American people until the lopsided victory of the Gulf War revealed its dimensions and power.

The human dimension

The military forces we mustered in the Persian Gulf represented the cream of American youth. Compared to any other military force our country ever deployed, the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines who fought in the desert were better educated (over 90 per cent were high school graduates), physically more capable, better trained (with hi-tech force-on-force live-fire exercises as well as battlefield simulations), and more situationally prepared for the operational environment they faced in battle. When compared to the armed forces of the late 1970s, the contrast is stark. In 1976-1981 when I served as a mechanized infantry battalion commander and executive officer in Germany, the Army routinely missed recruiting goals. Morale, readiness, and training were marginal: drug abuse, crime, and maintenance problems were high. During that sad era, all our military services struggled with similar devastating problems of uncertain readiness.

More than a decade was required to build the military force that America eventually watched with such pride during the Gulf conflict. Improved pay, benefits, and military facilities contributed to the sense that service in the armed

forces was a vital career worthy of our best and brightest young women and men. Cutting-edge warfare technology was clearly crucial. However, of greater importance was our focus on rebuilding the Noncommissioned Officer Corps, creating a physically fit and disciplined military culture, and rejecting the alcohol and drug abuse that had sapped the professional strength of the armed services and their leaders during the aftermath of Vietnam.

Warfare equipment and technology

Throughout the 1980s, US scientific research and development supported the defense industrial base to create and then field a number of revolutionary combat systems that were designed to overwhelm the best Soviet weapons and tactics. This modernized air-sea-ground warfare capability was a key component in our incredibly rapid destruction of the enormous, well-equipped, and experienced Iraqi military machine, which had been hardened by eight years of conflict with Iran as well as the brutal internal suppression of Shi'ites and Kurds. US defense critics derided many of these warfare systems as controversial during the years preceding the Persian Gulf War. For example, some defense skeptics questioned the survivability and utility of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. The M1 Abrams Main Battle Tank was deemed mechanically unreliable and logistically unsupportable because of its high fuel consumption and gas turbine engine. Several of our advanced weapons and other technological systems – including the Sea-Launched Cruise Missile, the F-117 Stealth Fighter, and much of our night vision and electronic warfare capabilities – never had been used in combat and had only been exposed to limited operational evaluation. Some critics condemned American military hardware as too complex and prone to failure under harsh conditions. The Soviets were routinely cited as a model of a more rational military-industrial process.

Fortunately, the cynics' concerns proved unfounded. Our enormous technological edge over Iraq translated into a decisive tactical advantage on all Persian Gulf battlefields. However, in my professional opinion, the US forces in DESERT STORM could have won the Gulf War decisively even if we swapped equipment with the Iraqi military. My viewpoint reflects two deeply ingrained, experience-based beliefs. First, sophisticated military technology requires highly effective, results-oriented training to exploit its capabilities. The Iraqi training regime that we observed during the DESERT SHIELD build-up was almost as pathetic as its strategic leadership. Secondly, the most important component of our US technological advantage was the blinding speed with which joint air and ground maneuver took place. This air–ground *blitzkrieg* minimized casualties. AirLand Battle Doctrine – the product of a decade of Air Force-Army debate and joint training – provided the organizing leadership and management principles that both services exploited with violent air-ground coordinated operations. The huge Iraqi war machine, however, was saddled with a military doctrine that

mixed the worst of Soviet set-piece, centralized decision-making with a World War I-style defensive infantry and fixed-obstacle tactics reminiscent of the Battle of Verdun.

US joint military doctrine

Doctrine plays a unifying conceptual role in the effective military employment of people, resources, and time. History demonstrates through countless tragic lessons that brave soldiers with great equipment can be paralyzed and defeated if they lack the doctrine to integrate and then leverage their advantages. The humiliation of the French armed forces by the Wehrmacht–Luftwaffe *blitzkrieg* during the opening moves of the German assault to the west during World War II certainly makes this point. Prior to DESERT STORM, the US Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines had invested years in attempting with some success to integrate their respective warfighting doctrines. This collective effort produced forward-looking, offense-based strategies that exploited US strengths and enemy weaknesses. For example, during the early 1980s the Army moved from a more reactive and static combat doctrine, labeled the 'Active Defense,' to what we labeled 'AirLand Battle' – with its focus on maneuver flexibility, synergy, and violence. The change in ground-force doctrine paralleled leadership training improvements in the Army as a whole. AirLand Battle's emphasis was on bold, coordinated ground and air offensive action and the exploitation of battlefield initiative. This doctrine was the decisive military advantage that made possible the one hundred-hour sledgehammer maneuver that characterized our 400-kilometer attack and consequent victory during DESERT STORM.

US joint training

Realistic and rigorously evaluated training during peacetime was the required glue to bond together our people, equipment, and doctrine into an effective fighting force. Beginning with the groundbreaking US Navy 'Top Gun' air combat training school, which was first put together during the Vietnam era, all the military services soon developed state-of-the-art force-on-force training centers and simulation exercises to link doctrine with new technological systems under realistic conditions. These training environments developed combat leaders whose personal and collective successes (and promotions) were based on brutal, demanding, and fully transparent battlefield exercises. The Army's National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California; the Air Force's Red Flag exercises at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada; the Marine Air Ground Combat Center at Twentynine Palms, California; and the Navy's instrumented sea warfare training in the Caribbean allowed a generation of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines to fight a 'bloodless war' and make fatal mistakes in a realistic battle laboratory – instead of in combat. There is no instant replay in warfare. But at the joint training

centers, combat leaders underwent a painful learning process that frequently damaged their egos but ultimately saved lives in war. A training atmosphere of candor, feedback, and defined outcome standards was critical to our triumph in DESERT STORM. No military force in history was as rigorously prepared for combat – under conditions that created high-fidelity, demanding battlefield environments – before the first shot was fired.

The military legacy of DESERT STORM

We should ask ourselves whether the battlefield lessons that contributed to the success of DESERT STORM are relevant ten years later. Military leaders throughout history have been criticized for fighting the last war in subsequent military engagements. If this axiom applies to the principles of DESERT STORM, then studying our template for the Gulf War victory would be at best a wasted intellectual exercise and at worse a prescription for defeat on some future battlefield. If we fix our doctrinal focus upon past successes, we could blind ourselves to rapidly evolving asymmetrical threats, which will target predictable US military doctrine, leadership, and equipment.

Political and military leaders from all the services are now doing the analytical work to shape the structure of America's armed forces for the coming two decades. The political-military challenge we face also has changed substantially, in complex and dangerous ways, since Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. Fortunately, the monolithic threat of the Soviet Union no longer exists. However, its political self-destruction and economic implosion re-created hostilities along ancient ethnic fault-lines. A host of bitter disputes have emerged among the former Soviet states and their adversarial neighbors – and even within the Russian Federation. In addition, with the Soviet disintegration the United States lost the central organizing national security threat that defined our Cold War forces and purpose. In the largest sense, this development is positive. For example, the political and military insanity of our grossly over-resourced nuclear deterrence capability is now being addressed rationally to reduce excessive atomic weaponry.

Some argue that the US doctrinal battlefield focus on European armored combat left us with a rigid air–ground force capability driven by the requirements of the rapid sea–air Time Phased Force Deployment (TPFD) to Europe. Many believe that our reserve forces are also still sub-optimized to focus on the invalid mission dictates of high-intensity war in Western Europe. However, our seriously overloaded American military is being called upon today to handle broader national security missions than simply waging total war. The armed forces are expected to tackle problems that range from peacekeeping operations to deterring the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Providing humanitarian aid, combating terrorism, and confronting the threat of international drug cartels and the organized-crime threat are among the support duties of our military. These

twenty-first-century missions are not collateral duties. They are central to national security – even by the most narrow of definitions. We must take these responsibilities seriously and restructure our doctrine, equipment, and leadership to succeed with these new missions. At the same time, we never should lose track of our core principle, which is to fight and win the nation's wars. Without question, we must remain prepared to project power and wage short-notice combat operations anywhere on the globe where America's vital security interests are seriously impaired. We will not have the luxury of garrisoning substantial military forces at all potential areas of conflict where we might be called upon to fight.

In view of these realities and our experience over the past ten years, what insights can we gain from DESERT STORM and apply to US military forces and operations in the future?

The human dimension

The United States armed forces will continue to require substantial numbers (1.5 million) of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines – and their tactical leaders who have motivation, military skills, and mental agility – to operate decisively in a complex, confusing, and dangerous international arena. As combat equipment becomes even more technologically sophisticated, we need broadly educated, literate, and highly trained people to operate and maintain these systems. Violent conflict in the twenty-first century will require global reach, rapid decision-making cycles, and an expansion of conventional notions of battlespace to embrace digital, space-based information systems. Overwhelming amounts of raw intelligence from a wide range of sensors could promote paralysis rather than decisive action by battle staffs. The ability of military leaders, at all levels, to assimilate real-time combat data and sort out vital information will be critical to operational success.

The politically sensitive nature of future battlefields will be driven by their increasing transparency to high-tech news media oversight. We will require military leaders who can function effectively under challenging conditions despite intense scrutiny from both international news sources and hostile political actors. We have seen firsthand how the actions of small military units or individual soldiers can quickly affect the public perception and outcome of peacekeeping or contingency operations. Near instantaneous global communication creates a political-military environment in which the tactical decisions of even junior non-commissioned officers can affect the politics shaping our national strategy. Furthermore, technologically advanced combat systems will put increasingly lethal, simplified weapons and targeting capabilities in the hands of both enemy and friendly small-unit leaders at the lowest levels. These operations are not going to be run successfully from Washington or a Joint CINC's (Commander-in-Chief) war room. The US armed forces must recruit and

train the best and brightest of America's young people and then instill in them a level of maturity and battlefield judgment that was previously expected only of more senior, seasoned servicemen and women.

Fortunately, America still produces enormous numbers of young people with great physical courage and leadership ability. Professionals of this caliber will not stay in the armed forces simply for high pay, dual-income opportunities, large military quarters, or predictable home-station time. Neither will they leave the service of their country primarily because they fear death or injury in combat. However, they will be unforgiving if we fail to provide the combat edge and confidence generated by demanding and realistic training, first-class technology, and a military culture based on trust, respect, and personal growth. We need to tell these young GIs and their leaders the truth about their national service: 'You are here to fight and perhaps lose your lives so that our open democracy can survive for another generation.'

Warfare equipment and technology

The development, acquisition, and fielding of US combat systems requires assumptions about next generation national security threats that will shape the resources and conceptual doctrine of our forces. Some military leaders may be nostalgic about losing the linear, historical predictability of a Soviet adversary that steadily produced increasing threat capabilities and symmetrically confronted our own force structure. Now the US military R&D world is conceptually adrift. The mayhem and brutality of modern global violence are a function of non-state armed militias, truck bombs, chemical weapons, cruise missiles, diesel submarines and high-speed missile boats, mines, booby traps, and massive amounts of cheap, extremely dangerous Warsaw Pact military hardware sloshing around the world's arms bazaars. Billions of dollars in drug money and international criminal activity fuel this lethal mixture. Finally, our own US equipment-technology doctrine cycle must be driven by the transportation-logistics requirements to deploy from the continental United States. We must be capable of successful combat operations on arrival – thousands of miles from home. We cannot resolve these terrible new threats to international security solely with sea-launched precision weapons and US-based air power. We currently have substantially the wrong force structure in the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force to achieve our expected military missions. America needs new defense concepts, enhanced resources, and a re-vitalized strategic political consensus to build a defense force geared for the war-fighting and peace-making functions we face in the twenty-first century. The threat environment we must confront is a stew of violence, revolution, AIDS, water shortages, income disparity, drugs, ethnic hatred, and the frequent failure of nation-states.

The challenge for US military and political leadership over the coming two decades will be to preserve the viability of our existing infrastructure while

developing the next generation of weapons, doctrine, and training. We know from experience that the major military systems procurement life cycle is fifteen years long. Significant overlap will exist between older combat systems that must be maintained while newer versions are developed and gradually integrated into the force structure. Most of our important combat systems are rapidly aging. As an example, the M1 Main Battle Tank entered the active inventory in the early 1980s while the F-15 Fighter began service with the First Tactical Fighter Wing in 1975. Without question, incremental technological improvements in many of these US battlefield systems have kept us as the preeminent military capability in the world. However, we must think beyond contemporary technology and force structures to envision what will be needed to dominate the battlefield of 2015.

Two national security principles will be the key for maintaining our current military dominance while anticipating future requirements. First, the US armed forces must continue to be prepared for the worst-case scenario: high-intensity conflict against a significant, determined enemy. Substantial, modern standing armies fielded by sovereign nation-states still pose the most significant, although less likely, threats to US vital interests. In the years preceding the Persian Gulf War, we organized most of our armed forces around this core commitment. The strategy worked. We prevailed both in DESERT STORM and without bloodshed in the face-off with the Warsaw Pact. The price of failure in a possible high-intensity conflict demands that we never allow our focus to drift from this central large-scale warfighting threat. We must *also* never walk away from the US requirement for an overmatching, flexible, and modernized strategic and tactical nuclear deterrence infrastructure.

Second, we must develop and procure warfare systems that are operationally relevant to realistic deployment scenarios from the continental US to a distant battlefield. We simply cannot count upon our enemies to allow us time for a six-month build-up, as was the case in DESERT SHIELD/STORM. We must substantially increase our resource investment in the capability to deliver decisive military force anywhere in the world on short notice. Major, sea-based, pre-positioned equipment stocks are an important part of the answer. However, the deployability design of ground and air military equipment systems is also crucial. The United States armed services must be transformed from a ground-based, forward-deployed force – reinforced by CONUS (Continental United States)-stationed assets – to a CONUS-centered air-ground force with global air- and sea-delivered reach. Of course, selected off-shore basing of our forces in some strategic areas of interest must be continued. Many vulnerable countries will welcome the stabilizing influence that a US military presence can bring to the threatened host region. However, we are increasingly less likely to support large-scale garrisoning of US forces along the fault-lines of potential military conflict as we did at the high-threat inter-German border for more than forty years. Our next generation of military equipment must be designed with this reality in mind.

We also need to re-think what seems to be a self-defeating political-military requirement – that each deployment of the armed forces be articulated to the American people with a publicly stated 'exit strategy.' This foreign policy notion has been an unmitigated disaster. We should commit US armed forces to war-fighting or peace-making missions only when we are determined to achieve our purpose – whether it entails shedding blood or staying fifty years as we have done through NATO. The elevation of the notion of an 'exit strategy' to the status of a strategic principle signals a weak commitment to national purpose. It also ensures that the elements of time and initiative are on the side of our enemies. Approximately 275 million Americans constitute the wealthiest nation on earth. We have created history's longest-running experiment in political and economic freedom. If we expect to preserve this freedom for ourselves and our Allies, then we must endorse the legitimacy of military sacrifice and provide the resources and political resolve necessary to ensure success.

Joint doctrine

The US military doctrine developed to defeat the Soviet Union during the Cold War served us well in DESERT STORM. This doctrine emphasized offensive initiative and the coordinated day-night employment of advanced-technology combat systems. Our battle doctrine was especially well suited for high-intensity operations against a rigid, brutal, and poorly led Iraqi force. In preparing for future conflicts on the high-intensity end of the spectrum, most of our same doctrinal AirLand Battle principles will continue to be valid. While refinements of existing doctrine are necessary (due primarily to technological advances), the fundamentals of US joint, synchronized, offensive action against large enemy organizations are unlikely to change.

Since DESERT STORM, however, the United States armed forces have also been called upon to engage in near continuous global 'operations other than war' involving humanitarian, counter-terrorist, peacekeeping and peacemaking actions as well as counter-drug support. These security responsibilities challenged the US military to develop new doctrine for dealing with contingencies on the low-intensity end of the operational continuum. Significant US military involvement in multi-national peacekeeping and peace-enforcement activities are likely to continue as a vital requirement of US national security for many years to come. We need to better learn how to employ all of our nation's military forces to maximal advantage in prosecuting these complex missions. Fortunately, since DESERT STORM the military services have continued to effectively develop our joint capabilities in doctrine and inter-operability. However, a substantial amount of creative integrative work remains to be done. Many defense critics compellingly argue that our military departments remain to some extent parallel and non-complementary force structures characterized by disconnected service doctrines. This situation also generates bitter turf battles over resources.

American national security leadership had better address and fix this situation in the coming five years or we risk getting our clocks cleaned by a brutal group of non-state thugs on some confusing, non-traditional, asymmetric battlefield.

The postulated employment of remote lethal targeting technology to wage war – followed by the non-opposed deployment of peacekeepers – has given rise to the hopeful but false belief that future wars can be fought with little or no loss of American lives. Technology seemingly allows us to remove ourselves from the suffering of war. We cherish the belief that we can simply push cruise missile buttons from over the horizon and then go to the video as technology surgically neutralizes a faceless enemy.

Absolute dependence upon high technology in pursuit of a bloodless war may encumber our warfighting doctrine with at least two major weaknesses. First, it will limit our ability to respond to the full range of potential conflicts. There is also great danger in communicating to potential foes that we have foreclosed the direct employment of ground combat troops in favor of options that present the least immediate risk to our forces. We cannot safeguard the American people and protect innocent populations if we try to achieve zero casualty force protection as our dominant priority. There are causes for which American soldiers should be willing to fight and die. Achieving the required end-game of our strategy must always dominate how we shape military options.

Military leaders must not be mesmerized and see in their most recent adversary the face of all future enemies. If a particular type of force, technology, or tactic soundly defeated an opponent on the last battlefield, we are tempted to ascribe these same vulnerabilities to future enemies. History tutors us to beware of building our national security on such shaky premises. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, guerrilla warfare, terrorist actions linked to drug money and international crime, and high-technology weapons will continue to make violent action an attractive means of pursuing otherwise impossible political ends. In responding to the wide range of upcoming threats, US doctrine must be flexible and comprehensive enough to exploit all of our military's operational resources.

A second national security danger resulting from the misguided belief in the possibility of bloodless war flows from elevating abstract notions of battlefield fairness or proportionality to the level of a military operational imperative. Americans have a strong sense of fair play and justice. Our humanitarian instincts lead us to abhor human suffering. This sensitivity is among our greatest strengths as a people. However, blindly applying the concepts of fairness and balance to the battlefield is inimical to our national security. History suggests that the denial of military experience and battlefield instinct will actually increase the long-term suffering inherent in combat rather than ameliorate it.

A military power that limits itself to the use of narrowly calibrated proportional force is an army in search of defeat. We don't go to war to put up a good fight; we go to win. We don't attack in kind; we attack with all kinds of

force at our disposal to break the enemy's will to fight and defeat him. By prosecuting warfare aggressively, we not only limit our own losses but shorten the conflict and thereby lessen the suffering of both civilian non-combatants and, in many cases, the enemy force itself.

When we fight, our troops clearly must act in full accordance with the international laws of war. We must respect the rights of prisoners and non-combatants. We are accountable to the American public and open to scrutiny from the press. Just as political leaders must explain the justness of our cause, military leadership should help the news media inform the public about the strategies we employ to protect the nation's interests. However, when the United States goes to war, commanders are entrusted with our most precious commodity: the lives of America's fighting men and women. Our national security leadership – from the President to the fire team leader – bears responsibility for achieving the nation's tactical and strategic objectives while safeguarding American lives.

Joint training

The increasing dominance of expensive, high-tech equipment on future battlefields will require commensurate increases in the quality of training for US joint forces. If we are to obtain maximum benefit from these advanced technologies, we should make an equivalent long-term resource commitment to GI and leader training, education, and career development. We should not assume that the qualitative military advantage we enjoy today, in terms of exclusive access to technologically advanced systems, will continue indefinitely. Potential battlefield adversaries will make every effort to diminish our technological edge by acquiring the advanced military systems with simplified operational requirements that are becoming increasingly available on the open market. In such a future threat environment, the joint training preparation required by US forces to employ technology in an integrated force structure will assume even greater importance.

To accomplish the array of national security missions our forces are likely to face, our training systems must be both tailored and flexible. Such training technology will warrant the expenditure of resources and leadership commensurate with the complexity of actual warfare. Simulations and high-fidelity virtual battlefields will become the preferred force-on-force joint training option. We will also have to recognize that the existing constrained force structure will frequently not allow us the luxury of strictly matching forces to contingencies. Commanders will have to deal with the operational expectation that their units may be called upon to go anywhere at any time for a range of possible missions. Realistic, rigorous, joint and combined arms training will have to produce cohesive teams that can adapt to rapidly changing operational environments.

In training as a team, we will be forced to concentrate first on the riskiest operations. We will not be allowed the luxury of neglecting preparations for high-intensity conflict simply because it appears to be the least imminent requirement. We cannot set aside the critical importance of training for all missions along the peace–war continuum. However, just as in equipment procurement and readiness, the price of training failure for high-intensity conflict would be unacceptable and bloody. Joint training for this possibility is our first responsibility. The good news is that, with proper transitional training, we can 'step down' to peacetime engagement activities easier than we can 'step up' to high-intensity conflict during war.

The training and professional development of our military must also accept the reality that significant US casualties may be unavoidable in defeating a determined and well-prepared enemy. We have no historical reason to expect that our next fight will repeat the miraculously low casualties of DESERT STORM. Force protection is synonymous with casualty minimization, not elimination. We must not allow the unrealistic goal of 'zero dead, zero missing, zero maimed' to jeopardize the security of the American people or the safety of vulnerable foreign populations under our protection.

Military conclusions of DESERT STORM

The lessons of DESERT STORM with respect to people, equipment, doctrine, and training must be applied thoughtfully to the challenges we will face as the world's greatest military force. US military leadership will need the organizational agility to respond to evolving threats faster and more competently than we have in the past. We must continue to accept the heavy burden of operations focused on peacekeeping and peace enforcement, humanitarian aid, economic containment and embargo enforcement, counter-terrorism, and illegal drugs. We must prepare for and expect a violent engagement against major organized military forces that might threaten Southwest Asia, Japan, Korea, Thailand, or Israel. We must also continue supporting multi-national military engagement designed to keep open sea and air routes for the global free-trade economic community, maintain access to energy supplies, and defend vital interests in Europe and the Americas.

We were fortunate in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM that a tactical military surprise (Iraq's invasion of Kuwait) did not translate into a decisive operational and strategic advantage for the enemy. In part, this fortunate outcome was due to Iraq's failure to capitalize aggressively on its initial attack. However, we should also give enormous credit to US political leadership that, over the past twenty years, prepared us to defeat the Soviet Union, and in doing so created the military capability to overwhelm the Iraqi armed forces. We must seek the same type of doctrine-technology-training-leadership dominance in the next war and not count upon our future foe to assist us through political-strategic miscalculation or ineffective military performance.

The US national security process should consider the lessons of DESERT STORM to prepare for future threats that will test America's capabilities and resolve. The security of our nation and the lives of men and women in uniform will depend absolutely upon the wisdom and organizational skill that we bring to bear upon these issues in the coming decade of strategic defense planning. The Department of Defense and the Congress owe this commitment to the American people.

REFERENCES

Bourque, Stephen A. and John S. Brown *Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army; Center of Military History, 2002).

von Clausewitz, Carl *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

Harmon, E. N. 'Notes on Combat Actions in Tunisia and North Africa,' unpublished paper.

Kamiya, Jason K. *A History of the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division Combat Team during Operation Desert Storm* (FT Stewart, GA: 24th ID, 1991).

Keegan, John *The Face of Battle* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1976).

Marshall, S. L. A. *Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000).

Scales, Robert H. Jr. *Certain Victory* (Washington, DC: Office of Chief of Staff, 1993).

Swain, Richard M. *'Lucky War': Third Army in Desert Storm* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Command and General Staff College Press, 1997).

24th Mechanized Infantry Division Combat Team, *Attack Plan OPLAN 91-3* (Fort Stewart, GA: Department of the Army, 1991).

INDEX

Abdulmomen, Brigadier General 67
Abdulsalam (recruit) 66
'Active Defense' 184
Advanced Non-Commissioned Officers Course 127
'Agent Oil' 95
AGS (light armored battalion) 50
Ahmed, MAJ 65
Air Force 2, 3, 46, 184, 187; Central Command (CENFTAF) 84; Red Flag exercises 184
Air Ground Combat Training Center 3, 184
Air Warfare Center 3
Air-Land Battle Doctrine 182, 183, 184, 189
Algomdi, M. 63
Alpha Section 124, 125
Ambr (recruit) 66
Ammunition Supply Point 121
Annual Training 60
Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) 13, 14
anti-tank (TOW) company 45
Apache (helicopter) battalion 2, 45, 47, 49
Area Support Groups (ASGs) 58–9
armored gun system 49
Army 2, 3, 184, 187
Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT) 83, 84, 86, 87, 90, 97; Deception planning 94; Forward G2 95; G2 analysis staff 89; Provost Marshall 93
Army Infantry School 26
Army Reserve Unit (USAR) 56, 58, 59, 61, 75, 141, 145
Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) 16
Army Training Program 15
Army Transformation 50
ATGMs 16, 20, 23
Awwad (recruit) 65

B-2 bombers 2
Baez, SSG P. 125, 126, 132
Basic Non-Commissioned Officers Course 127
Battle Damage Assessment 90
Bertubin, PFC 110
Big Red One *see* 1st Infantry Division 3rd Brigade
Bloss, C. 85
Blue Force (BLUFOR) 3–4
Bravo Section 123, 124, 125, 130
Brown, Brigadier General J.S. 11–24
Buchanan, SSG T. 124
Bullington, CPT J. 85
Burns, SSG W. 111
Bush, G. 33, 46, 133

casualty reporting system 134
Central Command (CENTCOM) 45, 74, 86, 87, 88, 90, 92, 93, 97; 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment 118
Chamberlain, LTC B. 40
Charlie Company 166, 170
Clausewitz, C. von 106
coalition forces 90
combat experience 127
Combat Service Support 79
combat support missions 77–88
Combined Training Centers 42
Command, Control and Communications (C3) 21–2
Command Post Exercises (CPX) 45, 46, 58–9, 60

Command Sergeant Major 20
common operational picture 96
Conkle, Private 156, 160–1
Continental United States (CONUS) 28, 31, 188
Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) Ridgeway 118
Corps: Battle Staff 79; Combat Support 79; Holding Cage 79; Support Group 67
Crowder, CW3 H. 90
Crutcher, SSG W. 122
Current Situation 90

Daly, LTC J. 127, 131, 132
Darling, SGT D. 84
Deception planning 94
DEFORGER 58
Department of Defense 96
deployment 27–9, 77
DESERT CALM (Operation) 97
DESERT FAREWELL (Operation) 57
DESERT SHIELD (Operation) 4, 182, 183, 188, 192; and 19th Engineer Brigade 150; and 21st TAACOM (CA) 57, 74, 75; and 37th Engineer Battalion 167; and 82nd Airborne Division 45, 46, 47, 48; and 493rd Supply and Service Company 140, 147; and 513th MI Brigade 97; and Task Force 2–18 27, 29, 30–1, 42
DESERT STORM 3, 4, 6, 18, 181–93; and 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment 122; and 14th Military Police Brigade 77; and 19th Engineer Brigade 149, 150; and 21st TAACOM (CA) 56, 57, 58, 64, 74, 75; and 37th Engineer Battalion 167, 170, 174; and 82nd Airborne Division 45, 47, 48, 49; and 493rd Supply and Service Company 142, 147; and 513th MI Brigade 88, 90, 93, 97; human dimension 182–3, 186–7; joint doctrine 189–91; joint military doctrine 184; joint training 184–5, 191–2; military conclusions 192–3; military legacy 185–6; and Task Force 2–18 31–41, 42, 43; warfare equipment and technology 183–4, 187–9
DeStefano, LT J. 108, 111
Digbie, SSG 110
Division Collecting Point 79
Division Ready Brigade (DRB) 45, 46, 50
Domenic, SGT M. 94
Dukame (recruit) 66

Eagle Troop of 2nd Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment 105–17, 130
Eastern Area Command 46
Echelon Above Corps (EAC) 89
Eid (recruit) 66
18th Airborne Corps 26
18th Military Police Brigade 77
XVIII Airborne Corps 25, 38; and 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment 118; and 21st TAACOM (CA) 60, 61, 74; and 37th Engineer Battalion 166, 167, 168, 169, 172; and 82nd Airborne Division 44, 45, 46, 48, 49; and 513th MI Brigade 86; and Eagle Troop of the 2nd Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment 107
89th Military Police Brigade 77
82nd Airborne Division 25, 29, 44–51, 120, 121–2; and 37th Engineer Battalion 167, 168, 169, 172, 173–4
87th Maintenance Battalion 139
Embassy Regional Security Team 93
Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise Program 46
'end run' 34
Enemy Prisoner of War operations 49, 76, 86, 112, 126; 14th Military Police Brigade 79–82
Explosive Ordnance Detachment (EOD) 173, 174

F117 stealth fighters 2
F Troop 107
F-14 aircraft 2
F-15 aircraft 2
F-16 aircraft 2
F/A-18 aircraft 2
faith in combat 98–9
Fasal, MAJ 65
Feltman, SGT B. 109
Ferguson, WO1 95
Fielder, CPL L. 131–2, 134, 135
Field Training Exercises (FTXs) 60
54th Engineer Battalion, 1st Armored Division 118
Fighter Weapons School (Top Gun) 3
fire support, indirect 127–8
1st Armored Division 11, 68, 118, 149

1st Cavalry Division 167
1st Infantry Division 32, 94, 112, 142; DISCOM 144–5
1st Mechanized Infantry Division 1st Brigade 12
1st Mechanized Infantry Division 3rd Brigade (Big Red One) 11, 12
1st Platoon 108, 109, 110, 112, 122
1st squadron 130
513th MI Brigade 83–101; challenges 96; EAC 89; lessons learned 97–9; operations 89–95; pre-deployment expectations 86–95; pre-deployment training, planning and preparations 84–6; set-up 86–9; Task Force Freedom 95–6
V Corps 76, 78
Flowers, COL R. 84, 170, 174–5
focus 98
Forces Command 85
45th Infantry Division 39
47th FSB 144
Forward G2 95
493rd Supply and Service Company 139–48
14th Military Police Brigade 76–82; deployment concept 77; Enemy Prisoner of War operations in Desert Storm 80–2; Enemy Prisoner of War planning 79–80; initial combat support missions 77–8; training concept 78–9
4th Battalion 176, 177, 179
4th Platoon 108
4th Special Forces unit 66
Franks, GEN F. 107
fratricide 129–35
Friesen, CPT B. 129–30, 132

G2 analysis staff 89
G Troop 107, 108, 112
G-day 149
Gage, CPL A. 123
Garrison, SPC T. 126, 128
Gauthier, LT T. 108, 109, 115
General Defense Plan 29, 30
Geneva Conventions 79
Gifford, LT J. 111
Global Positioning System 2, 22–3, 108, 113, 130
Government Accounting Office 132
graves registration (GREEG) platoons 66–7, 68
Griffin, LT 145
Gulf Cooperation Council 84, 87

Haider (recruit) 66
Hamilton, 1LT M. 108
Harmon, MAJ GEN E. 106, 116
Harris, SGT M. 109
Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT) 16, 22
Hedenskog, SPC C. 110
HET movement 122
Hillen, LT J. 111
Holder, COL L.D. 111
Host Nation: Activities 64; Office 69; Officers 61; Section 66, 75; Support 55, 56, 57–8, 61, 63; Support Forward (KKMC) 61, 62; Support Main 61; Team 68
Hovey, CPT P. 126
Huber, COL M. 166–75
human dimension 182–3, 186–7
Hunt, SGT B. 126
Hussien (recruit) 66

I Troop 112, 118, 122, 123–4, 126, 128, 130
Individual Ready Reserve 176–80; re-deployment 179; reception of Platoon 177–8; training 178–9
Infantry Officer Advanced Course 108
Infantry Officer Basic Course 177, 178, 179
Infantry School 27
information 98
Intelligence Center 94, 95, 96, 98
Intelligence Preparation for the Battlefield Team 90
intelligence summary 90
interim brigade combat teams 50
INTERNAL LOOK 90 45, 46, 84, 97
Iraqi Armed Forces 65
Iraqi Freedom (Operation) 4, 6, 133, 135
Iverson, CW3 84
Iwicki, CPT S. 90

Jasem (recruit) 66
Johnson, LG (Retired) J. 44–51
Joint Chiefs of Staff 85
Joint Command 66
joint doctrine 189–91
Joint Endeavor (Operation) 59, 75
joint military doctrine 184
Joint Readiness Training Center 46, 48

joint training 184–5, 191–2
journals 99

K Troop 130
Kagan, F.W. 1–7
Keegan, J. 106
Kennedy, SSG J. 122
Kestel, SFC C. 151, 161–4
Al-Khalad Al Sabah, General J. 64
King, WO1 J. 84
Klotz, LT J. 90
Koch, SGT 109, 110
Kubik, MAJ C. 149-65
Kuwaiti Army Reserve 65

L Troop 130
Larson, PFC D. 120
Laudeman, Dr LC (Retired) K. 55–75
Lawrence, SGT D. 109
leadership 134
Lee, SPC M. 116
Leide, BG 90
Lemke, CPT T. 90
live fire exercises (LFXs) 49
Logistics Command Center 58
Lombardo, CPT A. 88
Luck, LTG G. 118, 127, 128

M1 tanks 2, 3, 5, 25
M1A1 tanks 12, 13, 14, 15, 18–19, 21, 22, 23, 113
M2 Bradley infantry 13–14, 18–19, 22
M3 Bradley battalion 2, 16, 20
M16 marksmen 20
M88A1 Medium Recovery Vehicles 13
M113 Armored Personnel Carriers 25, 26
M240 machine guns 13, 16
M977 HEMMTS 16
McCaffrey, GEN (Retired) B.R. 28, 31, 38, 181–93
MacGregor, MAJ D. 111
McLane, LT A. 130, 134
McMaster, COL H.R. 105–17
McNamara, LTC T. 85
McReynolds, SSG J. 109, 115
Main Supply Route 76, 77, 168, 169
MARCENT 90
Marines 3, 46, 107, 184, 187; Air Ground Combat Center 184
Marshall, S.L.A. 157–8
Martin, MAJ B. 129
Martinez, SPC R. 115
Merryman, LTC V. 91
Metzger, WO1 T. 90
Military Academy 4, 147
Military Police 73
Military Training Mission 88
Miller, CAP D. 112
Miller, CW3 S. 90
Ministry of Defense 87
Mission Cycle 46
Mission Essential Task List 49
Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) 119
Mohad (recruit) 66
Mohammed, MAJ 108, 112, 113, 114
moral courage 99
Morgan, SGT T. 123, 124
Morris, SGT 66
multidiscipline counter intelligence threats 90
Multiple-Launch Rocket System 2

Nasser, COL 63
National Guard 3, 58, 59, 78, 145
National Training Center 3, 4, 16, 184; 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment 119; 82nd Airborne Division 48; Task Force 2–18 26, 28, 29
Navy 2, 3, 46, 184, 187; Top Gun 184
Nayef (recruit) 65
NBC 16, 30, 60
Negin, MAJ J.J. 118–35
Nighthawk 35 126
19th Engineer Brigade 149–65; platoon sergeant paradox 161–4; ranger leadership 150–5; trust 156–61
96th CA Battalion 61
Non-Commissioned Officers 19–22
Norfolk, Battle for 11–24
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 79, 189
Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) environment 29

Oakley, COL F.P. 85
Objective: Brown 38, 39, 168; Gold 172; Purple 168, 169, 172; Saturn 172
Ocon, PFC K. 125
Officer Basic Course 159
Officer Candidate School 151
Olson, Major General E.T. 25–43

101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) 25, 37, 38, 39, 120, 167; and 82nd Airborne Division 46, 47
159th Support Group 139, 141–2
174 (IC) Mission 90
194th Armored Brigade (Separate) 149
197th Infantry Brigade (Sledgehammer Brigade) 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 34, 36, 37, 38, 41
Opposing Forces (OPFOR) 3

Pagonis, General W. 55, 66, 74
Patriot anti-aircraft missile system 2
Petschek, LT M. 108, 109, 112
POL (Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants) Platoon 142–3, 144, 146–7
Pomager, COL (Retired) R.A. 76–82
POMCUS (pre-positioning material configured to unit sets) 58
pre-deployment expectations 86–95
pre-deployment training, planning and preparations 84–6
Primary Leadership Development Course 127
Prisoner of War Camp 79
Provost Marshall 93

Quality Dragon (Operation) 86
Quartermaster Officer Basic Course 140

ranger leadership 150–5
Rashad, COL 65
rear area threat summary (RATSUM) 91, 96
Rear Operations Team 83, 89, 90, 94
Recovery Military Occupational Specialty 21
'Red Team' 3
re-deployment 179
refuel on the move 142–3
Regimental Association 32
Republican Guard 11, 12; and 21st TAACOM (CA) 66; and 82nd Airborne Division 44; and Eagle Troop of 2nd Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment 105, 106, 107, 108, 114, 115; and Task Force 2–18 25, 33–4, 40, 43
Reserve Officer Training Corps 178
Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) 57–8, 119, 120
Rifles Six 125, 126
Rios, SFC E. 126
Robeson, W. 95
Royal Saudi Land Forces 86
RSLF (Royal Saudi Land Forces) building 91, 92
Ruch, SSG S. 124–5, 130, 132

Saad (recruit) 66
Saddam Fedayeen 6
Saddam Hussein 33, 34, 66, 70, 84, 133
safety 128
Salaam (recruit) 65
Sandoval, MAJ C.C. 83–101
Sartiano, CAP J. 107
Sartorius, J. 85
Sayles, ISG K. 122, 134
Schoomaker, SFC P. 122
Schwarzkopf, General 44, 85
SCUD launches 91
2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment 11, 12, 15, 78, 118, 142; *see also* Eagle Troop
2nd Armored Division 106; Tiger Brigade 107
2nd Armored Division (Forward) 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18
2nd Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment *see* Task Force 2–18
2nd Brigade, 1ID 96
2nd Infantry Division 97
2nd Platoon 108, 169, 170
2nd Squadron *see* Eagle Troop
Senate 132
7th Engineer Brigade 149
73 Easting, Battle of 105–17
VII Corps 11, 12; and 2nd Advanced Cavalry Regiment 118; and 14th Military Police Brigade 76, 80, 82; and 19th Engineer Brigade 149; and 21st TAACOM (CA) 60, 61–2, 66, 74; and 24th Infantry Division 118; and 37th Engineer Brigade 168; and 82nd Airborne Division 44, 48; and 493rd Supply and Service Company 139, 140, 142; and 513th MI Brigade 86, 94; Battle staff 80; and Eagle Troop of 2nd Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment 105, 107, 108; G-4 80, 81
Shehri Brigadier General 63
Sheridan battalion 45, 48
Sherman tank 3
Shields, LTC R. 149

Sholly, COL R. 61
single points of contact 61
6th Light Armored Division (French) 47, 166, 167
66th Military Intelligence Company 123
Skarbowski, CPT 90
SOCCENT (Special Operations Command Central) 90
Special Forces Command 61
Sprowls, CAP T. 107
Standing Operating Procedures 121
Starr, COL D. 123–4, 125, 126–7
Stouder, LTC R. 31
support from home 98

T-55 tanks 13, 16, 20, 22, 23
T-72 113
Tank company 130
Tank Table VIII 16
Tank Table XII engagement 16
Targeting Team 90
Task Force 89
Task Force 2-18 (2nd Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment 25–43; deployment 27–9; Desert Shield (Operation) 30–1; Desert Storm (Operation) 31–41
Task Force 2–69 38, 41
Task Force 174 (Intelligence Center) 89
Task Force Freedom 95–6
Tatarka, MAJ C. 176–80
Taylor, PFC J. 115
Team D/2-18 37
Team Delta 40
technology 183–4, 187–9
3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment 47, 118–35, 166, 167; first firefight 122–8; fratricide at Ar Rumaylah airfield 129–35; preparing for combat 119–22; waiting for ground war to commence 128–9
3rd Armored Division 11, 71, 72
3rd Commando regiment 40
3rd Infantry Division 144
3rd Platoon 108, 110, 115, 118, 122, 123–4, 126, 128, 130
3rd Squadron 108, 112, 122, 130
37th Engineer Battalion 166–75; background 167–8, 170, 172; challenge 168, 170, 172–3; situation 168–9; solution 168–9, 171, 173–4
304th CA Group 61, 66
Tiger Brigade 107
Time Phased Force Deployment 85, 185
training 78–9, 97–8, 127, 178–9; joint 184–5, 191–2
Training Cycle 46
trust 156–61
Truxton, MAJ C. 85
12th Armored Division 37th Brigade 12
20th Engineer Brigade 166, 170
25th Infantry Division 176, 178, 179
21st Theater Area Army Command (TAACOM CONUS Augmentation) (CA) 55–75
24th Infantry Division 118, 120, 121, 122, 167
24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) (Combat Team) (Victory Division) 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, 36, 37, 38, 41–2; and 82nd Airborne Division 44, 47–8
22nd Support Command 55, 57, 59, 61, 62, 75; Forward 55, 56, 57, 74, 75
27th Infantry Regiment 176, 177
2-18 Scout platoon 37
202nd Military Intelligence Battalion 86
297th Operations Battalion (Provisional) 90

UH60 Blackhawk transport helicopter 2
Unit Conduct of Fire Trainer (UCOFT) 15
United Nations 1
United States Army Europe (USAREUR) gunners 16
United States Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) 90

Valentine, CPL M. 126, 128
Vann-Olejasz, MAJ S.L. 139–48
Virrill, SGT B. 112

Walter, SSG 95, 96
warfare equipment 183–4, 187–9
Warsaw Pact 188
wingman cover 127